



**Catholic Relief Services/Senegambia
Development Activity Program (DAP)
FY2002-FY2006**

MID-TERM EVALUATION REPORT

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SO2: Increased effectiveness of FFP's PVO and Mission partners in carrying out Title II development activities with measurable results related to food security, with a primary focus on household nutrition and agricultural productivity.

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Acronyms

7A	L'Appui à l'Autoformation des Adultes Appliquée à l'Action par Alternance et en Alternative- passage incontournable-Marewe, Casamance, Sénégal
ADB	African Development Bank
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
AAJAC	<i>Association Africaine de la Jeunesse Agricole et Culturelle</i>
AP	Promotion Agents
ASSOLUCER	<i>Association pour la Lutte contre l'Exode Rural</i>
CERAAS	<i>Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches pour l'Amélioration de l'Adaptation a la Sécheresse</i>
CIG	Communication-Information-Gestion Cabinet
CMC	Community Management Committee
CRD	Central River Division
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
D	Dalassis
DAP	Development Activity Program
DRDR	<i>Direction Régionale du Développement Rural</i>
FADECBA	<i>Fédération des Associations de Développement Communautaire de Balantacounda</i>
FANTA	Food and Nutrition Technical Assistance
FCFA	<i>Franç Communité Financière Africaine</i>
FDGPF/B	<i>La Fédération Départementale des Groupements de Promotion Féminine de Bignona</i>
FENPROSE	<i>Fédération Nationale de Producteurs de Sésame</i>
FFP	Food for Peace
FFW	Food for Work
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FRAO	<i>Fondation Rurale pour l'Afrique de l'Ouest</i>
FY	Fiscal Year
GADEC	<i>Groupe d'action pour le développement communautaire</i>
GAFNA	The Gambian Food and Nutrition Association
GIE	<i>Groupement d'Intérêt Economique</i>
IGA	Income Generating Activities
IR	Intermediate Result
LRD	Lower River Division
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MIS	Market Information System
MT	Metric Tons
NARI	National Agriculture Research Institute
NAWFA	National Women Farmers Association
NEC	National Executive Committee (NAWFA)
NEW	NAWFA Extension Workers
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
PADFSE	<i>Programme d'Appui au Développement de la Filière Sésame</i>
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
PRIMOCA	<i>Projet Intégré de la Moyenne Casamance</i>

RSOD	Rural Support Organization for the Disabled
SGA	Sesame Grower's Association
SO	Strategic Objective
SSO	Sub-Strategic Objective
URD	Upper River Division
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Program
WSB	Wheat Soybean Blend

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Executive Summary

Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and its Partners are implementing a joint country Title II Development Activity Program (DAP) for FY 2002-2006 in the most vulnerable regions of Senegal and The Gambia (referred to as Senegambia). The Senegambia DAP seeks to address some of the underlying causes of food insecurity and to mitigate its impact on the most vulnerable members of the population¹.

The overall **goal** of the Senegambia DAP is to **improve the level of food security of targeted rural households and vulnerable groups in Senegal and The Gambia by 2006**. The goal will be achieved through activities focused on achieving two strategic objectives:

- Strategic Objective 1: Improved economic access to food for farm households engaged in sesame production in targeted areas in Senegal and The Gambia by 2006.
- Strategic Objective 2: Increased availability of food for vulnerable persons in Senegal and The Gambia by 2006.

The Senegambia DAP is being implemented in adjacent regions of Senegal and The Gambia: Kolda and Tambacounda in Senegal; and in The Gambia, Lower River Division (LRD), Central River Division (CRD) and Upper River Division (URD). CRS Partners in Senegal are: GADEC, ASSOLUCER, 7A for the sesame component; CARITAS Tambacounda and CARITAS Kolda for the safety net component. In The Gambia, CRS Partners are NAWFA for the sesame component and GAFNA for the safety net component.

A mid-term evaluation of the Senegambia DAP was conducted from January 27 to February 20, 2005. The purpose of the evaluation was to assess the progress made toward meeting program objectives as well as to review the organizational structures and systems in place for project implementation. Working closely with CRS and partner staff, the evaluation team was to identify problems and constraints, and develop actionable recommendations to improve the project's design and implementation. The mid-term evaluation team was composed of a team leader (independent consultant) and a marketing specialist (CRS/Burkina Faso). It was assisted by two resource persons from Food For Peace Washington and Dakar.

The results of the mid-term evaluation are presented in this document as a report of the joint country program which includes information on both components, Sesame and Safety Net. An additional document with a more detailed analysis of the sesame component is also available.

Progress Toward Achieving Program Objectives

¹ In the DAP, vulnerable segments of the population have been defined as: malnourished children (6 months – 3 years), the severely disabled, single female heads of households, and the chronically ill (people living with HIV/AIDS and Tuberculosis).

Strategic Objective 1. Improved economic access to food for farm households engaged in sesame production in targeted areas in Senegal and The Gambia by 2006.

In both Senegal and the Gambia, the DAP program has been able to successfully increase farm gate prices, enabling growers to have a fair price for their produce and to increase their agricultural income. As indicated in the FY04 results report, the ratio of farm gate price to export price increased from 31% in FY02, to 38% in FY03, and 46% in FY04. Increased farm gate prices have resulted in an increase in the number of farmers growing sesame and in an increase in the area cultivated in both countries. As a result, during the 2003/2004 campaign, a total of 554 Metric Tons (MT) (294.9% achieved vs target) was marketed through collection centers in The Gambia and Senegal.

An analysis of production costs, transaction costs and prices at each level of the marketing channel indicates that net margins at the farmer level are high and that the efficiency rate is around 22.80% for both Senegal and for The Gambia. In contrast, net margins are significantly lower at the export company level with efficiencies of 5% in Senegal and in The Gambia, the efficiency is negative. This analysis indicates that the farmer price may be at a maximum and that in order to ensure market efficiency DAP partners will need to refrain from price speculation particularly with international market prices for sesame falling.

Sub Strategic Objective 1.1: Sesame Collection Centers are operating as market venues to improve market stability and efficiency.

Eight collection centers (5 in The Gambia, 3 in Senegal) have been renovated, staffed and are fully functional as of September 30, 2004. This represents 66.7% of the FY04 target (12 centers). Centers were supplied with the equipment necessary for cleaning, bagging, weighing and tagging sesame for shipment. Thirty-seven collection center operators were trained in the operation and maintenance of machines and 18 people were trained in record keeping and inventory control. This represents about 60% of the target due to the fact that the training and hiring follow the rhythm of the center establishment and the installation of the machines.

Of the 8 collection centers which have been established, six were visited during the evaluation (3 in Senegal, 3 in The Gambia). All but one had record keeping and inventory control systems in place. At some centers, it was difficult to find the information, notes and data were recorded in various notebooks which were not all archived together. None of the collection centers were being utilized to their full capacity. Operational costs are high and those in The Gambia will not be sustainable without continued support from CRS.

Transaction costs are high for farmers and associations because of the great distances between the collection centers and the production centers. While the DAP intervention zone is larger than that of The Gambia, only 3 cleaning machines have been set up there so that some farmers must travel 100 km or more to a collection center. Many associations have been unable to purchase sufficient quantities of sesame because they

have problems pre-financing the marketing campaign. At least one association has buyers who have their own machines and therefore would prefer to buy uncleaned sesame.

73% of sesame growers are aware of the sesame prices before coming to sell their sesame. This is because the DAP partners in Senegal and The Gambia have been very successful in using various media to communicate the prices they have set: Television, radio, posters, farmer meetings. Only 7.7% of sesame growers can correctly identify the location of the nearest collection center. This means that the collection centers are not able to efficiently perform their functions either as market venues or as sources of marketing information. As a result, CRS and its partners have readjusted the strategy, focusing on buying points and assembly points which have reduced the costs of marketing.

Sub Strategic Objective 1.2: Farmers' associations provide policy, advocacy, marketing, production and information services and training to members.

The FY04 results report indicated that 50% of SGA/Farmer association members interviewed were satisfied with their experience being a member of the association. The management matrix score from questionnaires administered to SGA committee members indicated that there is a need for more training so that they can better support their members.

Most SGAs and Associations are well structured and legally recognized. Some are democratically governed but many are not. Members participate actively in Association meetings. There is literacy program for association members in the Gambia, but not in Senegal.

Of the 4 DAP partners, 2 are grass root membership organizations (ASSOLUCER and NAWFA) and 2 are Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) (GADEC and 7A). The goal of the 2 NGOs is to build the capacity of the Unions and Federations farmers' groups with which they work. 7 Village level organizations have received support from GADEC for reorganization and legal recognition. 3 have already gotten legal recognition as *Groupeement d'Intérêt Economique* (GIE) and 2 are in their way to being recognized. All 7 Associations' group members were trained in organizational development including: group leadership, how to conduct meetings, role of group members, how an organization functions, etc. Once the groups are legally recognized and functioning, GADEC will accompany them in the creation of a federation of sesame growers which may in the long run join FENPROSE, the nascent national federation of sesame growers.

7A reinforces the management capacity and the governance of the structures, which now includes groups and federations. It currently works with *Fédération ADC Ninamba* and *Union de Kento* and as well as several village groups. The Union and the Federation are well structured, legally recognized and democratically managed.

The grass root membership organizations, as partners, are responsible for building the capacity of the farmers groups which are their members. As membership

organizations, they should benefit from capacity building activities also. ASSOLUCER is composed of 86 groups. 18 of them have an annual plan, and 59 have by-laws.

The National Women's Farmer Association (NAWFA) is a membership-based organization in The Gambia comprising 74 SGAs and operating in 1,070 villages with an estimated membership of 48,000 (Sonko and Ceesay 2004). Most of the village-based women farmers' groups, Kaffos, have registered with NAWFA and/or the Attorney General's Department or elsewhere. The SGAs, the district level structures, are recognized and respected structures for women. Increasingly, the SGAs are providing voice and choice to women. They serve as conduits for disseminating information to their respective Kaffos as well as mobilizing and channeling development resources to women, most of which now come from NAWFA.

Overall, although the SGAs and Associations visited in The Gambia and Senegal seem to be well structured and to have strong leadership, capacity building remains important, particularly at the grass root level. Illiteracy is high among the association members and financial management aspects need to be reinforced.

Until recently, there hasn't been a national organization in Senegal which could provide leadership to advocate for association members' interests. CRS Senegal has supported the creation of the *Fédération Nationale des Producteurs de Sésame* (FENPROSE). It is made of 5 Associations in the Kolda and Ziguinchor regions. While it's already recognized as a *Groupeement d'Intérêt Economique* (GIE), its vision and mission still need to be clarified. Because it is only a nascent organization, it has not been in a position to represent sesame growers concerns to key government agencies.

In The Gambia, NAWFA has actively intensified its land advocacy campaign to promote women's access to land. One village chief who is head of the advocacy committee reported that thanks to this campaign, all 23 women's groups in his village have been allocated land ranging from 1-2 ha or less, depending on the size of the association. Another land advocacy committee member in Njau, CRD-North, indicated of 82 kafoos in the area, 2 have received permanent land for sesame farming. The others were given land nearby the villages, which is a good step towards having permanent access to land.

Sub Strategic Objective 1.3: Research is conducted to identify and reduce the costs of, and constraints to marketing; to improve the post harvest handling practices; and to increase productivity of sesame farmers.

The FY04 results report indicated that 35% of farmers have adopted two or more recommended production techniques. Several factors have made the application of the best practice technical package difficult, particularly by women. These include: the lack of appropriate farming implements; competition for farmers' time at key points in the cropping season; and inadequate extension service support for sesame. A study on the costs of production was conducted and a comparative analysis was made of sesame production and other crops. Based on research results, three sesame varieties have been recommended in The Gambia. Both programs (Senegal and The Gambia) have produced extension messages and training materials which have incorporated the research/study results.

Strategic Objective 2: Increased availability of food for vulnerable persons in Senegal and The Gambia by 2006.

All beneficiaries interviewed during the MTE expressed their gratitude for having received the food. For some, having someone take an interest in their well being was a source of courage and hope.

Sub Strategic Objective 2.1: Food is distributed to vulnerable individuals.

According to the FY04 results report, 1,273 MT of the total LOA 3,959 MT have been distributed to date (32% of LOA target). Given the late startup of Safety Net Activities (March 2003), these results are on-target and consistent with a program in its second year of activity. Of the food distributed, approximately 60% has been distributed in The Gambia and 40% in Senegal. During the DAP design, it was assumed that more food would be distributed through institutions than through communities. Over the life of the project, the proportions have been modified so that currently 80% is distributed through communities and 20% through institutions.

The ration size and type are not tailored to the different beneficiary categories. According to the DAP document, the ration is to provide 100% of the caloric intake for the chronically ill in an institution and 20% of the caloric intake for the vulnerable person plus four family members in the community. The amount of food distributed to each beneficiary, regardless of category, is the same: 7.2 kg yellow corn, 0.49 kg of lentils, 0.69 kg vegetable oil, and 6.8 kg of wheat soybean blend (WSB). There is no special allocation for malnourished children, the largest beneficiary category in The Gambia. Other issues related to the size and type of ration are: the difficulty of accurately measuring the rations; the cost and time for transforming the yellow corn into a form which is eaten locally.

Sub Strategic Objective 2.2: Institutions and communities are able to analyze and advocate for safety net needs.

14 institutions (100% of target to date) and 10 communities (200% of target to date) have received training in food security issues. In addition to the training, food security analyses are being conducted at the community level. Five have already been completed, 3 in The Gambia, 2 in Senegal, using participatory rural assessment techniques. The output of the exercise is an action plan for reducing food insecurity in the community and for providing support to its vulnerable members. This activity has not been given enough priority in DAP implementation. In addition, no community followup has been incorporated into either CRS or Partner work plans.

A pilot project for peer counseling was established in The Gambia using CRS private funds. Several indicators for this project have been incorporated into the Senegambia DAP IPTT. This project was designed to promote behavior changes in mothers with malnourished children. It is focused on messages for treating malaria, diarrhea, acute respiratory infections and exclusive breast feeding. It was hoped that there would be synergies between the peer counseling program and the safety net component of the DAP but only two communities which distribute food have peer counselors.

In order to facilitate fund mobilization, communities and institutions were supposed to be trained in proposal writing, resource acquisition and diversification of funding. To date, no training has taken place but it is scheduled for later in FY05.

Sub Strategic Objective 2.3: Institutions and community organizations can manage safety net interventions for vulnerable groups.

All institutions and communities have established written agreements with the Partners for food distribution activities. They have been using established criteria for beneficiary selection, criteria which have been applied more flexibly in Senegal than in The Gambia.

Institutions (114.3% of target) and communities (110.7% of target) have been trained in commodity management and financial systems and respectively. There is less understanding among the implementing communities on what the financial management training entailed. Not one person interviewed in either Senegal or The Gambia during the mid-term evaluation mentioned training themes that were other than commodity management.

90% of institutions and 70% of communities in The Gambia have received a satisfactory audit rating based on end-use checkers reports. This audit system measures effective commodity management. A rating of 70% or lower would be grounds for removal from the safety net program. Since only 70% of the communities received a satisfactory rating, GAFNA needs to provide more training and technical support to communities to improve the commodity management systems. The audit system, piloted in The Gambia, will soon be used in Senegal.

Assessment of Strategy

Sesame component

The principal assumption made during the design of the Senegambia DAP was that the establishment of Collection Centers, which clean, weigh, bag and consolidate sesame into export-size quantities, would improve the efficiency of marketing activities and lower the marketing costs for both farmers and buyers. This became the focus of the sesame marketing strategy. Table 3 a summary of its strengths and weaknesses.

Strengths

Market strategy

CRS and its Partners found that the collection center approach did not facilitate sesame marketing so they quickly adjusted the strategy. The new strategy offers sesame growers more options: buying points, where the actual buying and selling of sesame takes place; assembly points, where the sesame is transported and stored; collection centers, where the sesame is cleaned, bagged and sold to the buyer. This has permitted a more cost effective system of marketing.

Table 3: Strengths and weaknesses of the sesame component strategy

Strengths	Weaknesses
-Market strategy adjusted to local conditions (buying points, assembly points, collection centers)	- Too much emphasis on marketing and insufficient focus on crop production and seed multiplication
- Markets stabilized and market efficiencies realized	- Extension services inadequate and do not reach all farmers
- Farm gate price to farmers increased	- Poor access to farm implements and appropriate technologies for post harvest handling
- Linkages between buyers, sellers, banks facilitated by program	- Pre-financing of sesame buying still a problem
- In Senegal, sesame recognized as an important alternative crop that is now receiving government support	- Lack of professionalism in the associations to ensure credibility with buyers
- Literacy training provided to SGA members in The Gambia	

Market stability and efficiency

The price setting policies adopted by CRS partners ensured that the farm gate to farmers increased so that farmers were encouraged to market through the DAP system which has stabilized the market. Because international market prices have been falling, and the farm gate prices are set so high, the market may be inefficient in some cases.

Linkages to buyers

CRS has facilitated the forum of buyers, growers associations and private sector, which has helped the associations to establish contacts with buyers and to negotiate initial pre-financing arrangements. In Senegal, private buyers such as RECOFI and SIMEX accepted to take the risk to pre-finance ASSOLUCER, 7A and GADEC. In The Gambia, NAWFA has benefited from a Marketing fund set up by CRS to pre-finance sesame purchases from the SGA's.

Sesame promotion

CRS has been successful in promoting the production of sesame as an alternative cash crop in Senegal. In 2003, the Government of Senegal initiated the *Programme d'Appui au Développement de la Filière Sésame* (PADFSE) to promote sesame production nationwide. The Government interventions will focus on promoting sesame production as a cash crop; making seeds available to all farmers; providing associations and government decentralized services with 100 cleaning machines and processing units; supporting training in sesame production; and subsidizing the purchase of farming equipment (75-80%) and agricultural inputs such as fertilizer (50%).

In The Gambia, there is still a need for a strong advocacy program to encourage the government to promote sesame. In both Senegal and The Gambia, efforts are still needed to promote sesame at the grass root level.

Literacy

In The Gambia, literacy training is being offered to SGA members because most of them are illiterate. They cannot read relevant records and documents so that their effective participation in decision making, particularly as it relates to sesame marketing, and supervision of their executive committees is limited. This activity is greatly appreciated by those who have benefited from the training.

Weaknesses

Crop production and seed multiplication

The quantity of sesame produced in Senegal and The Gambia is far below the market demand. Despite increased area in sesame cultivation, yields remain low (average yield 365 kg/ha in The Gambia and 343 kg/ha in Senegal). Some of the principal reasons given to explain low yields in both countries are: 1) farmers do not have access to adapted sesame varieties and good quality seed; 2) farmers are not using improved production and post harvest handling techniques; 3) farmers do not have access to appropriate farm implements; and 4) extension services are inadequate and do not reach all farmers. In addition, yields are traditionally lower on communal fields which are most often farmed by women. NAWFA has recently been advocating for women to have access to individual fields.

Two improved white seeded varieties which correspond to market demand are being promoted in The Gambia but seed multiplication and distribution still remain a problem. Farmers plant whatever seed is available or distributed to them. Most of the seed is not certified.

Extension services

The extension services provided by the Partners are inadequate for the increasing numbers of sesame growers in the DAP intervention zone. The number of villages and farmers they cover varies from one organization to another but some agents can be responsible for more than 1000 farmers in 60 villages. They do not have the resources to cover a large geographic area. In The Gambia, many of the extension agents don't have education or experience in agriculture or marketing. While they are trained by CRS, the government extension agents and the Partners' supervisors, this is insufficient to make them effective in the field.

The contact farmers in the villages do not have the means to effectively collaborate with the extension agents (train farmers, organize sesame collection, collect data). Although they receive a commission on the sesame collected, for their services, this is considered to be insufficient compensation for the work they do. The contact farmers are expected to collect the data for the extension agents and many are illiterate.

Farm implements and appropriate technologies

Growers, particularly women in both Senegal and The Gambia, indicated that the lack of appropriate farm implements and material (plows, seeders having a distributor plate adapted to sesame seeds, and plastic sheets for cleaning) is a major problem for them.

Considerable emphasis in the DAP strategy has been placed on the cleaning machines installed at the collection centers. Their efficiency is reduced if poorly cleaned seed is put through them. At the GADEC collection center, the sesame had 8% foreign matter after cleaning when the manufacturer's specifications indicated that there should only be 2-3%. In The Gambia, buying points require farmers to pre-clean their seed at the village or to pay for laborers to re-clean the sesame at the buying point before purchase.

Professionalism

Negotiations for the annual marketing campaign take place in November or December when the market prices of sesame are not known. Most DAP partners do not have the capacity to know the quantity and quality of sesame they will be offering. Contracts are sometimes signed which cannot be honored. Defaulting on delivery has implications all along the marketing chain. The buyer at his level cannot honor his commitment to his partners in Europe or Asia. Credibility then becomes an issue for the product, the country and the buyer.

Safety net component

The Safety net component was designed to provide humanitarian assistance to vulnerable groups and to strengthen the capacity of communities to advocate on their behalf and to support services for vulnerable community members. Table 3 presents a summary of the strengths and weaknesses of the safety net component strategy.

Strengths

Partner Networks

CARITAS, a diocesan charitable organization, covers a wide geographical area. The entire diocese is divided into parishes, each one with a parish committee which distributes the safety net food. This provides the DAP with an easy entrée into both the Tambacounda and Kolda regions of Senegal. GAFNA has worked closely with CRS implementing health projects in The Gambia. It has a well established network of 119 community management committees (CMC) throughout the country. After the vulnerability analyses were conducted and the most food insecure zones were selected, it was relatively easy to mobilize 10 CMCs in the program intervention zone.

Beneficiary Selection

CRS and its Partners established criteria for identifying vulnerable groups. Through vulnerability assessments, they were able to allocate beneficiary numbers among communities. The Parish committees, the CMCs and the institutions have respected the criteria and have chosen the most vulnerable members of the population.

Table 3: Strengths and weaknesses of the safety net component

Strengths	Weaknesses
- Partner (GAFNA, Caritas) Networks cover a wide geographic area	- Difference in philosophy between CRS and CARITAS has spread Safety Net resources very thin in Senegal.
- Beneficiary selection at both the institution and community level was taken seriously by the people involved so that the most vulnerable people were selected.	- There is no integration between the Safety Net component and the agriculture component of the DAP; between the DAP and other CRS programs such as microfinance
- Food rations made chronically ill beneficiaries stronger and reduced the incidence of illness in other categories of beneficiaries.	- Partners and management committees (CMCs, Parishes) have little flexibility in implementing the program and finding solutions to local problems
- Ration sharing benefited children in the compound (freed up resources for school fees; made children more alert in school)	- Little emphasis has been placed on local capacity building to date

Benefits of food

Beneficiaries appreciate the safety net food rations for many reasons including:

- Disabled and chronically ill people have more strength and contract fewer illnesses;
- Children eating WSB for breakfast are more alert in school;
- Parents can pay school fees with the money they don't have to spend on food;
- Persons living with HIV/AIDS are better able to tolerate the antiretroviral medications that they take.

Most people indicated that they would appreciate it if the rations could be increased. People living with HIV/AIDS indicated that they would like the rations to be more diversified to cover other food groups that they need which are too costly for them to buy.

Weaknesses

Coverage of safety net in Senegal

The Safety Net resources are spread very thin in Senegal because CARITAS believes that all of the parishes should benefit from the resources of the program. The result is that a small number of beneficiaries may be chosen from each village in a parish. When beneficiaries are selected over a wide geographical area, vulnerable people have to travel long distances to collect the food. Transportation to come to the parish warehouse can cost more than the value of the food received. Some people who were selected resign from the program.

Integration/collaboration

There is no integration between the sesame component of the DAP and the safety net component even though there is geographical overlap in the intervention zones. In The Gambia, many of the beneficiaries are farmers or from farming households so that some member could benefit from increased income from sesame production if there was more integration between the two components.

Likewise, there is no collaboration between the Microfinance program of CRS and the DAP safety net program. There is a tendency to view the safety net program only in terms of humanitarian assistance and not in terms of reducing food insecurity. If more attention is given in the last year of the project to the development and implementation of the food security action plans, then closer linkages between farming, microenterprise development and microfinance could be established.

Flexibility in program implementation

CARITAS and GAFNA have both attempted to solve problems related to food distribution but their solutions were rejected by CRS. If adequate controls are put in place and the solution is agreed upon by both beneficiaries and Partners, then CRS should accept these initiatives as long as they are consistent with USAID regulations.

Members of CMCs in The Gambia indicated that they have quotas for each beneficiary category. If someone comes off the beneficiary register, they can only be replaced by someone from the same category even though there might be someone needier in another category. Communities would like to have the flexibility to modify the relative proportion of beneficiaries in each category while maintaining the overall beneficiary numbers.

Capacity building

Food security analysis training has not been as extensive as planned. The ultimate goal of the analysis is for communities to develop food security action plans which can be implemented by mobilizing community resources or through accessing outside resources. This is a key element in ensuring sustainability of community managed safety net activities and should be given priority in the last year of the project.

Training has been effective in commodity management but needs to be reinforced and expanded, particularly in communities. CMC's and Parish committees should become involved in training people how to do the food distribution in order to increase the volunteer base. This will increase community solidarity but more importantly will reduce the burden on CMC and parish committee members.

The commodity management training that GAFNA conducts teaches the participants how to keep good records. However, in the case of the CMCs, many members are illiterate so record keeping becomes the function of a store clerk who gets paid 600 Dalasi per month for the six months that food is distributed (out of three visited two were men). Therefore, the capacity of the CMC to manage safety net activities is not being enhanced. Literacy training should be an integral part of all DAP activities.

Relevance of Activities

Safety net component

Food distribution for vulnerable people is still a relevant activity for the safety net component. In order to reduce dependency, greater linkages between food aid and development activities need to be established. Some beneficiaries or a family member could engage in productive activities if given some assistance. In urban centers, beneficiaries proposed engaging in petty commerce if microfinance services were available. In rural areas, beneficiaries would use credit to improve their agricultural production. Skills training (soap making, tie dyeing, etc), agricultural training and extension services (livestock raising; sesame production) could also be offered to some vulnerable people and to their family members.

In Senegal, where poverty and destitution are criteria for selecting beneficiaries, food for work (FFW) could be used instead of direct food distributions for some groups, for example, single female heads of households with many dependents. This would require another level of management skill for CRS and its Partners, CARITAS, but it would enable communities to accomplish a range of projects: repairing roads and paths, bridges; repairing/constructing storage facilities; digging wells and simple irrigation systems; etc.

During the Child Survival Project in The Gambia, mothers paid a small fee (5 D) to weigh their children each month. This system has continued in the safety net program. Mothers of malnourished children pay a small fee when they come to pick up their rations. The money is used by the CMC to maintain the warehouse, pay for off loading etc. It seems unethical to charge someone who is defined as “vulnerable” for food. In addition, if one vulnerable group (mothers of malnourished children) can afford to pay, the others should too. No similar system was mentioned in Senegal.

Relevance of indicators and the reporting system

Indicators

In response to criticisms of the M&E system in the previous DAP, a very extensive set of indicators (65, monitoring and impact combined) was established in order to track the DAP performance. Most of impact indicators are really monitoring indicators. Many of the monitoring indicators are based on discreet activities and shouldn't be included in the tracking table. The problem originates in the design whereby the project was organized into 2 Strategic Objectives (SO), 6 Sub Strategic Objectives (SSO), and 25 Intermediate Results (IR). This structure is too cumbersome. When combined with the need to improve the M&E, the result was a large number of indicators which are not relevant and are repetitive. A proposal for simplifying the Indicator Performance Tracking Table, which includes those proposed already in the FY06 resource request, is presented in Annex 6.

Tools

The monitoring tools which have been developed for the M&E system are very good and should provide the DAP team with adequate information to determine the level of program performance. The major constraint is the capacity of the partner organizations to effectively use the instruments to collect reliable data. While CRS has trained M&E personnel at the partner institutions, there has been considerable turnover in staff. In addition, many community members, contact farmers, model farmers are illiterate making it impossible for them to be actively involved in data collection.

The annual DAP survey is a broad based community survey with a large sample size which provides extensive information about food security, and sesame production and marketing at the community level. Both DAP participants and non-DAP participants are interviewed since the sample is randomly selected. The annual survey could be used more effectively to evaluate trends than to gather information for the results report IPTT.

Reporting system

While USAID/FFP wants one consolidated report from the Senegambia DAP, it is important that each country maintain an IPTT with its own performance targets. This is being done but not in a systematic way. Having a disaggregated IPTT would permit each team to identify implementation problems and to address issues as they arise. The consolidated IPTT masks low performance and conversely does not permit the teams to benefit from their colleagues “best practices”.

Relevance of targeting

Sesame component

Sesame had been promoted throughout the entire country in the previous Gambian DAP. For the Senegambia DAP, emphasis has been placed on CRD North, URD, and LRD. In Senegal, during the food insecurity mapping exercise, Tambacounda, Kolda, and Fatick regions were targeted for interventions. Because of financial constraints, only Tambacounda and Kolda were retained. Since improved food security remains the principal objective of CRS activities, Tambacounda and Kolda should remain priority areas of intervention. If any expansion is considered, it should be into Ziguinchor where this project could promote economic recovery linked to the recent peace agreement and support FENPROSE.

Sesame has been targeted as an alternative cash crop which can grow on poor soils. Sesame grows better in drier environments, hence the higher level of production in regions such as Kaolack which currently accounts for 2/3 of the sesame marketed in Senegal. The Senegalese Government will be promoting sesame production nationally. In the future, sesame production and marketing in the DAP zone of intervention may not be as competitive as it is now. There is already some interest by farmers groups and partners to diversify DAP agricultural interventions.

Safety net component

Food security analysis and ranking were used to identify geographic zones for project intervention. The areas selected in both Senegal (Kolda, Tambacounda) and The Gambia (CRD North, CRD South, URD) suffer from chronic food insecurity. Within the zones selected, a two phase process was used to: 1) identify partners (Senegal), communities and institutions (Senegal and The Gambia); and 2) determine numbers of potential beneficiaries according to categories of vulnerable people.

Malnourished children, disabled, and the chronically ill are the favored beneficiaries in the Gambia Safety Net Program despite data from the vulnerability assessment indicating that in CRD North, orphans and destitute people far outnumber malnourished children in the region. The focus on malnourished children is in part because of the child survival program which had been an important component of the previous DAP.

In Senegal, widows and female headed households as well as the disabled and the chronically ill are targeted. Severely malnourished children are treated at the rehabilitation centers, some of which have been selected as institutions receiving safety net support.

Sustainability

Empowering grass root level organizations is the key to the sustainability of both DAP components. Capacity building, literacy training, and giving grass root organizations the authority and the responsibility to make decisions affecting program implementation are critical to their empowerment.

Two of the implementing Partners of the sesame component (NAWFA and ASSOLUCER) are grass root organizations which are responsible for capacity building of their member organizations. As a membership based organizations themselves, they should, in their own right benefit from capacity building activities which are based on institutional assessments and which are part of a clearly defined exit strategy.

In the safety net component, community management committees and parish committees are responsible for commodity management and distribution. Despite the significant role they play in the program, they have been unable to take initiatives to modify beneficiary selection according to local conditions (The Gambia), and to solve logistical problems in commodity management and distribution. By blocking these initiatives, CRS and their Partners may reduce community ownership of the program at a time when they trying to transfer responsibility and management to communities.

Assessment of organizational structure and implementation capacity

CRS

Organizational structure

During the DAP design, it does not appear that much thought was given to the personnel requirements or to the management structure needed to implement and

manage a joint country DAP. As gaps have been identified, posts have been established and CRS has hired competent technical staff to implement the DAP. They have significant experience in the fields of agriculture, marketing, M&E, and commodity management. The field staff is backstopped by regional specialists (marketing, M&E). There is no regional safety net specialist but the Senegal Liaison (now DAP manager) has assumed this function.

Many of the DAP personnel, regional and country, have responsibilities within other CRS programs and/or administration. For example, the regional marketing specialist is doing monetization for the program and is acting country representative for CRS The Gambia. The key technical staff in Senegal (agriculture and marketing) are not full time DAP employees. One works with other CRS agricultural programs and the other manages the CRS/Senegal office in Kolda.

Some DAP staff are reporting technically to a regional DAP specialist and administratively to a country level person. This has led to some confusion in terms of lines of command and reporting although most people seem to have been able to categorize their relationships and reporting lines with experience.

During the DAP management review in September, it was recognized that there needs to be an organizational chart which is simple but which clearly represents the lines of supervision and reporting. For the last year of the Senegambia DAP, it would be preferable for CRS to make fully operational the regional specialists in order to promote more interaction between the technical personnel of each component (sesame, safety net, M&E). In addition to retaining the current regional specialists (marketing (or agriculture) and M&E), a regional Safety Net Manager should be recruited. It would make sense for this person to be based in The Gambia because of the proximity to the commodity management team and because there is more commodity distribution in The Gambia. The Sesame component regional specialist would then be based in Senegal. Both of these persons would respond to the DAP Coordinator who would not have a technical role in project implementation but would provide overall leadership and guidance. Together with the regional specialists, the DAP coordinator would encourage synergies between the country teams including partners.

Management issues

In general, there is insufficient internal and external (to the Partners) feedback from the DAP management. CRS staff indicated that they receive rapid and appropriate feedback on financial reports. When it comes to the progress reports, feedback is not as timely. Feedback to partners is even more important and seems to be lacking. Some safety Net partners lamented the fact that they didn't receive any feedback or recommendations after CRS management field visits. At various times, they have been asked to curtail field activities without adequate explanations and information from CRS. The Partners would like to be clearly informed when there are problems.

Particularly in the sesame component, CRS has been semi-operational in order to ensure that the program keeps on-track. This may not allow enough room for Partners to increase their capacity (The Gambia). The grass root membership organizations which implement the DAP show some managerial weaknesses but it is not advisable

that CRS respond to this by being semi-operational. Weaknesses in partners' ability to implement the project should be tackled through capacity building.

Commodity Management

Personnel

The commodity management staff of CRS has had significant experience in managing food acquisition, storage, and delivery. They have well established procedures in place for commodity tracking. There has been a lot of staff turnover at the field level where there are currently vacancies for two end use checkers. In addition, there has not been a full time regional safety net manager appointed which has reduced the potential of sharing experiences and harmonizing commodity management procedures.

Commodity requests

CRS is responsible for placing the commodity call forward with USAID/FFP; facilitating the movement of commodities from the port to the warehouse; and assuring the delivery of commodities to the final point of distribution or to the secondary warehouse of the Partner. In order to do this, the commodity manager needs to receive regular reports from the field in a timely manner.

In Senegal, the Partners and the new Safety Net Program Assistant Manager complained about the rounding techniques used by CRS commodity managers at the primary warehouse. If the commodity request is for an amount that represents only part of a sack, for example, 8 kg of maize, the managers round down instead of up. In addition, there are no provisions for having a backup stock to cover these losses and other small losses due to accidents during distribution and weighing errors.

Warehousing

The two CRS warehouses in Banjul (one for the Gambia and one for Senegal) both have a capacity of 500 MT and are in good condition. They are clean and there is a clear system in place (and posted) for tracking the metric tonnage that comes in and goes out of the warehouses. CRS has contracted a quality control surveyor who checks the quality of the food when it arrives, before it leaves and on a monthly basis. He determines if the food is fit for human consumption, if it is fit for animal feed or if it must be destroyed.

The only issue at the CRS warehouse is that of spoiled food. For example, in 2004, 49 bags of yellow corn for The Gambia, one bag of yellow corn for Senegal and two bags of WSB for the Gambia were spoiled. After the quality control surveyor made his determination, the bags were fumigated. CRS has requested to waive responsibility for the losses, but the request is still pending.

Commodity tracking

At the warehouse in Banjul, the warehouse officer enters all waybill information into a hand written ledger and into his computer in a simple spreadsheet he designed. This process of entering the same information twice is time-consuming and unnecessary.

Personnel in both Senegal and The Gambia have developed simple commodity tracking systems using Excel because CRS no longer uses FOOD LOG except to generate reports. These systems should be harmonized to facilitate information flow.

Distribution system

The CRS commodity management team needs to improve feedback and information exchange with the field. In more than one institution in The Gambia and in several parishes in Senegal, commodities had been delayed for one or two months. When the commodities arrived, the commodities for the previous months were never replaced. The MTE team has been informed that this occurred during an emergency situation in FY04 when the commodities were used in The Gambia. This information was never communicated to the Partners and in turn to the beneficiaries who didn't understand why they received incomplete rations or no ration at all.

If a beneficiary misses a ration for one month, there is a resulting ration balance. CRS has no official policy on how to treat the extra rations. Several Parishes and CMCs have tried to find solutions to this problem: letting a family member come for the ration; giving double rations; giving the ration to someone on the waiting list. CRS needs to work with its Partners to address this issue.

Commodity management training

CRS offers a three-day commodity management training annually. While the training may teach the difference between the approved beneficiary level and the actual beneficiaries served, this distinction does not appear to be coming across in the reporting in both The Gambia and Senegal.

CRS/Gambia has produced a Safety Net Manual that was distributed to CMCs and institutions in September 2004. The document was intentionally written in simple English so that the record keepers could interpret the information for the institutions and CMC members. The manual was given to CRS/Senegal for translation and should be available for the next round of training.

Partners

Sesame Component

GADEC (Senegal)

Management capacity: GADEC is currently implementing several projects in various sectors including water, agriculture, natural resource management, training, credit, and health. They have systems in place for good project management. The accounting and

financial management system is computerized and is run by a team of 3 persons. They are audited each year by independent firms. GADEC has tremendous experience managing large and complex projects including a World Bank Project estimated at 6 billion FCFA.

Technical capacity: The sesame project team is composed of 3 permanent staff, and 11 volunteers. The Supervisor, an agronomist with extensive experience in rural development and training, supervises 2 Promotion Agents. The Promotion Agents are agricultural technicians with good skills in communication and training. The agents are well known at the village level and work well with the 11 farmer volunteers who assist them, and with the contact farmers, one per village, who train farmers in sesame production techniques and organize the sesame collection. The contact farmers are also responsible for data collection.

Two major problems were raised during the MTE. First, the project is covering 98 villages and continues to expand given the high demand from the growers. The supervisor estimates that for one agent to be effective, he should be covering no more than 35 villages. In the current situation, one agent is covering 55 and the second 43.

The second problem raised by both the project team and the group leaders is the motivation of the 11 farmer volunteers and the contact farmers. They are not paid by the project nor do they have adequate means of transport to provide extension services and assistance to farmers.

ASSOLUCER (Senegal)

Management capacity: ASSOLUCER has experience in various aspects of food security and agricultural development including small enterprises development, horticulture, cereal banking, mother and child health program (with CRS years ago), livestock raising, capacity building and training of their member groups.

ASSOLUCER's financial management capacity is presently weak due to inadequate staffing, tools, and procedures but is being built up progressively by CRS. From time to time, they have financial audits.

Technical capacity: The sesame promotion project team is made of 7 staff members including: 1 project supervisor who has a civil engineering background; 3 promotion agents with backgrounds in Agriculture; 1 person in charge of accounting who also has an agricultural background.

When the program began, ASSOLUCER did not limit the area of intervention nor did it determine the number of growers which could be reached with the resources available. With the increased number of villages demanding their support for sesame production, the current staff levels are too low. One promotion agent is handling 63 villages and 1,077 farmers; the second 53 villages and 1,211 farmers; and the third one is handling 46 villages and 724 farmers. This reduces the efficiency and effectiveness of their interventions. According to the project team, to be more effective, one extension agent should manage a maximum of 500 farmers.

ASSOLUCER uses contact farmers for mass extension service provision as well as data collection for CRS. This has the advantage of making the approach appropriate and sustainable since the farmer is selected by the village on the basis of established criteria. However, some of them are illiterate and do not have a means of transport to go around and assist farmers.

ASSOLUCER needs to increase its knowledge of price setting. In 2003/2004, the price they received from the buyer was lower than they anticipated so that it was difficult to reimburse the bank loan that they took to pre-finance sesame purchases.

7A (Senegal)

Management capacity: 7A was established in 1988 and has developed into a consulting NGO with contracts from several sources, including the African Development Bank (ADB). 7A has 13 permanent staff and 7 part time staff. The Executive secretary is an Agronomist with a specialization in sociology. They have a team of 2 persons for accounting and financial management. They have both external and internal audits.

7A experience includes managing projects in food security, Local Governance, micro enterprise and credit. 7A has experience in training and capacity building. It favors a participatory approach with the use of the contact farmers. It is experienced in the management of other sectors, “filieres” such as maize, rice and potatoes.

Technical capacity: The sesame marketing project team is made of a team leader who is an agronomist, and 4 Promotion Agents (AP) with backgrounds in agriculture, animation and training. 7A develops action plans, budgets and elaborates a strategy with the village organizations and the contact farmers. At the beginning of each marketing season, they have a meeting with the villages involved to discuss achievement in the previous campaign and strategies. At present, 7A has 1 AP for 137 villages (1078 farmers); 1 for 115 villages (773 farmers); and 1 for 59 villages (640 farmers).

NAWFA (The Gambia)

Management capacity: NAWFA has programs in sesame production, processing, and marketing; income generation; group management and training; and related micro enterprise development initiatives. NAWFA’s current personnel include an executive director, a program manager (who doubles as the M&E manager), one accountant, a capacity building officer, an office manager, a secretary, a data entry clerk, and several logistic support staff.

The Association’s management staff is considered to be well trained and experienced in their respective fields of specialization (mainly agriculture). However, several weaknesses were identified during the institutional assessment conducted in September, 2004. NAWFA’s Accounts Office is under staffed and also operates without some of the basic systems in place. The organization has no Financial Procedures Manual and no computerized Financial Accounting Software/ System. It currently functions with a simple Excel spread sheet. They need to need to develop an integrated management

information system database and an M&E system and database to ensure timely access to management information.

Technical capacity: NAWFA has 2 field coordinators (based at headquarters), 18 extension workers (none of whom are women) but no dedicated marketing staff despite its focus on the sesame sector. The Extension workers are not well trained and cover a geographic area that is too large (one extension worker for 20-30 Kaffos and sometimes as many as 60). They have inadequate resources (transportation, fuel allowances) to effectively do their jobs.

Safety net component

GAFNA (The Gambia)

Management Capacity: GAFNA has a tripartite governance system—Membership-Board-Secretariat. The Board of Directors provides policy direction to the organization while the Secretariat is responsible for the day-to-day management. The Secretariat is composed of the Director, the project managers, finance and administration staff and support staff.

GAFNA uses CRS's procedures for financial management and accounting. All accounting records such as cashbook, ledger, and journal are maintained in Microsoft Excel spreadsheets, and periodic statements are printed to reconcile with Bank statements and CRS bi-monthly imprest funds. The Organization has a bank account and recognized external auditors, who carry out annual audit exercises. Audit reports are made available to all concerned.

GAFNA produces regular program status reports for submission to funding partners such as CRS but has not got a complete management information data base set up. The previous M&E manager left and the position has only recently been filled.

Technical capacity: The Safety Net activities are managed by a project coordinator, based in Banjul but who makes regular visits to the field; a program account; and two field coordinators who were nurses before joining GAFNA. One is located in Basse, the other is based in Kaur. The field coordinators have both received training in commodity management. It is their responsibility to monitor both the CMCs and institutions on a regular basis and to provide on-the-job training as needed. It is unclear that they have the skills necessary to facilitate the development of food security action plans and to followup on their implementation.

GAFNA should be doing a better job of confirming the adequacy and quality of storage space, communicating messages from CRS to the institutions and CMCs (ex: pallet requests and decisions taken), communicating messages from the institutions and CMCs to CRS (ex: spoilage) and checking the quality of the monthly reports (projected vs. actual beneficiaries).

CARITAS Tambacounda (Senegal)

Management capacity: CARITAS Tambacounda has a permanent professional staff of 4 persons but currently the key program officer position is vacant as well as several logistic support positions. The organization has a department which handles commodity distribution, particularly in response to emergencies (civil strife and natural disasters). It is currently implementing a school feeding program in collaboration with the World Food Program (WFP).

Two areas of program management have been sources of tension between CARITAS Tambacounda and CRS in the past. CRS would prefer to have a more focused food distribution program while the philosophy of CARITAS is to ensure that all Parishes receive some food aid. The reporting requirements of the Safety Net program are more rigorous than those of CARITAS. This originally caused some consternation but CARITAS has indicated that the new system has helped them improve overall management of their own commodity management and distribution system.

Technical capacity: In order to implement the Safety Net Program, a field coordinator (with previous experience in commodity management and inventory) and an accountant were hired using funding from CRS. They have an office in the same building as the commodity storage facility. The Safety Net personnel are not well integrated into the CARITAS structure. They both have received commodity management training from CRS but are not aware of the USAID regulations which guide the safety net program. While they are young and dynamic, it is unclear that they will be able to effectively facilitate the development of the food security action plans without being trained by CRS first.

CARITAS Kolda (Senegal)

Management capacity: CARITAS Kolda, the most recent of the national CARITAS network, receives institutional support from CRS (office rental, office equipment, staff salaries etc). Prior to its establishment in 2003, CARITAS activities in Kolda were conducted from Ziguinchor. The CARITAS full time staff include the Director, the accountant (safety net accountant), the Safety Net Coordinator.

CARITAS Kolda has recently finished its strategic planning exercise. Their priorities for action include: Humanitarian assistance, Water and Sanitation, Rural Development, Natural Resource Management, Reducing women's work loads, and training. They have a strong development focus even for the humanitarian assistance work that they do.

Technical Capacity: The Safety Net Coordinator and Accountant are both well integrated into the CARITAS structure and have their offices in the same building as the Director. The field coordinator is experienced in project management and training (particularly participatory approaches to community problem analysis). Both the accountant and the Coordinator have indicated that, despite training, they would like to have more information on the overall commodity management system of CRS/The Gambia and more knowledge of CRS financial reporting procedures (presentation of travel and miscellaneous expenses, etc).

Successes and Lessons Learned

Successes

- Sesame is now a recognized alternative cash crop in both Senegal and The Gambia.
- The market has been stabilized and farmers are getting better prices that reflect their labor;
- Sesame production and yields have increased in both Senegal and The Gambia because of farmers' increased knowledge of sesame production and marketing;
- There has been increased capacity of sesame grower associations to negotiate contracts and financing;
- Land advocacy has yielded positive results and changed community perceptions;
- The DAP has increased CRS visibility in the field;
- A sound M&E system has been developed and provided to partners in Senegal;
- The beneficiaries of the Safety Net Component have been well targeted using well defined criteria;
- The distributed food has had a positive impact on beneficiaries and other compound/household members;
- Community solidarity has been enhanced through the management of Safety Net activities at the community/parish level.

Lessons Learned

1. Program design should be done jointly with partners and CRS field staff in order to take into account the technical capacity and experience of each organization and to ensure ownership of the program.
2. While various studies and research on specific themes have been commissioned during the DAP in order to adapt field implementation to current conditions, many of them should have been done prior to DAP design to better inform the process.
3. In a joint country DAP, synergies will not occur unless actively facilitated.
4. Program sustainability is compromised and dependence on CRS is increased when an exit strategy is not built into the program design and implementation begun early in the program.
5. The timing of the DAP mid-term evaluation, as scheduled in the DAP document, should be maintained despite late startup of project activities in the field in order to use the results to improve program implementation.

Recommendations for immediate attention

Recommendations for both immediate attention and more long-term reflection have been presented by the evaluation team. Since the DAP is in its last year, most of the recommendations, both immediate and long-term will inform the design process for

future DAP programs. The most important of recommendations being proposed for immediate attention are presented here.

General

M&E

The DAP Annual Survey should be conducted next in March-April 2006, not this year. It provides valuable information on trends in sesame production and food security at the community level (both DAP and non-DAP farmers). It is too costly to be conducted annually. A DAP survey can be done at the beginning, in the middle, and at the end of the DAP.

The resources that would have been used for the annual DAP survey should be allocated to improve the M&E system, particularly at the partner level. The additional resources can be used to collect additional information for the results report IPTT.

Project Management

CRS should ensure that the two country field teams meet more frequently (including the Partners) in order to share experiences and to coordinate strategies. Specific areas in which project implementation could be improved by closer interaction include: marketing strategies (price setting, contracting arrangements); sesame promotion strategies; resolving commodity management and distribution problems; harmonizing data collection and analysis.

CRS should involve partners more in project decision making and provide more timely feedback on issues which are identified during monitoring missions, when results reports are presented, or during meetings. There should also be better feedback between DAP management and CRS field staff which could ensure that problems which affect field implementation are resolved more quickly.

Each country team should have well defined annual performance targets which when combined will be the targets presented in the consolidated IPTT. This would make the workplans more operational, make it easier to identify problems and to find solutions.

Sesame Component

Seed multiplication and distribution

In the short term, CRS should support its partners to organize a farmer seed multiplication system in collaboration with the DRDR (*Direction Régionale du Développement Rural*) in Senegal and NARI in The Gambia. Partners can identify and train the seed multipliers, and have the seed quality be controlled by DRDR and NARI before the sesame is sold or distributed.

Extension services

CRS and its partners should review the extension service systems that are currently being used to promote sesame production and marketing. The study should identify what steps need to be taken to improve service delivery and effectiveness.

Because contact farmers play an important role in the DAP implementation in Senegal (collecting information for M&E; providing extension services), CRS and the DAP partners should review their situations and identify ways of rewarding them or giving them some form of incentive, for example, training them in seed multiplication.

Sesame Cleaning Machines

The evaluation team recommends that no additional cleaning machines be bought for the program. CRS/The Gambia and CRS/Senegal should set up a joint committee to conduct a study to identify strategic locations for the existing 8 machines. Criteria for selecting the locations should include: 1) the amount of sesame produced in the area; 2) whether or not the site is the DAP intervention zone; 3) the cost/benefit of locating the machine at the site; 4) the sustainability of the machine operation; and in Senegal, 5) the planned location of the PADFSE cleaning machines.

If during the study recommended above, the committee demonstrates that the cleaning machines will not be sustainable even after moving to more strategic locations, the committee should explore options for selling them according to CRS and FFP regulations.

Agricultural Equipment

CRS should continue to support research and on-farm testing of seeders adapted to sesame production in collaboration with the government and the private sector, for example, the sesame grower in Ziguinchor who has adapted a seeder plate for sesame planting.

Exit strategies

CRS should develop exit strategies for NAWFA and other organizations with which it works in implementing the sesame component. This would include strengthening the executive/operational staff of these organizations. Besides reinforcing the financial and management capacity of these organizations, emphasis should be placed on strategic planning, program development, monitoring and evaluation. A timeline for implementing the strategy and expected outcomes at each point should be included so that at some point (sooner for NAWFA), these organizations would be independent of CRS, capable of offering services to their members, raising funds, and lobbying for their members.

Capacity building

CRS should place more emphasis on increasing the capacity of Associations/SGAs so that they can be more active in federations, unions, and national organizations of

farmers. The CRS Partners should develop a capacity building plan for each federation and association with which they work. The implementation of the plan should be supported by CRS.

Operators and book keepers at collection centers in The Gambia, need additional training in order to improve the record keeping systems. The necessary information collection tools should be provided to each location and be available for inspection by NAWFA and CRS staff.

Price setting strategy

CRS should work with its Partners to encourage SGAs/Associations to be realistic when setting prices at the beginning of each marketing campaign and to use fair price to growers rather than a speculation prices as the basis for negotiations. In addition, CRS should encourage all DAP partners and Associations to establish profit sharing schemes so that the profits from the sale of sesame are regularly returned to the producers in addition to ensuring that farmers receive a fair price for their production.

Pre-financing and contract arrangements

NAWFA and the Senegal DAP partners should make sure all the tools and appropriate human resources are in the field and are capable of collecting relevant data that will enable them to better predict the quantity and the quality of sesame they will receive during the year.

FENPROSE

CRS should improve the operational and managerial capacity of FENPROSE so that it can represent sesame growers nationally in the future. CRS/Senegal should develop a capacity building project (2-3 years) for FENPROSE which would include : support for a small secretariat with minimum staff and equipment; the necessary means to coordinate and increase awareness among sesame grower associations nationally; resources for exchange visits with NAWFA and other commodity federations; a well defined exit strategy. CRS/Senegal should consider allocating private funds to this initiative.

NAWFA

In order to better provide technical assistance to growers, NAWFA should review its recruitment policy and make sure that competent staff is recruited for the field. Extension agents should have experience/training in agriculture or marketing and have a minimum education level.

CRS should ensure that the M&E system become fully operational within NAWFA as soon as possible.

Safety Net

Capacity building

CRS should reinforce its commodity management training program for its own staff and its partners. Special emphasis should be placed on understanding USAID regulation 211.

CRS should organize exchange visits for its partners in Senegal and The Gambia. The Senegal partners would better understand the CRS system of commodity management and warehousing. GAFNA would be able to see more effective use of commodities in an institutional setting in Senegal. Partners from both countries and CRS would benefit from a frank exchange of views which could lead to more effective program management.

Call forwards and food dispatching

Food pipeline analysis should inform call forwards and food dispatching more effectively in the future.

Spoiled food

CRS should review procedures for removing small amounts of spoiled foods from institutions and community centers and establish appropriate mechanisms for the future. In the immediate, CRS should arrange for the immediate removal of spoiled food from the institutions and community centers. In The Gambia, CRS should authorize GAFNA to collect the spoiled bags and bring them to the CRS warehouse in Banjul where they will undergo quality control and be disposed of accordingly.

Requests for commodities

For each quarter, the partner organization should request food that will get the institution, or community/parish, through the rest of that quarter, even if it is only for one or two months. This will ensure that no institution misses a month of rations, that CRS does not have to pay the cost of one small shipment and that everyone is on the same cycle.

Commodity tracking

CRS should harmonize the commodity tracking systems used in The Gambia and Senegal. Simple excel spread sheets will be adequate until West African Regional Office (WARO) develops a system for regional use.

Distribution

CRS and the Partners should encourage committees responsible for food distribution to be creative in finding solutions to food distribution problems. Alternative strategies should be tested on a small scale to determine their effectiveness.

1.0 Introduction

Catholic Relief Services (CRS) is implementing a joint country Title II Development Activity Program (DAP) for FY 2002-2006 that was designed to increase food security in the most vulnerable regions of Senegal and The Gambia (referred to as Senegambia). The Senegambia DAP seeks to address some of the underlying causes of food insecurity and to mitigate its impact on the most vulnerable members of the population². Rural households in both countries suffer from chronic and seasonal food insecurity as a result of poor economic access to, and limited availability of, food. The most vulnerable segments of the population are adversely affected all year round.

As part of the design process, CRS conducted an extensive food insecurity analysis in Senegal and The Gambia to identify the principal causes of food insecurity and key leverage points where CRS could intervene. According to this analysis, there are two immediate causes of insufficient food crop **availability** particularly at the household level: low and variable production of staple food crops, and fluctuating rainfall patterns. Low production is caused by factors such as poor soil quality, inappropriate varieties, and the use of traditional production techniques. It is affected by limited access to stable and profitable markets. Availability is also affected by low levels of literacy and reduced productivity due to chronic illnesses.

Poverty reduces the economic **access** to food and is caused by low levels of income from both on-farm and off-farm income generating activities (IGA) as well as limited diversity of IGA. Agriculture remains the primary occupation of rural households in Senegal and in The Gambia. Low agricultural income is caused by poor cash crop yields (affected by the same factors as food crops) as well as a lack of market integration, and inadequate access to credit and savings services. Both on-farm and off-farm income is affected by a lack of skills (low levels of education and training, illiteracy) in the adult population as well as reduced productivity due to chronic illnesses.

The key leverage points CRS identified during the food insecurity analysis include: low income, low levels of education or illiteracy, and illnesses (such as HIV/AIDS). The DAP was designed to intervene particularly to address the problem of low income.

1.1 Program Overview

The DAP FY 2002-2006 is a five year, US \$10 million USAID Food For Peace (FFP) funded project implemented by CRS and its partners. In order to more effectively address food security and to maximize available resources, the Senegambia DAP is implemented as a joint country program in adjacent regions of the two countries: in Senegal, Kolda and Tambacounda; in The Gambia, Lower River Division (LRD), Central River Division (CRD) and Upper River Division (URD).

The overall **goal** of the Senegambia DAP is to **improve the level of food security of targeted rural households and vulnerable groups in Senegal and The Gambia by**

² In the DAP, vulnerable segments of the population have been defined as: malnourished children (6 months – 3 years), the severely disabled, single female heads of households, and the chronically ill (people living with HIV/AIDS and Tuberculosis).

2006. By working closely with local partners, community-based organizations and the host governments, CRS will realize its goal through the achievement of the following Strategic Objectives:

Strategic Objective 1. Improved economic access to food for farm households engaged in sesame production in targeted areas in Senegal and The Gambia by 2006. CRS will attain this Strategic Objective (Sesame Component) through the achievement of the following Sub-Strategic Objectives (SSO):

- Sesame Collection Centers are operating as market venues to improve market stability and efficiency.
- Farmers' associations provide policy, advocacy, marketing, production and information services and training to members.
- Research is conducted to identify and reduce the costs of, and constraints to marketing; to improve the post harvest handling practices; and to increase productivity of sesame farmers.

Strategic Objective 2: Increased availability of food for vulnerable persons in Senegal and The Gambia by 2006. CRS will achieve this Strategic Objective (Safety Net Component) through the achievement of the following Sub-Strategic Objectives:

- Food is distributed to vulnerable individuals.
- Institutions and communities are able to analyze and advocate for safety net needs.
- Institutions and community organizations can manage safety net interventions for vulnerable groups.

The Sesame Component seeks to increase income among poor, rural households through the promotion of more stable and efficient sesame market channels. Sesame was selected as the focal point for the agricultural interventions because CRS has, in previous projects, promoted sesame as an alternative cash crop in Senegal (the Casamance Rehabilitation Project) and as a woman's cash crop in The Gambia (the DAP 1996-2001). Marketing opportunities exist in both countries which can be strengthened through the DAP project. Encouraging larger numbers of growers to produce and market sesame will have an impact on household food security by increasing farmer's income. Activities of this component aim to empower participating farmer's organizations in the areas of marketing, production, advocacy and information, and providing services such as training to members. This component focuses on strengthening/establishing marketing systems and on extensive market oriented production research. Research activities have been designed to complement and to ensure high quality marketing interventions.

The Safety Net component of the program aims to increase the availability of food for vulnerable populations by providing food rations to them. This component reinforces the capacities of institutions and community groups to identify, advocate for, and address the food security needs of vulnerable groups. It includes issues related to conflict resolution in areas where conflict is demonstrated to be a cause of food insecurity.

The program is implemented in the field by local partners. In The Gambia, these include the National Women's Farming Association (NAWFA) for the sesame component, and the Gambia Food and Nutrition Association (GAFNA) for safety net activities. In Senegal, the partners for sesame include: the *Association pour la Lutte Contre l'Exode Rural* (ASSOLUCER), *Groupe d'Action pour le Développement Communautaire* (GADEC), and *L'Appui à l'Autoformation des Adultes Appliqué à l'Action par Alternance et en Alternative* (7A). The Safety Net partners in Senegal are CARITAS Tambacounda and CARITAS Kolda.

1.2 Mid Term Evaluation Objectives

The DAP project document calls for a mid-term evaluation (MTE) during the third year of implementation. The purpose of the evaluation is to assess the progress made toward meeting program objectives as well as to review the organizational structures and systems in place for project implementation. The MTE team, working closely with CRS and partner staff, will identify problems and constraints, and develop actionable recommendations to improve the project's design and implementation. Specifically, the objectives of the MTE are to:

- Assess the current status of the DAP activities, measured against Intermediate Results and Strategic Objectives;
- Assess the strengths and weaknesses of the implementation strategy, and determine the extent to which project activities and indicators are relevant to meeting the DAP objectives;
- Assess the appropriateness and capacity of partners to implement DAP activities;
- Determine the effectiveness of project's organizational structure and systems (i.e. M&E and reporting systems) in place, and the extent to which the systems are sustainable;
- Provide lessons learned for implementation of the remainder of the current DAP;
- Make recommendations to CRS on how to improve the implementation of the current DAP activities.

1.3 Evaluation Methodology

The mid-term evaluation was conducted in Senegal and The Gambia from January 27-February 20, 2005. The Scope of Work is presented in Annex 1. The evaluation team was composed of a marketing specialist and the team leader who was assisted by two Food For Peace (FFP) safety net resource persons. The team reviewed available DAP documents including the original project documents, results reports and resource requests, the baseline survey, annual DAP surveys, safety net assessments, consultant reports, as well as monitoring and evaluation tools for both components (Annex 2). Using this information, the team prepared interview guidelines (Annex 3) which were modified in the field as more information was collected. The MTE team interviewed CRS staff and together they established a program for the field visits (Annex 4). Group discussions as well as individual interviews with CRS staff, partner staff, key informants, program beneficiaries and other stakeholders were conducted (Annex 5). The information was analyzed and presented in preliminary form to CRS/Senegal and CRS/The Gambia staff at a meeting held in Banjul on February 14. After the meeting,

additional information was collected to complement the field interviews and observations. A draft report was prepared and after comments from CRS, finalized.

The results of the MTE are presented in this document as a report of the joint country program which includes information on both components, Sesame and Safety Net. The sections include: Introduction; Progress Toward Achieving Program Objectives; Analysis of Program Strategy; Assessment of Organizational Structure and Implementation Capacity; Successes and Lessons Learned; Recommendations; and Annexes. Persons interested in more information on the Sesame Component are referred to a separate document containing a detailed analysis of the Sesame component.

1.4 Positive Aspects of the Evaluation

Any evaluation poses many challenges to those organizing it but a joint country DAP has them doubled: coordination between CRS DAP country program staff; coordination with multiple partners and beneficiary groups; cross border travel and logistics; security. The logistics for the field visits were well organized and CRS and its partners are to be congratulated. The few problems which arose were easily handled by the accompanying staff (technical staff from CRS and partners as well as the drivers).

Both CRS and partner staff were very helpful and cooperative during the MTE. They were all very interested in presenting their accomplishments as well as in finding solutions to the problems which they have encountered in field implementation. They responded well to additional requests for more information (either documents or meetings with key informants identified in the field) or logistic support.

1.5 Limitations of the Evaluation

As with all evaluations, it takes a lot of preparation to make sure that everything is in place and once started, there are always a few problems which are encountered in the field. Several of the more important issues are presented below.

Not all pertinent documents were available at the beginning of the evaluation making it difficult to establish the work plan and the interview guidelines. While some documents were sent electronically to the MTE Team, some key documents which were necessary to do the field level planning were not received until the team arrived in Dakar. In addition, a lot of the data and information files from the Gambia were not available in Dakar. These could only be accessed upon arrival in Banjul after the field work had been completed. All the documents provided to the MTE team were returned to CRS/Senegal or CRS/The Gambia. These should be kept in a separate location and updated because they will be needed for the final evaluation.

Because of confusion over role of FFP personnel in the MTE, the Team Leader was obliged to take a more active role in the evaluation of the Safety Net Component than was originally planned. The Team Leader had limited knowledge of commodity management in the context of safety net activities prior to the MTE (knowledge gained through the support of the FFP resource persons during the MTE). In the future, CRS will need to hire a consultant for this component or bring in regional CRS support.

When planning the field activities for the evaluation of the Safety Net component, the MTE team assumed that they would visit the beneficiaries in their villages. Since most food distribution is done at a distribution point (parish committee warehouse, or at the Community Management Committee (CMC) warehouse), the beneficiaries were asked to meet the team at the distribution points. This meant that the beneficiaries who were interviewed came from within a 5 km radius of the distribution center. Any information about problems that beneficiaries and village committees living far from the distribution point (sometimes up to 30 km), have was made second hand by the field coordinators and the management committee members.

2.0 Progress Toward Achieving Project Objectives


2.1 Strategic Objective 1: Improved economic access to food for farm households engaged in sesame production in targeted areas in Senegal and The Gambia by 2006.

2.1.1 Sub-Strategic Objective 1.1. Sesame Collection Centers are operating as market venues to improve market stability and efficiency for 25,000 farm households.

In both Senegal and the Gambia, the DAP program has been able to successfully increase farm gate prices, enabling growers to have a fair price for their produce and to increase their agricultural income. As indicated in the FY04 results report, the ratio of farm gate price to export price increased from 31% in FY02, to 38% in FY03, and 46% in FY04.


In Senegal, from 1996 to 2001, the price of sesame was kept low averaging between 100 and 150 FCFA. It has increased each year from 2001 to 2003 and has stabilized at around 200 FCFA/kg (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Trend in farm gate prices of sesame in Senegal




Increased farm gate prices have contributed to increased sesame cultivation in the DAP zone in Senegal (Figure 2). In both the ASSOLUCER and the 7A intervention zones, the area cultivated with sesame has significantly increased which indicates farmers' growing interest in the crop.

Figure 2: Surface area cultivated with sesame in the DAP area in Senegal




In The Gambia, NAWFA's price setting policy has enabled the farm gate price to increase each sesame campaign from 2001/2002 to 2004/2005 (Figure 3). This has contributed to increased area cultivated during this period (Figure 4) and to the establishment of sesame as an alternative crop in The Gambia.

Figure 3: Trend in farm gate prices of sesame in The Gambia



In both Senegal and The Gambia, the increases in farm gate prices over the years have also resulted in an increase in the number of sesame growers. As a result, during the 2003/2004 campaign, a total of 554 Metric Tons (MT) (294.9% achieved vs target) was marketed through the collection centers in The Gambia and Senegal.

Figure 4: Increase in surface area cultivated with sesame in the DAP area in the Gambia



An analysis of production costs, transaction costs and prices at each level of the marketing channel indicates that net margins at the farmer level are high and that the efficiency rate is around 22.80% for both Senegal and for The Gambia (Table 1).

Table 1: Profit margins and market efficiencies in Senegal and The Gambia

Actor	Senegal	The Gambia
Grower		
➤ Margins	85.71 FCFA/kg (\$0.171/kg)	5.05 D/kg (\$0.202)
➤ Efficiency	22.86%	22.89%
Associations		
➤ Margins	21.29 FCFA/kg (\$0.043)	1 D/kg (\$0.04)
➤ Efficiency	5.68%	5.33%
DAP Partner		
➤ Margins	32.01 FCFA/kg (\$0.064)	0.997 D/kg (\$0.04)
➤ Efficiency	8.54%	5.32%
Export Company		
➤ Margins	19.3 FCFA/kg (\$0.038)	-0.05 D/kg (-\$.002)
➤ Efficiency	5.73%	-0.27%

Growers are getting a large share of the profit in the marketing channel. In The Gambia, the margin for the export company is negative. This reflects the fact that the company signed a contract with NAWFA when the international market price was high. When NAWFA couldn't provide enough sesame and the international price dropped, the buyer was obliged to renegotiate the price with NAWFA. This demonstrates that market inefficiencies can occur when a contract is not honored which results in low profits on both sides.

IR1.1.1 Twenty Collection Centers established

According to the results report, eight collection centers (5 in The Gambia, 3 in Senegal) have been renovated, staffed and are fully functional as of September 30, 2004. This represents 66.7% of the FY04 target (12 centers). Centers were supplied with the equipment necessary for cleaning, bagging, weighing and tagging sesame for shipment. Thirty-seven collection center operators were trained in the operation and maintenance of machines and 18 people were trained in record keeping and inventory control. This represents about 60% of the target due to the fact that the training and hiring follow the rhythm of the center establishment and the installation of the machines.

The GADEC collection center (Senegal) has been functional since November, 2004. It is equipped with a cleaning machine, a scale and a generator. It is staffed with a cleaning machine operator, a stock manager for a 6-month period, and 5 temporary laborers. The operator and the stock manager have been trained by CRS. Records are filled out and kept. At the time of the MTE, the machine had just finished cleaning 115 MT of sesame, yielding 105.82 MT of cleaned sesame. The impurity or loss at the cleaning machine was 8.5% because the sesame wasn't cleaned well at the farm level prior to sale. Growers reported that not enough plastic sheets were provided by the project (one per village) so that most growers thresh directly on the ground. Sometimes the surface is cemented but most often it is dirt. In addition, the quality control at the buying point may have been inefficient. In The Gambia, the buying committees control the quality of the sesame at the time of purchase.

ASSOLUCER (Senegal) has received a cleaning machine, a generator, a scale, a generator and a "trieuse". The Center was built in 2003 and the machine operated during the 2003/2004 campaign. In 2003/2004, ASSOLUCER collected 148.591 MT of sesame yielding 143.750 MT after cleaning. The waste was 4.18 MT, or 3.25%. The machine is managed by 2 part time staff, including the machine operator and the record keeper. The operator has been trained by CRS in cleaning, weighing, bagging, tagging and storing sesame. Record keeping and inventory control procedures were established and a record keeper was trained by CRS. ASSOLUCER informed the MTE team that it will not clean this year because their buyers have cleaning machines and prefer to buy un-cleaned sesame.

7A (Senegal) received a cleaning machine, a generator, and scale in March, 2004. A team composed of an operator, a record keeper/stock manager, a guard and 4 laborers was hired in January to run the unit. Record keeping and inventory control procedures were established. The operator and the stock manager were both trained by CRS. As of February, 2005, the cleaning machine has not operated due to late collection of the sesame but 7A does plan to use the machine during the 2005 campaign.

In The Gambia, 5 cleaning machines are reported to be operational. The evaluation team visited 3 of them. The one in Basse became operational in October, 2004. In 2003/2004 it processed 15.954 MT with a yield of 15.104 MT (5.32 % loss). The operator and the extension agents were trained by CRS. Records are kept by the extension agent in notebooks. The team operating the machine includes 1 operator, 2 laborers and 2 extension agents. Record keeping should be improved because some information was kept in the personal exercise book of the extension agent. The operator reported not knowing where some of last year's documents were.

The machine located with the NAWFA Bundu Sesame Growers Association (SGA) was set up 2004 and has become operational since February, 2005. It has only processed 2.150 MT. A team of 6 persons including the operator and his assistant, 2 laborers, a security guard and 1 manager (SGA president) run the cleaning operation. The operator, his assistant and the record keeper were trained in 2004. No management systems were in place before the machine became operational. Except for the delivery note, no management document or recording document exist. In addition, the center team reported that: there is not enough fuel to operate the machine; they do not know how to pay the laborers and what amount; they haven't yet received the standard bags from NAWFA; they do not have the tools for record keeping.

The collection center location with SGA Njau in CRD-North has been operational since November, 2004. A team of 9 people including the SGA executive committee members (5), the operator, 2 laborers and the extension agent manage the buying and cleaning operations. A total of 6 people were trained. Record keeping tools including purchase vouchers and laser book were filled out and kept. However, some expenses are recorded in other books that were difficult to find.

It is important to note the uneven distribution of the cleaning machines between the 2 countries. While the Senegal DAP intervention zone is much larger than that of The Gambia, only 3 machines were set up in Senegal. In addition, none of the machines the evaluation team visited in Senegal or in The Gambia is working at its full capacity.

IR.1.1.2 Marketing information services provided through collection centers

The FY04 results report indicated that 73.3% of sesame growers knew market prices before arriving at the collection centers. Also, the high average score on sesame grower's perception of market information indicates that this activity has been successfully implemented although not through the collection centers. Market information has been developed and disseminated through radio, television, drama and farmer meetings.

In Senegal, before the market season begins, the *Fédération Nationale de Producteurs du Sésame* (FENPROSE) members decide on what price to offer to growers. This information is then communicated through meetings and by the extension agents and contact farmers. Most often, information includes the price of sesame (white and brown or Primoca), the date of sale, the place of buying etc..

In The Gambia, the National Executive Committee of NAWFA meets to set the prices. The prices as well as the buying points and the dates of sales are then communicated to growers by various media: television, radio, posters, newspapers and drama.

IR 1.1.3 Sixty collection center operators certified in cleaning, weighing, bagging, tagging, and storing sesame.

Currently, the number of people certified in cleaning, weighing, bagging, tagging and storing sesame is 37 as compared to the 60 envisaged. This intermediate result is then accomplished at 61%. Since training was linked to the schedule for the establishment of the collection centers, there was no need for training more people. All the operators

visited in Senegal and The Gambia during the MTE indicated that they had received the training prior to working in the collection centers.

IR 1.1.4 Record keeping and inventory control procedures established and each center will employ a certified storekeeper

In order to keep track of sesame movement into and out of storage, CRS and its partners developed a record keeping system and relevant manuals. A total of 18 people have been trained and certified for record keeping and inventory control. All the trained persons passed a proficiency test. Because of the limited number of collection centers that have been established, this activity has been achieved at 60%.

Of the 6 cleaning machines visited in Senegal and The Gambia during the MTE, all but one had record keeping and inventory control systems in place. The problem is that the documents are not always kept in one place and not always properly recorded.

IR 1.1.5 Collection center location and services are made known to sesame growers and buyers

Only 7.7% of sesame growers can correctly identify the location of the nearest collection center. This means that the collection centers are not able to efficiently perform their functions either as market venues or as sources of marketing information. As a result, CRS and its partners have readjusted the strategy, focusing on buying points and assembly points. Table 2 presents that marketing venues currently operational in the DAP zones of intervention.

Table 2: Number of sites locations where sesame is bought, cleaned and sold

Marketing Venue	NAWFA	GADEC	ASSOLUCER	7 A
Buying Points	72	13	135	28
Assembly Points		2	14	14
Collection Centers	5	1	1	1

2.1.2 Sub-Strategic objective 1.2: Democratic and efficiently managed Farmers Associations (Senegal) and the Sesame Growers Association (The Gambia) represent the concerns of, and provide policy advocacy services to members.

FY04 results report indicated that 50% of SGA/Farmer association members interviewed were satisfied with their experience being a member of the association. The management matrix score from questionnaires administered to SGA committee members indicated that there is a need for more training so that they can better support their members.

Most SGAs and Associations are well structured and legally recognized. Some are democratically governed but many are not. Members participate actively in Association meetings. There is literacy program for association members in the Gambia, but not in Senegal.

Of the 4 DAP partners, 2 are grass root membership organizations (ASSOLUCER and NAWFA) and 2 are Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) (GADEC and 7A). The goal of the 2 NGOs is to build the capacity of the Unions and Federations farmers' groups with which they work. The grass root membership organizations, as partners, are responsible for building the capacity of the farmers groups which are their members. As membership organizations, they should benefit from capacity building activities also.

IR 1.2.1 Farmers organizations are democratically governed, well managed and have planning, financial and administrative systems in place

NGO support to farmer organizations

GADEC has done a great job in the capacity building of local associations and organizations. 7 Village level organizations have received support from GADEC for reorganization and legal recognition. 3 have already gotten legal recognition as *Groupement d'Intérêt Economique* (GIE) and 2 are in their way to being recognized. All 7 Associations' group members were trained in organizational development including: group leadership, how to conduct meetings, role of group members, how an organization functions, etc.

Adequate tools for management of group activities were developed in local languages by GADEC, including tools for sesame collection. The two groups visited during the MTE showed a clear sense of democracy and governance. In the second group, though the group is mixed, women participate actively in group decision-making.

According to the director of GADEC, once the groups are legally recognized and functioning, GADEC will accompany them in the creation of a federation of sesame growers which may in the long run join FENPROSE. The objective is for the Farmers' Associations and Federation to be advocates for their members' interests and to be able to contract with buyers for the sale of the members' sesame.

7A had an internal evaluation in 1994 which revealed that many of the grass root organizations with which they were working did not have the desire to represent their constituency's needs. Moreover, their leaders did not want to function in a democratic manner. With the assistance of an NGO called *Fondation Rurale pour l'Afrique de l'Ouest* (FRAO), 7A developed a 5-year strategic plan and changed its approach in the field. 7A works with all villagers and when a grass root organization emerges, 7A reinforces the management capacity and the governance of the structures, which now includes groups and federations. It currently works with *Fédération ADC Ninamba* and *Union de Kento* and as well as several village groups. The Union and the Federation are well structured, legally recognized and democratically managed. At a meeting with the *Union de Kento*, one member told the evaluation team "our previous president was ejected because he wanted to always make decisions alone".

Membership Based Organizations

ASSOLUCER, created in 1984, has an Executive bureau of 9 members of which 4 are literate (French). The Bureau is renewed every 2 years although both the President and the Vice president have been appointed since 1984. The Vice President and the

treasurer are women. ASSOLUCER has a committee made of 30 persons which manages the institution on the day-to-day basis and makes most important decisions. ASSOLUCER is composed of 86 groups. 18 of them have an annual plan, and 59 have by-laws. ASSOLUCER is reported to have a computerized accounting system which was established by CRS. ASSOLUCER's financial management capacity is presently weak due to inadequate staffing, tools, and procedures but is being built up progressively by CRS.

The National Women's Farmer Association (NAWFA) is a membership-based organization in The Gambia comprising 74 SGAs and operating in 1,070 villages with an estimated membership of 48,000 (Sonko and Ceesay 2004). NAWFA has a well-established network from the village level to the national NAWFA secretariat. The National Executive Committee (NEC), appoints the executive Director. No term of office has been specified for this position. Some NEC members indicated this was the mistake they made during the elaboration of their constitution. NEC members (14) are elected by SGA members. SGA committee members are themselves elected based on their dynamism and their honesty. They must also be a Kaffo president, the village level organization. Although presidents are democratically elected, there is often not a big turnover in executive committee members at the Kaffo and SGA levels.

Most of the village-based women farmers' groups, Kaffos, have registered with NAWFA and/or the Attorney General's Department or elsewhere. The SGAs, the district level structures, are recognized and respected organizations for women. Increasingly, the SGAs are providing voice and choice to women. They serve as conduits for disseminating information to their respective Kaffos as well as mobilizing and channeling development resources to women, most of which now come from NAWFA.

Overall, although the SGAs and Associations visited in The Gambia and Senegal seem to be well structured and to have strong leadership, the strengthening of these grass root organizations remains important. Illiteracy is high among the association members and financial management aspects need to be reinforced.

IR1.2.2 1700 SGA members trained in literacy

Literacy training is only conducted in The Gambia using private funds. Of the 929 people who were targeted for literacy training in FY04, 450 were trained and only 39% of those passed the final test.

The population is very interested in the literacy training. As of February 2005, 600 people are enrolled in literacy training in 32 classes. A trainer in CRD-North indicated that the training is aimed at helping participants to know how to weigh and to calculate. The class is held 2 hours per day for 3 days a week. All the SGA members in that division are participating in the classes.

IR 1.2.3 Sesame growers' concerns and needs are represented to key government agencies, and mutually supportive linkages are made with research institutions and other development agencies.

In order to respond to this objective, CRS Senegal has taken a big step to support the creation of the *Fédération Nationale des Producteurs de Sésame* (FENPROSE). FENPROSE was created following meetings organized by CRS. It is made of 5 Associations including 7A, *Association Africaine de la Jeunesse Agricole et Culturelle* (AJAC), ASSOLUCER, *Fédération des Associations de Développement Communautaire de Balantacounda* (FADECBA), and The Federation of the Women Associations of Bignona. It has been recognized as a *Groupe d'Intérêt Economique* (GIE). The purpose of FENPROSE is to facilitate exchanges among the growers and to strengthen their capacity in negotiation. Its vision and mission still need to be clarified. Because it is only a nascent organization, it has not been in a position to represent sesame growers concerns to key government agencies.

In The Gambia, NAWFA has actively intensified its land advocacy campaign to promote women's access to land. During the MTE, the evaluation team met with a village chief who is the head of the advocacy committee. He reported that thanks to this campaign, all 23 women's groups in his village have been allocated land ranging from 1-2 ha or less, depending on the size of the association. Another land advocacy committee member in Njau, CRD-North, indicated that the process has yielded good results. Of 82 kafoos in the area, 2 have received permanent land for sesame farming. The other kafoos were given land nearby the villages, which is a good step towards having permanent access to land.

2.1.3 Sub-Strategic Objective 1.3 Research is conducted to identify and reduce the costs of, and constraints to marketing; to improve the post harvest handling practices; and to increase productivity of sesame farmers.

The FY04 results report indicated that 35% of farmers have adopted two or more recommended production techniques. A study on the costs of production was conducted and a comparative analysis was made of sesame production and other crops. Based on research results, three sesame varieties have been recommended in The Gambia. Both programs (Senegal and The Gambia) have produced extension messages and training materials which have incorporated the research/study results.

It should be noted that much of the information that has been collected to date and the information that will be collected from the gender and socio-economic studies could have been more effectively used to inform the design process. While marketing studies had been conducted prior to the Senegambia DAP design, no commodity chain analysis was done. A commodity chain analysis is broader than a marketing study because it examines a sector from production to consumption. Much of the research being commissioned under this DAP would have been part of a commodity chain analysis. This type of analysis may have identified the production and supply problems which are reducing the effectiveness of the marketing strategy of the current DAP.

IR 1.3.1 Thirty farmers participated in on-farm research and receive training in seed multiplication and sales of market-oriented varieties

On-farm varietal research has been conducted in The Gambia and in Senegal. Since the beginning of the project, 116 farmers have participated in on farm research with 100% of the FY04 target achieved. In contrast, only 18 farmers have been trained in seed multiplication.

Both the National Agricultural Research Institute (NARI), The Gambia, and the *Centre d'Etude Régionale pour l'Amélioration de l'Adaptation à la Sécheresse* (CERAAS), Senegal, conducted research on improved varieties of sesame. Both organizations have been unable to supply sufficient seed of the improved varieties they've identified. The sesame specialist and the Director General of NARI confirmed that 3 varieties are being recommended in the Gambia: (1) Primoca, (2) Jalgon, (3) Cross #2. Primoca is a black variety which is mainly used for oil processing; Jalgon and Cross #2 are white varieties, which are in demand for export markets. Currently, NARI has approximately 500 kg of seed that can be multiplied during the next cropping season. They will be identifying farmers for seed multiplication and believe that in 2 or 3 years good quality seeds will be widely available. There is also a need for an appropriate seeding plate/seeder which will be the object of research during FY05 and FY06.

IR1.3.2 Transaction costs estimated for identified link to marketing chain and results reviewed at workshop for possible incorporation into the project.

No action has been undertaken.

IR1.3.3 Data on socio-economic and gender influence on sesame production, processing and marketing decisions collected, analyzed, reviewed, and incorporated into the project

Although this study is scheduled for FY2005, it should be noted that an M&E report issued by CRS Senegal for the 3 DAP partners indicated the following:

- 76% of the sesame growers were male and 24% female
- Of producers who have abandoned their field, 75% were female and 25% were male.

In The Gambia, women reported having problems with access to land and to farming implements. Also, sesame competes with other crops. When it is time for sesame to be planted, it is time to weed other fields making it difficult to concentrate on sesame.

IR 1.3.4 Information on post harvest treatment and appropriate seed cleaning technology collected, reviewed and incorporated into the project

The results report indicated that this activity was conducted in both countries. The consultant's report from the study in The Gambia provides very explicit and detailed information on crop production and post harvest handling operations. The adoption of these technologies is still slow in both countries because of a lack of agricultural equipment such as plastic sheeting, and weak extension services for sesame.

IR1.3.5 Production cost collected, analyzed and reviewed to determine profitability and competitions for farm resources

As indicated in the results report, the production costs and pre/post harvesting studies were completed for Senegal in FY04. A comparative analysis between crops was made to demonstrate the high value of sesame production.

IR1.3.6 “Best practices” in sesame production identified, tested, assessed in farmers, workshops conducted and incorporated in the project

In The Gambia, CRS and NAWFA have developed a document on promoting the production, consumption and marketing of sesame in the Gambia which provides useful information and technical guidance for sesame production and post harvest handling. Simple messages for each operation as well as a message dissemination strategy using various media and communication techniques have been developed. CRS Senegal has also developed a training package for sesame growers based on research results and farmers’ knowledge.

Farmers indicated that several factors have made the application of the best practice technical package difficult, particularly by women. These include: the lack of appropriate farming implements; competition for farmers’ time at key points in the cropping season; and inadequate extension service support for sesame.

2.2 Strategic Objective 2: Increased availability of food for vulnerable households in Senegal and The Gambia by 2006.

2.2.1 Sub-Strategic Objective 2.1: 3,959 MT of food distributed to vulnerable individuals.

All beneficiaries interviewed during the MTE expressed their gratitude for having received the food. For some, having someone take an interest in their well being was a source of courage and hope. Most beneficiaries and some commodity management committee members indicated that the size of the ration was inadequate but that even the amount that people receive has made a difference in their lives.

I.R.2.1.1. Distribution of 3169.6 MT of food to vulnerable individuals in institutions.

I.R.2.1.2. Distribution of 792.4 MT of food to vulnerable individuals in communities.

According to the FY04 results report, 1,273 MT of the total LOA 3,959 MT have been distributed to date (32% of LOA target). Given the late startup of Safety Net Activities (March 2003), these results are on-target and consistent with a program in its second year of activity. Of the food distributed, approximately 60% has been distributed in The Gambia and 40% in Senegal.

During the DAP design, it was assumed that the proportion of food distributed through institutions would be higher than that distributed to communities. Over the life of the project, the proportion of food originally allocated to institutions and to communities

has been modified for a variety of reasons. In The Gambia, for example, it appears that the numbers of potential beneficiaries at the health centers were overestimated when the targeting studies were conducted. In addition, most of the health centers only offer dry rations because they lack the facilities to prepare food on site. Since the health centers are distributing dry rations, most of their beneficiaries could be served through the CMC system.

In Senegal, several of the institutions which benefit from the Safety Net program are associated with schools or shelters serving poor communities so that they are using wet rations on-site. Others, such as the centers which do nutritional rehabilitation for severely malnourished centers, provide both wet and dry rations. While the overall quantity of food remains the same, communities now distribute 80% of the food while institutional food distribution accounts for 20%. The Safety Net Program also responds to emergency situations and distributed 10,000 kilos of WSB to flood victims in Basse, The Gambia, during FY04.

The ration size and type are not tailored to the beneficiary categories. According to the DAP document, the rationale for the ration size is to provide 100% of the caloric intake for the chronically ill in an institution and 20% of the caloric intake for the vulnerable person plus four family members in the community so that the amount of food distributed to each beneficiary, regardless of category, is the same: 7.2 kg yellow corn, 0.49 kg of lentils, 0.69 kg vegetable oil, and 6.8 kg of wheat soybean blend (WSB). There is no special allocation for malnourished children, the largest beneficiary category in The Gambia. This food lasts from 2 days to 2 weeks depending on whether or not the food is shared with other household/compound members and the household size. During DAP implementation, the DAP managers strictly interpreted the ration sizes presented in the project document which were based on Food and Nutrition Technical Assistance (FANTA) guidelines.

The odd ration size makes it difficult to measure on distribution day, particularly the WSB which appears to be hygroscopic changing in weight and volume once the sack has been opened. The DAP team has provided each distribution center with standard measuring cups but it appears that these were made without taking into account the volume of the different commodities. It would be easier to measure and to maintain accurate records if the ration sizes were round numbers.

Both institutions and communities (committees and beneficiaries) indicated that it cost too much money and took too much time to mill the maize so it could be used in the household. All those interviewed said that they would prefer to receive the maize in another form. CRS has already modified the FY06 call forward and requested maize grits to replace the whole grain maize.

2.2.2 Sub-Strategic Objective 2.2: Twenty institutions and twenty communities are able to analyze the causes of food insecurity and provide support to vulnerable groups.

I.R 2.2.1. Twenty institutions trained on food security issues.

I.R 2.2.2. Twenty communities trained on food security issues.

According to the FY04 results report, 14 institutions (100% of target to date) and 10 communities (200% of target to date) have received training in food security issues. In addition to training on the causes of food insecurity, food security analyses are being conducted at the community level. Five have already been conducted (3 in The Gambia, 2 in Senegal) using participatory rural assessment techniques. The documentation provided to the MTE team on the two exercises in Senegal did not contain detailed food security action plans but rather a list of priorities for which the communities have identified. It is the action plans which are the most important part of this exercise. The plans will enable communities to implement a strategy to reduce food insecurity overall and to provide services and support to vulnerable people who cannot care for themselves. Without this plan, safety net interventions at the community level will not be sustainable. Despite the importance of this activity, it has not been given priority for implementation. In addition, there is no provision for follow up by either CRS or its partners. Once the plan is written and communities trained to find financial support from other donors (IR 2.2. 6), the responsibility of the DAP staff and its partners ends.

IR 2.2.3. Twenty communities trained in conflict resolution and transformation.

No training in conflict resolution and transformation to date but some training planned for FY05 in Senegal where conflicts have been identified between returning refugees and the local population.

IR 2.2.4. Three hundred and sixty peer group counselors trained in nutrition counseling and home-based care of persons with HIV/AIDS in targeted communities.

150 of 360 peer group counselors (PC) have been trained under a privately funded project in The Gambia. This project was designed to promote behavior changes in mothers with malnourished children. It is focused on messages for treating malaria, diarrhea, acute respiratory infections and exclusive breast feeding. It was hoped that there would be synergies between the PC program and the Safety Net but only two communities which distribute food have peer counselors. Most of the peer counselors are concentrated on the south bank of the Gambia River where food distribution is done by institutions.

While it would be useful to have peer counselors follow up with the care of vulnerable people receiving the safety net food, assisting them to better use the food and maintain a clean environment, the system is set up to address mother-child health. It would need to be modified to include messages on caregiving for vulnerable family members, healthy eating habits for the chronically ill, etc.

CRS and GAFNA, the implementing partner for both the safety net and the peer counseling project have recently held meetings to identify ways that there can be more collaboration between the two programs. In the context of the DAP, the PC should be viewed as a pilot effort and if linkages and impact can be shown, it should be incorporated into future safety net initiatives.

IR 2.2.5. Twenty institutions trained in proposal development, resources acquisition and diversification of funding.

IR 2.2.6. Twenty communities trained in proposal development, resources acquisition and diversification of funding.

No institutions or communities have been trained for proposal development, resource acquisition, and diversification of funding to date. These activities are scheduled for FY05.

In The Gambia, many of the CMC members are illiterate and will be unable to write proposals themselves. More emphasis in the training activities needs to be placed on mobilizing resources within the community. For example, the CMCs in The Gambia and the Parish Committees in Senegal might explore ways to utilize the traditional Moslem tithing system (Azaka) to assist them in providing safety net services to vulnerable people in the communities. Since communities in The Gambia receive technical assistance from GAFNA, it may be more useful for GAFNA to have good proposal writing skills to assist the communities in raising funds. In Senegal, more Parish committee members are literate. But even in Senegal, in the short term, it may be more important for CARITAS (Tambacounda and Kolda) to be able to write good proposals.

Many of the institutions in Senegal visited during the MTE are run by missionaries or by NGOs which have been quite successful in soliciting funds/support for their activities. The resources provided by the Senegambia DAP, while important, are complementary to their overall programs. In The Gambia, the Health Centers are government organizations and have until recently been exclusively dependent on government support. A new initiative to recover the costs of the health center services has placed more responsibility on communities to identify priorities and to manage the health centers. This provides an opportunity for the DAP to work with the community health committees to enable them to identify creative ways of mobilizing local resources and to solicit funds from outside the community.

2.2.3 Sub-Strategic Objective 2.3: Institutions and Communities can manage safety net interventions for vulnerable groups.

I.R.2.3.1. Twenty institutions trained in organizational financial systems and commodity management.

I.R.2.3.2. Twenty communities trained in organizational financial systems and commodity management.

IR.2.3.3. One hundred percent of commodities accounted for by institutions and community organizations.

All institutions and communities have established written agreements with the partners for food distribution activities. In addition, they have all been using established criteria for beneficiary selection. The selection criteria have been applied more flexibly in Senegal than in The Gambia.

Targets for training both institutions and communities in commodity management and financial systems have been surpassed, 114.3% and 110.7% respectively but it appears that there is less understanding among the implementing communities on what the

financial management training entailed. Not one person interviewed in either Senegal or The Gambia during the MTE mentioned training themes that were other than commodity management.

90% of institutions and 70% of communities have received a satisfactory audit rating based on end-use checkers reports. This audit system is being piloted in The Gambia and will be used in Senegal soon. It is interesting to note that according to the system which measures effective commodity management, a rating of 70% would be grounds for removal from the program. Since only 70% of the communities received a satisfactory rating, GAFNA needs to provide more training and technical support to communities to improve the commodity management systems.

In Senegal, several of the monthly reports which were reviewed during the MTE indicated that there are still problems in accounting for both beneficiaries and commodities. Some of the beneficiaries are not “signing” the registers as they receive the commodities. There are discrepancies between approved and actual beneficiary numbers which are not being reported. For example, one institution reported consistently the same number of beneficiaries each month. When asked about this, they indicated that the numbers change daily. It became apparent that in both Senegal and in The Gambia, the partners are not “catching” these reporting errors and are therefore not doing appropriate pipeline analyses in preparing commodity requests for submission to CRS. There is a need to ensure greater compliance and understanding of this process by partners, institutions, and community/parish committees.

3.0 Assessment of Program Strategy

The DAP design was based on a previous DAP implemented in The Gambia from 1996-2001. Because of logistical and administrative reasons (donor environment, complementarity between the programs with similar priorities in food security), it was decided to submit a joint DAP for The Gambia and Senegal. Two components were included: a Sesame Promotion and Marketing Component and a Safety Net Component. A comprehensive analysis of the Sesame Component (proposed strategy, current strategy, analysis of market stability and efficiency) has been done during the MTE and is presented in a separate report. The main elements are presented here. For additional detail, please refer to the Sesame Component Report.

3.1 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Strategy

3.1.1 Sesame Component

The Sesame Component strategy of CRS was developed on assumptions which came out of a United States Agency for International Development (USAID) study of expanding sesame production in the region, and the final evaluation of the Gambia DAP. These studies indicated that increases in overall sesame production regionally had been limited by the need to consolidate small lot sizes into larger (more efficient) quantities in order to increase export market opportunities for farmers. The small lot sizes produced by farmers raise the collection costs of buyers, which in turn lowers the prices offered to farmers. The establishment of Collection Centers, which clean, weigh, bag and consolidate sesame into export-size quantities would improve the efficiency of marketing activities and lower the marketing costs for both farmers and buyers. For

these reasons CRS chose to focus on sesame marketing as a strategy to address food insecurity in the Senegambia.

A summary of the strengths and weaknesses of the strategy is presented in Table 3.

Table 3: Strengths and weaknesses of the sesame component strategy

Strengths	Weaknesses
-Market strategy adjusted to local conditions (buying points, assembly points, collection centers)	- Too much emphasis on marketing and insufficient focus on crop production and seed multiplication
- Markets stabilized and market efficiencies realized	- Extension services inadequate and do not reach all farmers
- Farm gate price to farmers increased	- Poor access to farm implements and appropriate technologies for post harvest handling
- Linkages between buyers, sellers, banks facilitated by program	- Pre-financing of sesame buying still a problem
- In Senegal, sesame recognized as an important alternative crop that is now receiving government support	- Lack of professionalism in the associations to ensure credibility with buyers
- Literacy training provided to SGA members in The Gambia	

Strengths

Marketing strategy

The original DAP marketing strategy was centered on “collection centers” becoming market venues for farmers. In reality, this strategy did not work for the following reasons:

- Slow establishment of the collection centers in Senegal: November, 2004, for GADEC (now functional); March, 2004, for 7A (has not started functioning); and 2003 for ASSOLUCER (functioned 2003/2004 but will not function 2004/2005).
- Distance between production sites and collection centers too great in both Senegal (up to 100 km) and The Gambia (50 km) resulting in increased transaction costs for farmers and associations. In addition relying on the centers to provide market and production information to farmers would have had limited outreach given the distances.
- Bulking and credit payment was not a feasible option. The marketing season opens in Decembers, a time when farmers need cash. Other actors in the marketing channel such as “banabana” offer to pay 20-25% less but they pay cash.

- In both countries, it came out clearly that supply is a major problem in sesame promotion and marketing. The demand far exceeds the supply and structural problems on the supply side seem to have been overlooked in the DAP design. These include: (1) the seed multiplication and supply mechanism is inadequate; (2) growers lack access to appropriate agricultural materials for production and post harvest operations (sine plow and seeding plates/seeder, appropriate cleaning materials/plastic sheets); and (3) partners still have difficulties finding buyers or other support for pre-financing the purchase of the sesame.

Because CRS and its partners found that the collection center approach did not facilitate sesame marketing, they quickly moved to adjust the strategy to take into account local conditions. This permitted a more cost effective system of marketing.

The new strategy offers sesame growers more options for services provided in the marketing channel: buying points, where the actual buying and selling of sesame takes place; assembly points, where the sesame is transported and stored; collection centers, where the sesame is cleaned, bagged and sold to the buyer. A wide range of actors is involved in the system, each with a specific role to play (Table 4). This new system has promoted market stability and in some cases, greater efficiency.

Table 4: Summary of services provided and actors in the marketing channel

Channel	Services provided	Actors
Village/kafoo level	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Training in production techniques³ - Post harvest handling⁴ - Market information⁵ - Transportation of crops to home or buying point⁶ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The farmer The extension agent The SGA committee Contact/Model farmer
Buying point level	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Buying and selling of the sesame⁷ - Transport to Collection center or Assembly point - Meetings and sharing of information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Producers (individuals or kafoos) - Buying committee members⁸ - Machine operation staff
Assembly points	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Bulk and storage of sesame - Transport sesame to cleaning machine or buyers collect it from there 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Association/SGA members - Contact farmers Extension workers
Collection center (can also serve as a buying point)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Weighing before and after cleaning - Record keeping (in and out) - Cleaning with machine - Standardizing (50kg/bag) - Storage - Transportation - SGA Meetings 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Center management committee members⁹ - Buyers

³ This includes: land selection, land preparation, seed selection and storage, planting, tilling, gap filling, plowing, harvesting

⁴ This includes: threshing, sieving/cleaning

⁵ This includes: Prices offered, date of sales, place of sales, quality of sesame required and prices

⁶ This is supported by the farmer. Sometime the buying committee buy and collect the sesame from the village

⁷ Includes: weighing, buying and selling of sesame, record keeping, calculation of commissions, bagging, sowing, tagging, storage,

⁸ Buying committee members include: SGA president, SGA vice president, Cashier, Secretary, Extension agent.

Market efficiency and pricing policy

As indicated in the FY04 results report, the ratio of farm gate price to the export price increased from 31% in FY02, to 38% in FY03 and to 46% in FY04. The average net margin for sesame growers is 85.72 FCFA/kg in Senegal while it is 5.08 D/kg in The Gambia (Table 1). Farmers are getting high prices for their produce which is largely due to the impact of the DAP partners' pricing policies geared toward improved farm gate prices for growers.

Price setting policies so far adopted by CRS partners consist of:

- setting the price so high that the “banabana” cannot compete. This ensures that prices are stabilized and that farmers receive a high price. In addition, it encourages farmers to sell through the DAP established mechanism.
- basing the price on the higher international market prices for white sesame.

In The Gambia, the National Executive Committee of NAWFA sets the price, taking into account the international price, NAWFA costs, NAWFA mark up, as well as the prices offered at the local market. In 2003/2004, while NAWFA was offering 6 D/kg the “banabana” offered 7 D/kg. Farmers sold to the “banabana”. NAWFA then increased the price to 9 D/kg, a price the “banabana” could no longer offer. In addition, they conducted tender sales publicizing their offers in the newspapers.

In Senegal, FENPROSE members set prices during a meeting prior to the marketing season. They also look at the international market prices, their past year pricing experience. They all agree on a minimum farm gate price for the marketing season. This has helped stabilize the market and provide high price to growers.

An analysis of the cost of production, transaction costs and prices at each level of the marketing channel¹⁰ indicates that the ratio of net margins/final prices varies from 15.76% to 33.44% for the growers. The same ratio varies from -16.17% to 5.77% for the export companies. In general, when this ratio is >15%, it indicates that the market may not be efficient. In the case of the DAP, market inefficiency was confirmed by one of the NAWFA buyers who indicated that he will not purchase sesame this year because he cannot make a profit with the actual farm gate prices offered by NAWFA. Another buyer explained that with the world market price dropping and the farm gate price increasing, it would be difficult to make a profit. With the drop in the international market prices and with the prices offered to growers at a maximum, the partners should be careful not to speculate with the prices. The marketing business is a win-win game and each actor should have an interest in providing its services in the channel. This situation also highlights the importance of monitoring and reducing costs of marketing, for example, the high marketing costs of 7A have tremendously reduced its margins.

⁹ SGA executive bureau members, Machine operation staff, Extension agent

¹⁰ Detailed tables available in the Sesame Component Evaluation Report

Linkages between buyers, sellers, and banks

Since most growers will accept only cash for their sesame, the DAP partners are obliged to find the financial resources to pre-finance the purchase of sesame. CRS has facilitated the forum of buyers, growers associations and private sector, which has helped the associations to establish contacts with buyers and to negotiate initial pre-financing arrangements. In Senegal, private buyers such as RECOFI and SIMEX accepted to take the risk to pre-finance ASSOLUCER, 7A and GADEC. In The Gambia, NAWFA has benefited from a Marketing fund set up by CRS to pre-finance sesame purchases from the SGA's.

The buyers indicated that pre-financing is risky for them. Not only do they not have good knowledge of the DAP Partners except through CRS, but also, the partners do not have any tangible guarantees. In addition, buyers fear that after agreeing on a price, the partners will renege on the arrangement if someone else offers a higher price.

It is important to note that the whole system pricing system by which farmers are getting fair prices for their produce cannot be sustained unless DAP partners have cash for the purchase of the sesame in their intervention area. In some areas of NAWFA zone, it was reported that because of the late pre-financing, the "banabana" were able to offer lower farm gate price (10 D/kg instead of 13 D/kg offered by NAWFA).

After these first contacts, initiated by CRS, the DAP partners have been able to successfully negotiate contracts with other buyers.

Sesame Promotion

CRS has been successful in bringing the production of sesame as an alternative cash crop into the public arena in Senegal. In 2003, the Government of Senegal initiated the *Programme d'Appui au Développement de la Filière Sésame* (PADFSE) to promote sesame production nationwide. The new sesame program was developed because of the concerted efforts of several organizations such as CRS, microfinance institutions, and buyers.

The objective of the Government program is to improve food security for rural households through poverty reduction and improved nutrition. More specifically, the Government interventions will focus on:

- Promoting the production of sesame as a cash crop to increase income and improve nutrition. Production techniques will be explained on the radio and using other media; sesame will be introduced into regions which do not traditionally produce it;
- Making seeds freely available to all farmers;
- Providing Sesame Growers Association and Government decentralized services with 100 cleaning machines and processing units;
- Supporting government extension agents and farmers' training in sesame production; and
- Subsidizing the purchase of farming equipment and agricultural inputs such as fertilizer (fertilizers 50%, equipment 75-80%).

The government will use its decentralized Ministry of Agriculture services as well as NGOs and Associations to provide seeds and training to farmers. In 2003/2004, the government provided seeds to all sesame farmers in the country and has supported the production of 800 sine hoes. It will be important for CRS Senegal to stay informed about the program activities; to facilitate linkages between their partners, the farmers associations, and the government; and to explore ways of establishing a partnership between CRS and the government to more effectively support sesame growers in Senegal. CRS's expertise in sesame production and marketing makes it a good potential partner for the sesame promotion program.

According to information received from buyers during the MTE, there is a need for a strong advocacy program in The Gambia in order to encourage the government to promote sesame production. In both Senegal and The Gambia, efforts are still needed to promote sesame at the grass root level.

Literacy

In The Gambia, literacy training has been offered to SGA members. This activity has been greatly appreciated by the participating members. Because of the low level of literacy, many women are excluded from the management committees of the associations. In addition, they cannot actively participate as promotion agents and contact farmers within the NAWFA extension system. Literacy training increases the pool of people available to ascend to management positions and ensures more democratic governance of the organizations.

Weaknesses

Sesame production for market demand and seed multiplication

According to the sesame buyers in both countries, the quantity of sesame produced is far below the market demand. The results report indicated that DAP partners marketed 102 MT in 2001/2002, 325 MT in 2002/2003 and 554.5MT in 2003/2004. A buyer in The Gambia said "I was aiming for 1,000MT in 2005 but I am not sure I am going to get it". Another buyer in Senegal said "If I had 3,000 MT of sesame I would market it right away". One reason for insufficient quantities of sesame is that in both countries, sesame yields are very low.

In the Gambia, sesame yields vary between 150 kg/ha to 500 kg/ha, with an average of 365 kg/ha (Mopoi, 2004). In Senegal, DAP M&E data indicate that 2003 yields vary between 273 kg/ha and 385 kg/ha with an average of 343 kg/ha. Some of the principal reasons given to explain low yields in both countries are: 1) farmers do not have access to adapted sesame varieties and good quality seed; 2) farmers are not using improved production and post harvest handling techniques; 3) farmers do not have access to appropriate farm implements; and 4) extension services are inadequate and do not reach all farmers. Two other reasons that are particularly pertinent to women farmers are: 1) sesame production operations compete with other crops such as rice, peanuts, and cereal; 2) yields are traditionally lower on communal fields and women are more likely to grow sesame as a group on communal land. It is only recently that NAWFA is advocating for women to have access to individual fields for their own sesame production.

In both Senegal and The Gambia, farmers do not access to good quality seed for planting. Seeds provided to the farmers are most often not certified. Farmers cannot know the quality of the seeds nor the variety that they're given. In Senegal, seeds are supplied by the Government, the buyers and the local market. Most often the seeds come from the sesame that has been purchased for export, not produced especially for the seed market. In The Gambia, NAWFA is providing the seeds to the growers. Here too, the seeds are not certified seeds. Moreover, growers reported that the late arrival of seeds from NAWFA is also a problem. Growers either have to plant late or find seeds on the local market with are not always the appropriate variety for their conditions.

Until recently, farmers grew whatever varieties were available on the market or given to them. In The Gambia, two improved sesame varieties, 38-1-7 and 32-15, are being promoted throughout the country. They are clean, large and white which corresponds to international market demand. They command a higher price compared to the dark varieties. An estimated 85.54% of the area planted to sesame is in white varieties while 11.35% is in black sesame and 3.11% is in a mix. In Senegal, white sesame is also being promoted. The buyers who were interviewed during the MTE indicated that not all the sesame produced is white. For example, in the GADEC project area, 53% of sesame producers grow 38-1-7; 21% grow Primoca (a black variety); and the rest grow Jalgon (a white variety) or a mix.

It is important to note, however, that for the moment, all the sesame produced is purchased, although buyers in both Senegal and The Gambia indicated that there are insufficient quantities of white sesame to meet their demands. This is because in both countries, seed multiplication and distribution is still a critical problem.

While most sesame production and marketing efforts are now focused on international export markets, during the mid-term evaluation, at least one buyer indicated interest in establishing a sesame oil processing plant in Senegal. If he succeeds in doing that, there will be a local demand for black varieties of sesame which have higher oil content. It will be important to keep abreast of current trends in both the international and domestic markets in order to ensure that farmers have access to high quality seed for whichever market they are producing.

Extension services inadequate and not available to all farmers

In order to ensure that farmers respond to the market demand in quality and quantity, CRS, through its partners, has provided extension services and market information services to the growers. Both Senegal and The Gambia have used field agents/extension workers and contact farmers to train sesame growers in improved production and post harvest techniques. The field agents are trained by Partner staff, by government extension agents and agronomists, and by CRS staff. They in turn train the contact farmers in each village who train and follow up farmers in their fields.

In Senegal, while this approach has been less costly and provides a mechanism for ensuring long term sustainability, the contact farmer does not have a means of transport. In addition, he is only paid 10 FCFA/kg of sesame collected during the marketing season as an incentive to provide services to the farmers. Some contact farmers travel up to 15 km which makes it difficult to do their jobs. Some contact

farmers do not themselves farm sesame which reduces their effectiveness and credibility with sesame growers. Some contact farmers are illiterate which poses difficulties for data collection and the reliability of the data collected.

In addition, the Promotion agents who supervise the contact farmers do not always have an agricultural or marketing background. They only receive a couple of days of training from the Partner supervisors and CRS which is not enough to effectively do their jobs. Some agents cover more than 1000 farmers in 60 villages.

In The Gambia, some extension workers reported that they cover 500 farmers in the kafoo. Extension workers may have to travel more than 50 km to reach the farmers for whom they are responsible. Some of the extension workers do not have a background in agriculture or marketing and while most of the SGA members are women, the extension agents are all men. They are only provided 3-5 days of training on agricultural production techniques. While they have been allocated motorcycles, they receive only 20 liters of fuel a month to do their extension work. With the number of growers increasing and with large distances which need to be covered, it is unlikely that proper extension services can be provided to growers. As a result, except for Sesame Grower Association (SGA) committee members, most growers are not adequately applying the production techniques that they are taught.

Farm implements and appropriate technologies

Growers, particularly women in both Senegal and The Gambia, indicated that the lack of appropriate farm implements is a major problem for them. Plows, seeders having a distributor plate adapted to sesame seeds, and plastic sheets for cleaning are the types of equipment/materials mentioned most frequently. The DAP Senegal M&E report indicated that in the GADEC area of intervention, 59% of producers use hand sowing which leads to a high plant density. The currently available seeder does not have a distribution plate adapted to small grains like sesame and its use leads to low yields if not used with a lot of caution.

While considerable emphasis is being placed on the cleaning machines installed at the collection centers, plastic sheets for threshing in the villages have been distributed and are in high demand by sesame growers. In Senegal, each village received only one plastic sheet which is insufficient for the needs of 30-80 sesame growers. Because the seed being brought to the collection centers is not clean enough, the efficiency of the cleaning machines is reduced. After cleaning, the amount of foreign matter in the GADEC sesame was as high as 8% while the normal manufacturer's specifications for foreign matter using the cleaning machine are 2-3%.

In The Gambia, in addition to promoting the use of the cleaning machines, emphasis is being placed on purchasing clean sesame at the buying points. When a farmer brings seed to the buying point which is not clean enough, the buying committee requires the grower to pay for laborers to re-clean the sesame before it is purchased. A buyer in The Gambia reported that, even when sesame is cleaned by NAWFA, he is sometimes obliged to clean it again before it meets international standards. The Japanese standard is currently 1 % level of foreign matter while the cleaning machines used by NAWFA have a 2-3 % level.

Most of the DAP project cleaning machines are under utilized which results in high operation costs. This poses a problem for the long term sustainability of the collection centers. For GADEC in Senegal, the sale of uncleaned sesame provided a net margin of 30 FCFA/kg compared to 32 FCFA/kg for cleaned sesame. There was only a 2 FCFA difference between the two net margins and depreciation of the machines was not included in the calculation.

For NAWFA, it would seem that the operating costs for the 5 machines with 5 generators and over 25 staff would be greatly reduced if the sesame was cleaned at one or two collection centers only. NAWFA informed the evaluation team that the running cost of the cleaning machines is so high that they won't be able to keep them operating without CRS support.

Pre-financing and credibility

Several issues are important to understand about the current pre-financing arrangements. Contracts are sometimes signed in November/December when the market prices of sesame are not known. If prices fall below the negotiated price, the buyer may no longer be interested in buying the sesame. The money they promised to pre-finance the campaign does not come when planned or does not come at all. The DAP partners are compelled to look for another offer.

Signing a contract implies that the Association/DAP partner knows quite well the quantity as well as the quality of sesame it will be offering. This is not the case now for many of the DAP partners. Their M&E systems are not yet functioning so that they are not in possession of such important information. As a result, some DAP partners have signed contracts that they are unable to honor. Defaulting on delivery has implications all along the marketing chain. The buyer at his level cannot honor his commitment to his partners in Europe or Asia. Credibility then becomes an issue for the product, the country and the buyer who can lose his customers in Europe or Japan. In some cases when this happens, the contract of the DAP partners can be renegotiated at a lower price.

The marketing channel, particularly at the level of the Associations, needs to become more professional. More emphasis needs to be placed on capacity building so that associations can know the quantity and quality of sesame that they can mobilize in order to negotiate contracts that can be honored.

3.1.2 Safety Net Component

There are many reasons for the continued presence of vulnerable groups such as the chronically ill, the disabled, and malnourished children in Senegal and The Gambia. The major reason is that the national governments in both countries do not have the resources available to provide services to meet their needs. The Safety net component was designed to provide humanitarian assistance to vulnerable groups and to strengthen the capacity of communities to advocate on their behalf and to provide future safety net support to vulnerable community members. Table 5 presents the strengths and weaknesses of the safety net program.

Table 5: Strengths and weaknesses of the safety net component

Strengths	Weaknesses
- Partner (GAFNA, Caritas) Networks cover a wide geographic area	- Difference in philosophy between CRS and CARITAS has spread Safety Net resources very thin in Senegal.
- Beneficiary selection at both the institution and community level was taken seriously by the people involved so that the most vulnerable people were selected.	- There is no integration between the Safety Net component and the agriculture component of the DAP; between the DAP and other CRS programs such as microfinance
- Food rations made chronically ill beneficiaries stronger and reduced the incidence of illness in other categories of beneficiaries.	- Partners and management committees (CMCs, Parishes) have little flexibility in implementing the program and finding solutions to local problems
- Ration sharing benefited children in the compound (freed up resources for school fees; made children more alert in school)	- Little emphasis has been placed on local capacity building to date

Strengths**Partner Networks**

Because CARITAS is a diocesan organization, it covers a wide geographical area. The entire diocese is divided into parishes and each one has a parish committee. This provides the DAP with an easy entrée into both the Tambacounda and Kolda regions of Senegal. It was interesting to note that one of the priests indicated that by organizing the parish committees to manage the Safety Net Component, he was better able to focus their attention on the need to do charitable work and development activities to alleviate poverty in their parishes.

Because CRS and GAFNA have worked closely together implementing health projects in The Gambia, GAFNA has a well established network of 119 community management committees (CMC) throughout the country. After the food security and vulnerability analyses were conducted and the most food insecure zones were selected, it was relatively easy to mobilize the CMCs in the program intervention zone. If there are additional shifts in emphasis, e.g. away from institutions toward communities in the south bank of the CRD, it would be possible to mobilize CMCs in this area to manage the food distribution at the community level.

Vulnerable groups and beneficiary selection

CRS and its partners established criteria for identifying vulnerable groups and through vulnerability assessments they were able to allocate beneficiary numbers among communities. From the information collected during the MTE, it appeared that the Parish committees and the CMCs respected the criteria and have chosen the most vulnerable members of the population. Because of the widespread poverty in the DAP zones, they are constantly being approached by people who would like to be included

in the program. All the committees, including the institutions, keep waiting lists to which they refer if for some reason they have food left in their stores.

Benefits of the food

During the MTE, some of the beneficiaries indicated that despite the fact that the food rations last a short amount of time, they have benefited considerably from them. One physically disabled man said that after eating the food, he stumbles and falls less often and does not get sick as often. Several chronically ill people indicated that they feel stronger when they have the safety net rations to eat. Several women indicated that they save the WSB to give to their children for breakfast before going to school. The children are more alert and seem to be learning better. One mother indicated that she has to hide the WSB from the older children who eat it as a snack (in powder form) when returning from school because they like it so much. Several parents indicated that the money they save on buying food is used to pay for school fees.

Most people indicated that they would appreciate it if the rations could be increased because of the positive effects on their strength. People living with HIV/AIDS indicated that they are better able to support their anti-retroviral medicines. They would like the rations to be more diversified to cover other food groups that they need which are too costly for them to buy.

Weaknesses

Coverage of Safety Net in Senegal

The Safety Net resources are spread very thin in Senegal because CARITAS believes that all of the parishes should benefit from the resources of the program. The result is that a small number of beneficiaries may be chosen from each village in a parish even when many of the villages are inaccessible during the rainy season, the period during which food is distributed. When beneficiaries are selected over a wide geographic area, vulnerable people have to travel long distances to collect the food on distribution day. According to the field coordinators and members of the parish committees, transportation to come to the parish warehouse can cost more than the value of the food received. In addition, during rainy season, farmers use their donkeys for field operations so that transportation may not be available. For these reasons, some potential beneficiaries have removed themselves from the program.

Integration/collaboration

There is no integration between the sesame component of the DAP and the safety net component even though there is geographical overlap in the intervention zones. In The Gambia, some of the CMC members are NAWFA members; some have indicated that they've requested assistance from NAWFA for sesame production but the agent didn't have the time to assist them. Many of the beneficiaries are farmers or from farming households so that some member could benefit from increased income from sesame production if there was more integration between the two components.

Likewise, there is no collaboration between the Microfinance program of CRS and the DAP safety net program. There is a tendency to view the safety net program only in

terms of humanitarian assistance and not in terms of reducing food insecurity. If more attention is given in the last year of the project to the development and implementation of the food security action plans, then closer linkages between farming, microenterprise development and microfinance could be established.

Flexibility in program implementation

During the MTE, the team was informed that CARITAS and GAFNA had attempted to solve problems related to food distribution, in particular, the distances that some beneficiaries have to come to get food, but that their solutions were rejected by CRS. Solutions included: pooling resources and letting one beneficiary come (with the authorization of the others) to collect the food of several; having a priest transport the food and facilitate distribution on the days he visited remote villages; sending food with another NGO which collaborates with the CRS Partner. If adequate controls are put in place and the solution is agreed upon by both beneficiaries and partners, then CRS should accept these initiatives as long as they are consistent with USAID regulations.

Community Management Committee members regularly indicated that they had quotas by beneficiary type and that they had no flexibility in replacing a disabled person for a malnourished child if there was a greater need. The notion of a quota was discounted by both CRS and GAFNA but the persistence of this idea indicates that through training or through field implementation, unofficial quotas have been imposed. During the MTE visits, many CMC members indicated that they would like more flexibility in selecting which vulnerable groups receive food in their communities while staying within the overall number of beneficiaries allocated to them.

Capacity building

Food security analysis training has begun it has not been as extensive as planned. The ultimate goal of the analysis is for communities to develop food security action plans which can be implemented by mobilizing community resources or through accessing outside resources. In Senegal, although the process has started and priorities have been established, it was unclear that this information had been translated into concrete action plans which are being implemented. For those which have been completed in The Gambia, there has been no attempt to monitor whether or not the plans have been implemented. This is a key element in ensuring sustainability of community managed safety net activities and should be given priority in the last year of the project. In addition, follow up activities by both CRS and its Partners should be part of their work plans.

Training has been effective in commodity management but needs to be reinforced and expanded, particularly in communities. CMC's and Parish committees should become involved in training people in their communities to participate in the food distribution in order to increase the volunteer base. This will enhance community solidarity but more importantly will reduce the burden on CMC and parish committee members, particularly if they feel that the current levels of incentive are insufficient for the services they provide.

At the institutions, particularly in The Gambia, the community health committees should become more involved in the food distribution program. At the Health Centers

visited in The Gambia, the commodity management team is made up of health professionals whose time should be used to assist the sick not manage commodities and the food distribution process.

The commodity management training that GAFNA conducts teaches the participants how to keep good records. However, in the case of the CMCs, many members are illiterate so record keeping becomes the function of a store clerk who gets paid 600 Dalasi per month for the six months that food is distributed (out of three visited two were men). Therefore, the capacity of the CMC to manage safety net activities is not being enhanced. In Senegal, the Parish committees often have members who are school teachers so that record keeping doesn't seem to be much of an issue. For this reason, literacy training should be an integral part of all future DAP activities.

3.2 Relevance of Activities

3.2.1 Safety Net Component

Food distribution for vulnerable people is still a relevant use of safety net resources but in order to reduce dependency, greater linkages between food aid and development activities need to be established. Several disabled people informed us during the MTE that although they cannot work, some other family member could engage in productive activities if given some assistance, such as microfinance. The activity most often cited in the urban centers was petty commerce; in rural areas, agriculture. Other types of assistance such as skills training (soap making, tie dyeing, etc), agricultural training and extension services (livestock raising; sesame production) could be offered to some vulnerable people and to their family members. In chronically food insecure areas, there will always be a need for a safety net program. By reducing the numbers of vulnerable people, it would be more feasible for a community to offer these services to those really in need in a sustainable manner without outside resources.

In Senegal, where poverty and destitution are criteria for selecting beneficiaries, food for work (FFW) could be used instead of direct food distributions for some groups, for example, single female heads of households with many dependents. This would require another level of management skill for CRS and its Partners, CARITAS, but it would enable communities to accomplish a range of projects: repairing roads and paths, bridges; repairing/constructing storage facilities; digging wells and simple irrigation systems; etc. Some countries insist that most food aid is channeled through FFW programs with only a small amount going to the most vulnerable groups: those confined to institutions, the elderly, chronically ill, and severely disabled. In Ethiopia, even emergency assistance is supposed to be distributed as 80% FFW, 20% direct distribution.

During the Child Survival Project in The Gambia, mothers paid a small fee (five dalasi) to weigh their children each month. This system has been maintained so that mothers of malnourished children pay a small fee when they come to pick up their ration. The money is used by the CMC to maintain the warehouse, pay for off loading etc. Since the mother is no longer receiving the service of having her child weighed, she is essentially paying for the food. It seems unethical to charge someone who is defined as "vulnerable" for food. In addition, if one vulnerable group (mothers of malnourished children) can afford to pay, the others should too. No similar system was mentioned in

Senegal except that mothers with children admitted to the CREN pay a nominal charge for treatment.

Another issue related to this is the distribution of these funds at the end of the project. There are still unresolved issues with CMC bank accounts remaining unliquidated at the end of the previous DAP. There is a plan now to use these funds for community development projects. It might be possible to use some of this money to finance part of the food security action plans.

3.3 Relevance of Indicators and reporting system

Indicators

In response to criticisms of the M&E system in the previous DAP, a very extensive set of indicators (65, monitoring and impact combined) was established in order to track the DAP performance. Most of impact indicators are really monitoring indicators. Many of the monitoring indicators are based on discreet activities and shouldn't be included in the tracking table. The problem originates in the design whereby the project was organized into 2 Strategic Objectives (SO), 6 Sub Strategic Objectives (SSO), and 25 Intermediate Results (IR). This structure is too cumbersome. When combined with the need to improve the M&E, the result was a large number of indicators which are not relevant and are repetitive. A proposal for simplifying the Indicator Performance Tracking Table, which includes those proposed already in the FY06 resource request, is presented in Annex 6.

Tools

The monitoring tools which have been developed for the M&E system are very good and should provide the DAP team with adequate information to determine the level of program performance. The major constraint is the capacity of the partner organizations to effectively use the instruments to collect reliable data. While CRS has trained M&E personnel at the partner institutions, there has been considerable turnover in staff. In addition, many community members, contact farmers, model farmers are illiterate making it impossible for them to be actively involved in data collection. Using literacy as a criterion for selecting these village level positions will reduce the number of women who are selected for these positions.

The annual DAP survey is a broad based community survey with a large sample size which provides extensive information about food security and sesame production and marketing at the community level. Both DAP participants and non-DAP participants are interviewed since the sample is randomly selected villagers. For this reason, the DAP survey could be more effectively used to evaluate trends than to collect for the results report IPTT. Out of the 34 original indicators in the Sesame Component, only six refer to "sesame growers" rather than "SGA or Association members". The MTE team is proposing elimination of three. Therefore, most of the information needed for the IPTT table comes or should come from the monitoring system. The "annual" DAP survey, if conducted every two or three years, could determine if there are a greater number of sesame growers in the overall population, if they have adequate knowledge of market information, if they are applying improved agricultural practices, all

indications of “spontaneous adoption” of sesame production and marketing as a result of the DAP interventions.

Reporting system

While USAID/FFP wants one consolidated report from the Senegambia DAP, it is important that each country maintain an IPTT with its own performance targets. This is being done but not in a systematic way. Having a disaggregated IPTT would permit each team to identify implementation problems and to address issues as they arise. The consolidated IPTT masks low performance and conversely does not permit the teams to benefit from their colleagues “best practices”. In addition, USAID development programs often like to capture the information from a country Title II program to demonstrate synergies. This year, USAID/Senegal wanted to include the Senegal DAP activities in their annual report.

Data collection is the responsibility of the partners while analysis and reporting to the donor is done by CRS. The Partners have had little training in data analysis and management. Information is collected but the partners do not know how to use it make management decisions because the analysis and interpretation skills rest within CRS (The Gambia and Senegal (Kolda)). If the Partners are to become independent of CRS in the future, they will need to have this capacity. This is especially important for NAWFA and ASSOLUCER, both grass root based farmer organizations.

Personnel

The DAP M&E manager has a regional position supervising staff in both Senegal (Kolda) and The Gambia. Being based in The Gambia, he also is the head of M&E for the CRS/The Gambia country program. He has an assistant in The Gambia for the day to day management of the M&E of non-DAP projects and an assistant for the DAP. He (as head of M&E in The Gambia) has no counterpart in the CRS/Senegal office. Since M&E is a service that is usually offered to all programs, CRS/Senegal should consider building its capacity in this area.

3. 4 Relevance of Targeting

3.4.1 Sesame Component

In The Gambia, sesame production had been promoted throughout the entire country in the previous DAP. For the FY2002-2006 DAP, emphasis was placed on CRD North, URD, and LRD. In Senegal, during the food insecurity mapping exercise, Tambacounda, Kolda, and Fatick regions were targeted for interventions. Because of financial constraints, only Tambacounda and Kolda were retained. Geographical targeting based on high food insecurity excluded the Ziguinchor region where CRS had been working with women’s groups to produce sesame as an alternative crop in areas of civil strife in order to promote peace and reconciliation. During the first year of the DAP, Development Assistance funds were used to continue working with the women’s group in Ziguinchor. Expansion of DAP activities was included in the FY04 resource request but was rejected by FFP for financial reasons. It is interesting to note that this group now has a leadership role in the emerging *Fédération Nationale des Producteurs du Sésame* (FENPROSE) which CRS would like to support in the future.

Since improved food security remains the principal objective of CRS activities, Tambacounda and Kolda should remain priority areas of intervention. If any expansion is considered, it should be into Ziguinchor where this project could promote economic recovery linked to the recent peace agreement and support FENPROSE.

Sesame has been targeted as an alternative cash crop which can grow on poor soils. Because it requires less rainfall, it is planted later than cereal crops in most of the DAP intervention area. It is the late planting which contributes to the competition for women's time, both at planting and harvesting, critical stages in sesame production. Sesame grows better in drier environments, hence the higher level of production in regions such as Kaolack which currently accounts for 2/3 of the sesame marketed in Senegal. The Senegalese Government will be promoting sesame production nationally. In the future, sesame production and marketing in the DAP zone of intervention may not be as competitive as it is now. There is already some interest by farmers groups and partners to diversify agricultural interventions, using the same skills developed in the DAP but applying them to different crops depending on the region and interests of the associations. In addition, it would be worthwhile to explore crops which could be produced during times of the year when women have less of a workload and would welcome alternative agriculturally related income generating activities.

3.4.2 Safety Net

Geographical Targeting

Food security analysis and ranking were used to identify geographic zones for project intervention. The areas selected in both Senegal (Kolda, Tambacounda) and The Gambia (CRD North, CRD South, URD) suffer from chronic food insecurity. Conflict resolution was considered during the analysis but did not emerge as a key leverage point to link this program with previous activities in Ziguinchor.

Within the zones selected, a two phase process was used in both countries to: 1) identify partners (Senegal), communities and institutions (Senegal and The Gambia); and 2) determine numbers of potential beneficiaries according to categories of vulnerable people. Accessibility was used to only a limited degree to select communities despite the logistic difficulties inaccessible sites present.

CARITAS, as an organization, has a philosophy that all parishes should benefit from the Safety Net resulting in few beneficiaries per site in all the target parishes. This has, until recently, been a source of tension in the partnership between CRS and CARITAS. Some Parish Committees (St. Joseph in Kédougou) themselves used accessibility as a criteria but in general, resources are spread thinly over the entire geographic zone of the dioceses.

Both Senegal and The Gambia have been quite flexible in targeting "institutions" for participation in the food distribution program. In Senegal, Schools with dormitories serving poor communities, shelters for homeless, as well as nutrition rehabilitation centers receive and distribute food. In the Gambia, health centers, associations for disabled persons and for persons living with HIV/AIDS, a charitable organization and several government health centers manage and distribute food.

Although conditions have changed over the period of the DAP, no institutions have been removed from the program because they no longer meet the criteria used in their selection. Of the health centers visited in The Gambia (Basse, Bansang, Kaur), only Bansang has a nutritional rehabilitation program for malnourished children. None of the three provides wet rations to patients. The commodity management is done by skilled health care specialists (nurses, pharmacists), at institutions which are suffering from a lack of qualified medical personnel. Both of the commodity storage facilities visited (Basse, Bansang) no longer conform to the standards required by FFP regulations. Since the health centers are functioning like communities, it might be worth considering opening up CMCs on the south bank of the Gambia River and channeling the current recipients to them or to the Rural Support Organization for the Disabled (RSOD) or Saint Vincent De Paul, both “institutions” which function more like communities themselves. The Health Centers could maintain their role in beneficiary identification but be relieved of the commodity distribution and management tasks.

Beneficiary Targeting

Malnourished children, disabled, and the chronically ill are the favored beneficiaries in the Gambia Safety Net Program despite data from the vulnerability assessment indicating that in CRD North, orphans and destitute people far outnumber the number of malnourished children in the region. The focus on malnourished children is in part because of the child survival program which had been an important component of the previous DAP. Community Management Committee members indicated that they would like more flexibility in selecting which vulnerable groups receive food in their communities while staying within the overall number of beneficiaries allocated to them.

In Senegal, the Parish committees are more flexible in beneficiary targeting. More priority is given to widows and female headed households as well as the disabled and the chronically ill. Severely malnourished children are treated most often at the rehabilitation centers. These residential treatment centers have been selected for inclusion into the safety net program as institutions although mothers receive take home rations when the child is discharged from the rehabilitation program.

In the Gambia, it appeared that the CMCs have less influence over beneficiary selection than the Parish Committees in Senegal. When asked who selects the beneficiaries, the committee members referred to community health nurses, health centers, peer counselors, village chiefs. They commonly referred to their role in the process as “confirmation” or just in managing the food distribution process. It was difficult to determine if the problem was one of language or if the women generally had little control over the process. Letting communities have more control over which types of vulnerable people will receive food aid is one way to ensure long-term sustainability of safety net interventions.

3.5 Sustainability of Activities

Empowering grass root level organizations is the key to the sustainability of both DAP components. Capacity building, literacy training, and giving grass root organizations

the authority and the responsibility to make decisions affecting program implementation are critical to their empowerment.

Two implementing partners of the sesame component (NAWFA and ASSOLUCER) are grass root organizations which are responsible for capacity building of their member organizations. As a membership based organizations, they should, in their own right benefit from capacity building activities. There is a tendency to want to invest in higher level organizations such as NAWFA, ASSOLUCER, and in the future FENPROSE but these organizations will only be as strong as their village level associations and intermediate level organizations are since their management committees are drawn from these organizations. In order to ensure that there is a pool of capable people who can become future leaders, training should not be confined to the executive committees of the associations/SGAs. Because of the high level of illiteracy, capacity building should start with literacy training.

In terms of sesame marketing, in addition to having organizational management skills, it is important for all Associations/SGAs to have the skills necessary to evaluate sesame production, to set realistic prices, to lower marketing costs, and to negotiate contracts with buyers which include pre-financing arrangements. In addition, they need to be able to do forward planning, to determine the best way to reinvest their profits to the benefit of their members. Both GADEC and 7A are well placed to support the capacity building activities in the zones where they intervene.

Both NAWFA and ASSOLUCER may need additional support to develop a coherent strategy for the capacity building of their member associations. In addition, both organizations need assistance to improve their management capacity particularly financial management and monitoring and evaluation. Realistic exit strategies need to be established for CRS support to these organizations, particularly for NAWFA.

In the safety net component, community management committees and parish committees are responsible for commodity management and distribution at the community level. Despite the significant role they play in the program, they have been unable to take any initiative to modify beneficiary selection according to local conditions (The Gambia), and to solve logistical problems that they've encountered in commodity management and distribution. By blocking these initiatives, CRS and their partners reduce community ownership of the safety net program at a time when they trying to transfer responsibility for management to communities. Communities need to be empowered to find realistic solutions to field level problems that they encounter in commodity management and distribution. This will enhance their problem solving skills. CRS and its partners can assist them to evaluate alternative solutions so that they conform to USAID regulations for commodity management.

Training in food security analysis, the development of action plans and the acquisition of resources for their implementation is being concentrated in the last year of the project. Earlier training focused on commodity management. Since the analytical skills that are needed developing food security action plans are more difficult to acquire and apply, there should have been more emphasis on this type of training earlier in the project. In addition, mobilizing communities to reflect on their problems and potential solutions requires more time from field personnel. It is a more collaborative process

than monitoring commodity management. It also requires field personnel to have different skills.

It appears sometimes that capacity building, particularly of grass root organizations, is an afterthought, something which needs to be put in a DAP to demonstrate concern for sustainability but which is really not an integral part of it. As exit strategies need to be designed and implemented from the beginning of the project, so do capacity building activities. Empowering communities is the best means to program sustainability but it is not an easy task that can be accomplished in the last year of the project.

4.0 Assessment of organizational structure and implementation capacity

4.1 CRS

4.1.1 Overall Program Management

Organizational structure

During the DAP design, it does not appear that much thought was given to the personnel requirements or to the management structure needed to implement and manage a joint country DAP. As gaps have been identified, posts have been established and CRS has hired competent technical staff to implement the DAP. They have significant experience in the fields of agriculture, marketing, M&E, and commodity management. The field staff is backstopped by regional specialists (marketing, M&E). There is no regional safety net specialist but the Senegal Liaison (now DAP manager) has assumed this function. While the presence of the regional personnel should have facilitated exchanges between the two DAP teams and promoted the synergies, this has not happened.

Some DAP staff are reporting technically to a regional DAP specialist and administratively to a country level person. This has led to some confusion in terms of lines of command and reporting although most people seem to have been able to categorize their relationships and reporting lines with experience. One DAP staff could identify three persons to whom he sent information depending on the subject matter.

During the DAP management review in September, it was recognized that there needs to be an organization chart which is simple but which clearly represents the lines of supervision and reporting. It seems that two major options are available: one would promote better integration within the individual components, e.g. sesame, safety net, (the regional specialist model); the other would promote better integration within the country programs and promote cross border collaboration (separate DAP structures in each country).

The current DAP design would favor the adoption of the integration model which would also facilitate future joint DAP submissions. As the individual country programs mature and their strategic plans diverge, the collaborative mode may become more appropriate, with each country having an independent DAP project.

For the last year of the Senegambia DAP, it would be preferable for CRS to maintain the regional integration model with regional specialists who would encourage closer linkages between the technical personnel of that component. This would include exchange visits between country programs including CRS staff and partners, conference calls, and more travel by the regional specialists to provide backstopping to CRS and partner staff. In addition to retaining the current regional specialists (marketing (or agriculture) and M&E), a regional Safety Net Manager should be recruited. It would make sense for this person to be based in The Gambia because of the proximity to the commodity management team and because there is more commodity distribution in The Gambia. The Sesame component regional specialist would then be based in Senegal. Both of these persons would respond to the DAP Coordinator who would not have a technical role in project implementation but would provide overall leadership and guidance. Together with the regional specialists, the DAP coordinator would encourage synergies between the country teams including partners.

Management issues

In general, there is insufficient internal and external (to partner) feedback from the DAP management. CRS staff indicated that they receive rapid and appropriate feedback on financial reports. When it comes to the progress reports, feedback is not as timely. Feedback to partners is even more important. Some safety Net partners lamented the fact that they didn't receive any feedback or recommendations after CRS management visits. At various times they have been asked to curtail field activities without adequate explanations and information from CRS. The Partners would like to be clearly informed when there are problems.

Particularly in the sesame component, CRS has been semi-operational in order to ensure that the program keeps on-track. This may not allow enough room for partners to increase their capacity (The Gambia). The grass root membership organizations which implement the DAP show some managerial weaknesses but it is not advisable that CRS respond to this by being semi-operational. Weaknesses in partners' ability to implement the project should be tackled through capacity building.

4.1.2 Commodity Management

Personnel

The commodity management staff of CRS has had significant experience in managing food acquisition, storage, and delivery. They have well established procedures in place for commodity tracking. There has been a lot of staff turnover at the field level where there are currently vacancies for two end use checkers. In addition, there has not been a full time regional safety net manager appointed which has reduced the potential of sharing experiences (within the CRS team; between the Partners; between CRS and the Partners) and harmonizing commodity management procedures.

Commodity requests

CRS is responsible for: placing the commodity call forward with USAID/FFP; facilitating the movement of commodities from the port to the warehouse; and assuring the delivery of commodities to the final point of distribution or to the secondary

warehouse of the Partner. In order to do this, the commodity manager needs to receive regular reports from the field in a timely manner.

In Senegal, the Partners and the new Safety Net Program Assistant Manager complained about the rounding techniques used by CRS commodity managers at the primary warehouse. If the commodity request is for an amount that represents only part of a sack, for example, 8 kg of maize, the managers round down instead of up. In addition, there are no provisions for having a backup stock to cover these losses and other small losses due to accidents during distribution and weighing errors. This has led to missing foods for some beneficiaries or forced distribution committees to get the food complement from their stock. For the first quarter of FY 04¹¹, CRS identified 961.47 Kg (\$429) of food losses as unauthorized food distribution.

Warehousing

The two CRS warehouses in Banjul (one for the Gambia and one for Senegal) both have a capacity of 500 MT and are in good condition. They are clean and there is a clear system in place (and posted) for tracking the metric tonnage that comes in and goes out of the warehouses. CRS has contracted a quality control surveyor who checks the quality of the food when it arrives, before it leaves and on a monthly basis. He determines if the food is fit for human consumption, if it is fit for animal feed or if it must be destroyed.

The only issue at the CRS warehouse is that of spoiled food. For example, in 2004, 49 bags of yellow corn for The Gambia, one bag of yellow corn for Senegal and two bags of WSB for the Gambia were spoiled. After the quality control surveyor made his determination, the bags were fumigated. CRS has requested to waive responsibility for the losses, but the request is still pending.

In Senegal, stock cards were present in all visited warehouses while in The Gambia, none were displayed at the warehouses. Food stock physical inventories are done each month at the distribution centers by CARITAS safety net program coordinators and by GAFNA. Centers are audited on a quarterly basis by the CRS end use checkers and periodically by CRS/Gambia commodity manager and the assistant safety net managers. The Senegal end use checker report for the quarter April-June 2004 identified problems which have yet been resolved. There needs to be more followup with Partners to ensure that they understand their roles and responsibilities in the commodity management process.

Commodity tracking

In The Gambia, institutions and Community Management Committees (CMC) submit monthly reports to the field staff of GAFNA. These reports are transmitted to the Project Coordinator who compiles them and submits them to CRS. The CRS/Gambia commodity manager indicated that he always receives the reports from the CRS Safety Net Assistant Program Manager in The Gambia on time, but regularly received them late from Senegal. In an attempt to improve the timeliness of reporting, the Senegal Safety Net Assistant Program Manager now sends a draft copy to the CRS/Gambia

¹¹ CRS Loss report sent to RFFP/Senegal.

commodity manager at the same time he sends it to the DAP Manager (formerly liaison) in Senegal. The commodity manager uses these monthly reports to write the quarterly commodity status and recipient status reports that he sends to the regional FFP office in Dakar.

At the warehouse in Banjul, the warehouse officer enters all waybill information into a hand written ledger and into his computer in a simple spreadsheet he designed. This process of entering the same information twice is time-consuming and unnecessary. Personnel in both Senegal and The Gambia have developed simple commodity tracking systems using Excel because CRS no longer uses FOOD LOG except to generate reports. These systems should be harmonized to facilitate information flow.

Distribution system

The CRS commodity management team needs to improve feedback and information exchange with the field. No CMC in The Gambia visited during the MTE had missed an entire shipment of food. The longest delay, normally attributed to road conditions during the rainy season, was never more than three days. However, in more than one institution in The Gambia and in several parishes in Senegal, commodities had been delayed for one or two months. When the commodities arrived, the commodities for the previous months were never replaced. The MTE team has been informed that this occurred during an emergency situation in FY04 when the commodities were used in The Gambia. This information was never communicated to the Partners and in turn to the beneficiaries who didn't understand why they received incomplete rations or no ration at all.

If a beneficiary misses a ration for one month, there is a resulting ration balance. CRS has no official policy on how to treat the extra rations. Several Parishes and CMCs have tried to find solutions to this problem: letting a family member come for the ration; giving double rations; giving the ration to someone on the waiting list. CRS needs to work with its Partners to address this issue.

Commodity management training

CRS offers a three-day commodity management training annually. While the training may teach the difference between the approved beneficiary level and the actual beneficiaries served, this distinction does not appear to be coming across in the reporting in both The Gambia and Senegal.

In addition to learning the mechanics of commodity management, participants from the institutions enjoyed meeting their counterparts and exchanging ideas about how best to manage safety net programs. This type of observation was not forthcoming from managers of community based programs. Many of the participants in the training (from both institutions and from communities) lamented the time it took to get to the training site, the money it cost (no per diem) and the fact that they only had two days of real learning which they deemed inadequate given the amount of information that was transmitted.

CRS/Gambia has produced a Safety Net Manual that was distributed to CMCs and institutions in September 2004. The document was intentionally written in simple

English so that the record keepers could interpret the information for the institutions and CMC members. The manual was given to CRS/Senegal for translation and should be available for the next round of training.

4.2 Partners

4.2.1 Sesame Component

GADEC (Senegal)

GADEC is an NGO that has evolved since its inception in 1987 in response to beneficiary needs and the changing environment. Initially GADEC emphasized project implementation with communities. Since 2003, it is acting more like a technical advisor to development actors at the grass root level and for other NGOs.

Management capacity: GADEC has clear, written vision and mission statements in addition to well articulated objectives. From discussions held with the Executive Secretary, it seems that GADEC is well governed with a board composed of farmers and intellectuals. The president is a professor and the coordinator of an important Government education project. The executive secretary is a dynamic jurist.

GADEC is currently implementing several projects in various sectors including water, agriculture, natural resource management, training, credit, and health. They use a participatory approach to development and work to empower grass root organizations. They have systems in place for good project management. The accounting and financial management system is computerized and is run by a team of 3 persons. They are audited each year by independent firms. GADEC has tremendous experience managing large and complex projects including a World Bank Project estimated at 6 billion FCFA. GADEC has been able to diversify its funding base with support from Belgian NGOs (4), *Coopération Belge*, American PVOs including CRS (3), and others (3).

The evaluation team were informed that neither the Executive secretary nor the sesame project team have ever seen the DAP document. Besides the 3 sub strategic objectives listed in the “protocole d’accord”, they are not aware of the project IRs, proframe, or M&E plan. It was only recently that the reporting format was revised to include IPTT indicators. The project staff found that the M&E system has greatly improved since the indicators have been included in the report format and the data collection tools have been modified. In order to improve project planning and to enhance accountability and ownership, the GADEC management team and project staff need to be more knowledgeable about the project, which includes having a copy of the DAP document in French.

Technical capacity: The sesame project team is composed of 3 permanent staff, and 11 volunteers. The Supervisor, an agronomist with extensive experience in rural development and training, supervises 2 Promotion Agents. The Promotion Agents are agricultural technicians with good skills in communication and training. The agents are well known at the village level and work well with the 11 farmer volunteers, “paysan relai”, who assist them, and with the contact farmers, one per village, who train farmers in sesame production techniques and organize the sesame collection. The contact farmers are also responsible for collecting information related to sesame

production and marketing with the support of the extension agent. The use of volunteers and contact farmers has not only reduced the project costs but has also contributed to greater project outreach. This approach using farmers as models for other farmers and trainers will ensure sustainability of the activity.

Two major problems were raised during the MTE with regards to the capacity of the project team. First, the project is covering 98 villages and continues to expand given the high demand from the growers. The supervisor estimates that for one agent to be effective, he should be covering no more than 35 villages. In the current situation, one agent is covering 55 and the second 43. GADEC and CRS should analyze project coverage to determine the most effective ratio of farmers/extension agent in light of the responsibilities assigned to the extension agents.

The second problem raised by both the project team and the group leaders is the motivation of the 11 farmer volunteers and the contact farmers. They are not paid by the project nor do they have adequate means for transportation to facilitate the provision of the extension services and assistance to farmers. GADEC and the Association have decided to provide them with 10 FCFA/kg of sesame collected but this does not seem to be sufficient as an incentive.

Relationship GADEC/farmers: GADEC is well known in the communities visited during the MTE. Farmers appreciate GADEC's efforts to help them have a better price for their produce. They appreciate the training and the sense of long-term relationship they have with GADEC. In most of the villages covered by the project, GADEC was already known for having implemented other projects. Project staff is well integrated into the communities and there is an easy communication between the farmers and the supervisor and the extension agents.

Relationship GADEC/CRS: GADEC has been working with CRS since 1989 in a capacity building project. The Executive Secretary said that GADEC and CRS share a common vision especially with regard to participatory approach and "subsidiarité". They also appreciated the establishment of the Management Information System and all the training they have received from CRS. There is clearly a good relationship between the GADEC project staff and the CRS staff that accompanied the evaluation team

ASSOLUCER (Senegal)

Management capacity: ASSOLUCER was created in 1984. It has an Executive Bureau of 9 members which is renewed every 2 years. It also has a 30 person committee which manages the organization on the day-to-day basis. This committee makes most of the Association's important decisions.

ASSOLUCER has experience in various aspects of food security and agricultural development including small enterprises development, horticulture, cereal banking, mother and child health program (with CRS years ago), livestock raising, capacity building and training of their member groups and the sesame promotion with CRS. ASSOLUCER has been able to diversify its source of funding. Its major donors include the following: The *Association Francaises des Volontaire de Progrès* (AFVP), *Projet Intégré de la Moyen Casamance* (PRIMOCA), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and PAEFK (*Projet d'Appui a l'Entreprenariat de Kolda*) and CRS.

ASSOLUCER's financial management capacity is presently weak due to inadequate staffing, tools, and procedures but is being built up progressively by CRS. From time to time, they have financial audits.

ASSOLUCER has a weak knowledge of the key project activities and strategy. At the beginning of the project, ASSOLUCER used the Senegal Government's approach to democracy and governance, i.e., focusing on Information, Education and Sensitization on girls education issues, water and environment, excision etc. to implement SSO 2. It was later when CRS visited the project that they were informed what governance and democracy means in the DAP context.

Given that ASSOLUCER is a grass root membership organization, it is important that CRS focuses on its capacity building. An institutional assessment should be undertaken and an action plan drafted for support to the organization over the next three years.

Technical capacity: The sesame promotion project team is made of 7 staff members including: 1 project supervisor who has a civil engineering background, 3 promotion agents with backgrounds in Agriculture, 1 person in charge of accounting who also has an agricultural background, and 2 part time staff, the cleaning machine operator and the inventory and stock manager.

When the program began, ASSOLUCER did not limit the area of intervention nor did it determine the number of growers which could be reached with the resources available. With the increased number of villages demanding their support for sesame production, the current staff levels are too low. One promotion agent is handling 63 villages and 1,077 farmers; the second 53 villages and 1,211 farmers; and the third one is handling 46 villages and 724 farmers. This reduces the efficiency and effectiveness of their interventions. According to the project team, to be more effective, one extension agent should manage a maximum of 500 farmers.

ASSOLUCER uses contact farmers for mass extension service provision as well as data collection for CRS. This has the advantage of making the approach appropriate and sustainable since the farmer is selected by the village on the basis of established criteria. However, some of them are illiterate and do not have a means of transport to go around and assist farmers.

ASSOLUCER needs to increase its knowledge of price setting. In 2003/2004, they had a bad experience with a buyer because of their inability to adequately analyze the situation before setting prices. ASSOLUCER set a high price for growers (225 FCFA/kg) hoping that the buyer would purchase from them at 275 FCFA/kg. Unfortunately, the buyer informed them that he would pay no more than 235 FCFA/kg which made it difficult for them to reimburse the loan they received from a local bank to pre-finance sesame purchases.

Relationship ASSOLUCER /farmers: ASSOLUCER focuses on capacity building and training of its members. Training has been provided in various domains including market gardening, apiculture, literacy training, livestock raising, etc. It helps groups organize themselves, understand their roles and responsibilities and helps them to acquire legal status from the local government. ASSOLUCER has a good reputation

and is trusted by its member groups. This was confirmed by the fact growers refused to sell their sesame to the banabana even when they come with higher prices.

Relationship ASSOLUCER /CRS: ASSOLUCER indicated that they have an excellent relationship with CRS Senegal and CRS Kolda staff. They had already worked with CRS in a mother and child health program from 1978-1982 so they know CRS's development philosophy and its requirement for performance and transparency.

7A (Senegal)

Management capacity: 7 A was established in 1988 and has developed into a consulting NGO with contracts from several sources, including the African Development Bank (ADB). 7 A has 13 permanent staff and 7 part time staff. The Executive secretary is an Agronomist with a specialization in sociology. He has also been a consultant for FAO. They have a team of 2 persons for accounting and financial management. They have both external and internal audits. The project has only one laptop for the accounting and the field project team. This is largely insufficient and does not facilitate the work.

7 A experience includes managing projects in food security, Local Governance, micro enterprise and credit. Donors include CRS (for the sesame program), the *Conseil National de Lutte Contre le SIDA*, 2 Universities, World Bank (a literacy training program), and 2 provinces in Italy (food security, animal credit program, capacity building and microcredit). 7 A has experience in training and capacity building. It favors the participatory approach with the use of the contact farmers. It is experienced in the management of other sectors, "filieres" such as maize, rice and potatoes.

Technical capacity: The sesame marketing project team is made of a team leader who is an agronomist, and 4 Promotion Agents (AP) with backgrounds in agriculture, animation and training. 7A develops action plans, budgets and elaborates a strategy with the village organizations and the contact farmers. At the beginning of each marketing season, they have a meeting with the villages involved to discuss achievement in the previous campaign and strategies. At present, 7A has 1 AP for 137 villages (1078 farmers), 1 for 115 villages (773 farmers) and 1 for 59 villages (640 farmers).

Relationship partners/farmers: 7A has a good relationship with the farmers groups and is well known for their work in establishing long term relationships in the field. The representatives of "Union Kento" and of the Federation ADC Ninamba who were met during the MTE, expressed high esteem for 7 A support and collaboration.

Relationship 7A/CRS: The relationship between 7A and CRS dates back to 1997 when they worked together on a maize production project which lasted one year. In 1998, CRS collaborated with 7 A again but in microfinance. Because some aspects of the strategy were not suitable to 7A and because CRS realized that 7 A had accepted the project without a real analysis of their capacity in this domain, the collaboration was terminated.

7 A appreciates its collaboration with CRS. CRS has reinforced their capacity in marketing, provides technical assistance in accounting and financial management. They

greatly appreciated the establishment of the M&E system by the CRS Kolda M&E specialist as well as the financial assistance provided by the head of the Kolda office. They feel CRS is maintaining a partnership with them based on mutual respect.

NAWFA (The Gambia)

Management capacity: NAWFA has programs in sesame production, processing, and marketing; income generation; group management and training; and related micro enterprise development initiatives. NAWFA's current personnel include an executive director, a program manager (who doubles as the M&E manager), one accountant, a capacity building officer, an office manager, a secretary, a data entry clerk, and several logistic support staff.

The Association's management staff is considered to be well trained and experienced in their respective fields of specialization (mainly agriculture). However, several weaknesses were identified during the institutional assessment conducted in September, 2004. NAWFA's Accounts Office is under staffed and also operates without some of the basic systems in place. The organization has no Financial Procedures Manual and no computerized Financial Accounting Software/ System. It currently functions with a simple Excel spread sheet. They need to develop an integrated management information system database and an M&E system and database to ensure timely access to management information.

Technical capacity: NAWFA has 2 field coordinators (based at headquarters), 18 extension workers (none of whom are women) but no dedicated marketing staff despite its focus on the sesame sector. The Extension workers are not well trained and cover a geographic area that is too large (one extension worker for 20-30 Kaffos and sometimes as many as 60). They have inadequate resources (transportation, fuel allowances) to effectively do their jobs.

4.2.2 Safety net component

GAFNA (The Gambia)

Project management: The Gambian Food and Nutritional Association (GAFNA) is a membership organization established in 1986. It has a tripartite governance system—Membership-Board-Secretariat. The Board of Directors provides policy direction to the organization while the Secretariat is responsible for the day-to-day management. The Secretariat is composed of the Director, the project managers, finance and administration staff and support staff.

GAFNA has a written mission statement. A strategic plan is currently being developed. The staff understands the mission of the organization while other stakeholders such as the Community Management Committees do not have a clear idea of what GAFNA is.

There is a Financial and Accounting Procedures Manual available at GAFNA. The organization adheres to donors' procedures and uses CRS's procedural document for the operational funding of the bi-monthly approved budget lines from CRS. All accounting records such as cashbook, ledger, and journal are maintained in Microsoft Excel spreadsheets, and period statements are printed to reconcile with Bank statements

and CRS bi-monthly imprest funds. The Organization has bank account and recognized external auditor(s), who carry out annual audit exercises. Audit reports are made available to all concerned.

GAFNA produces regular program status reports for submission to funding partners such as CRS but has not got a complete management information data base set up. The previous M&E manager left and the position has only recently been filled.

GAFNA has made an effort to diversify funding and actively approaches donors to establish collaboration. Besides CRS, GAFNA has worked with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, The United Nations Children Fund, and WaterAid.

Technical capacity: The Safety Net activities are managed by a project coordinator, based in Banjul but who makes regular visits to the field, two field coordinators who were nurses before joining GAFNA, one based in Basse, the other based in Kaur and a program accountant. The field coordinators have both received training in commodity management and it is their responsibility to monitor both the CMCs and institutions on a regular basis and to provide on-the-job training as needed. It is unclear that they have the skills necessary to facilitate the development of food security action plans and to followup on their implementation.

GAFNA should be doing a better job of confirming the adequacy and quality of storage space, communicating messages from CRS to the institutions and CMCs (ex: pallet requests and decisions taken), communicating messages from the institutions and CMCs to CRS (ex: spoilage) and checking the quality of the monthly reports (projected vs. actual beneficiaries).

CARITAS Tambacounda (Senegal)

Management capacity: CARITAS Tambacounda has been working in the region since 1981. It is part of the national network of CARITAS which is the social program and charitable arm of the Catholic Church. CARITAS Tambacounda has a permanent professional staff of 4 persons but currently the key program officer position is vacant as well as several logistic support positions. CARITAS has developed a strategic plan which includes activities in rural development (hydrology, forestry, agriculture) and for women (education, income generating activities, health and hygiene, transformation of agricultural products). It anticipates participating in microfinance activities when the financial institution developed by CRS is formalized. The organization has a department which handles commodity distribution, particularly in response to emergencies (civil strife and natural disasters). It is currently implementing a school feeding program in collaboration with the World Food Program (WFP). Besides the support received from CRS, their major donor for charity work is Misereor, Germany.

CARITAS Tambacounda works through an extensive network of Parish committees which cover the entire region. It is through these committees that the Safety Net distributions at the community level are managed. In addition, the Safety Net program in Tambacounda works with several institutions (schools, nutritional rehabilitation centers, organizations providing services to vulnerable groups).

Two areas of program management have been sources of tension between CARITAS Tambacounda and CRS in the past. CRS would prefer to have a more focused food distribution program while the philosophy of CARITAS is to ensure that all Parishes receive some food aid. This has led to logistics problems in food distribution and spreading resources over a wide geographical area. Some of the parishes are inaccessible during the rainy season making the movement of commodities to the site on a quarterly basis difficult if not impossible. The availability of storage facilities limits the amount of food which can be stored at one time. In at least one case, food is still being stored at a secondary facility in Kedougou because there has been no way to get it to the distribution site.

The reporting requirements of the Safety Net program are more rigorous than those of CARITAS. This originally caused some consternation but CARITAS has indicated that the new system has helped them improve overall management of their own commodity management and distribution system.

Technical capacity: In order to implement the Safety Net Program, a field coordinator (with previous experience in commodity management and inventory) and an accountant were hired using funding from CRS. They have an office in the same building as the commodity storage facility. The Safety Net personnel are not well integrated into the CARITAS structure. They both have received training from CRS but feel that they need additional training/information on CRS commodity (overall process and how commodities are managed out of The Gambia) and financial (management procedures). While they are young and dynamic, it is unclear that they will be able to effectively facilitate the development of the food security action plans without being trained by CRS first.

The Tambacounda CARITAS has a primary warehouse at its headquarters. This warehouse is not up to the standards required for Title II food storage (poor aeration, evidence of mice, holes in roof etc). The person who manages the warehouse (which is also used to store the WFP commodities) is the head of the emergency response department. He has received training from CRS but aside from managing the flow of commodities into and out of the warehouse, he is not actively involved in the management of the Safety Net Program. For community distributions, each parish committee uses an existing warehouse or a room belonging to the church/community that has been transformed for short-term storage. Where no appropriate structure has been available, a new facility has been constructed by the program. The institutions had storage when they were selected but some have received support to bring them up to the standards required by the Safety Net program.

CARITAS Kolda (Senegal)

Management capacity: CARITAS Kolda is the most recent of the national CARITAS network, established in 2003. It receives institutional support from CRS (office rental, office equipment, staff salaries etc). Prior to its establishment, CARITAS activities in Kolda were conducted from Ziguinchor. The CARITAS full time staff include the Director, the accountant (safety net accountant), the Safety Net Coordinator.

CARITAS Kolda has recently finished its strategic planning exercise. Their priorities for action include: Humanitarian assistance, Water and Sanitation, Rural Development,

Natural Resource Management, Reducing women's work loads, and training. They are submitting this strategic plan to Misereor and *Secours Catholique* France to elicit support for their field activities. All their activities will contain messages to make people aware that they must work and take responsibility for their own lives. Even humanitarian assistance is only to enable people to have some support while they are developing skills, or a strategy for becoming independent all the time realizing that there will always be some people in need of assistance.

CARITAS Kolda has elicited the assistance of CARITAS Ziguinchor to train the parish committees so that they will become change agents and assist the population to organize themselves. They are very development oriented and have been participating in the forum of NGOs in Senegal.

Technical Capacity: The Safety Net Coordinator and Accountant are both well integrated into the CARITAS structure and have their offices in the same building as the Director. The field coordinator is experienced in project management and training (particularly participatory approaches to community problem analysis). Both the accountant and the Coordinator have indicated that despite training, they would like to have more information on the overall commodity management system of CRS/The Gambia and more knowledge of CRS financial reporting procedures (presentation of travel and miscellaneous expenses, etc).

In Kolda, the primary warehouse is at a Parish so it is used for both primary storage and for the Parish distribution. Where a Parish committee or institution did not have an appropriate structure, CRS has assisted them to rehabilitate existing structures. CARITAS Kolda currently has a problem because some of their communities are using classrooms for storage but the rooms are now needed. The CARITAS staff would like to have a storage facility in each community to be used long-term for a safety net program. It appears that their intent is more in line with strategic storage than a traditional grain bank approach which CRS is hesitant to support.

5.0 Successes and Lessons Learned

5.1 Successes

- Sesame is now a recognized alternative cash crop in both Senegal and The Gambia.
- The market has been stabilized and farmers are getting better prices that reflect their labor;
- Sesame production and yields have increased in both Senegal and The Gambia because of farmers' increased knowledge of sesame production and marketing;
- There has been increased capacity of sesame grower associations to negotiate contracts and financing;
- The DAP staff and partners in The Gambia and in Senegal have demonstrated an impressive ability to adjust the program strategy to field realities, especially with regards to the collection center focus;
- Land advocacy has yielded positive results and changed community perceptions;
- The DAP has increased CRS visibility in the field;
- A sound M&E system has been developed and provided to partners in Senegal;

- The beneficiaries of the Safety Net Component have been well targeted using well defined criteria;
- The distributed food has had a positive impact on beneficiaries and other compound/household members;
- Community solidarity has been enhanced through the management of Safety Net activities at the community/parish level.

5.2 Lessons Learned

1. Program design should be done jointly with partners and CRS field staff in order to take into account the technical capacity and experience of each organization and to ensure ownership of the program.

Some CRS partners were not actively involved in the Senegambia DAP design process. They were presented with a completed document and asked to participate in implementation. Roles and responsibilities are not completely understood so that the partners are not taking the initiative to solve problems that arise in the field now. Because CRS is responsible for project implementation, it has become too involved at the operational level when it appears that targets will not be met.

2. While various studies and research on specific themes have been commissioned during the DAP in order to adapt field implementation to current conditions, many of them should have been done prior to DAP design to better inform the process.

Sesame promotion had been the focus of previous projects in both Senegal and The Gambia. Some of the studies commissioned for execution in the Senegambia DAP should have been done prior to the design phase. Information related to gender and socio-economic factors, had it been available earlier, may have changed the focus of the DAP implementation strategy. The research and study results should be used to better guide the design of the next DAP.

3. In joint country DAP, synergies will not occur unless actively facilitated.

One of the advantages of a joint DAP is to promote synergies and collaboration between the two country programs. This has not been aggressively promoted in the implementation of this DAP. Areas where sharing experience and coordinating strategies could have improved implementation include: marketing strategies (price setting, contracting arrangements); sesame promotion strategies; resolving commodity management and distribution problems; harmonizing data collection and analysis.

4. Program sustainability is compromised and dependence on CRS is increased when an exit strategy is not built into the program design and implementation begun early in the program.

CRS has been supporting and collaborating with NAWFA in the area of sesame production and promotion for many years. One member of the NAWFA executive committee described the relationship as a marriage with no divorce in sight. An institutional assessment of NAWFA suggested that, if managed properly, the sesame marketing activities could generate enough revenue to support the organization's sesame program. In order for this to happen, additional institution building support is

needed particularly in monitoring and evaluation and financial management. NAWFA is ready and willing to become more independent. Together with CRS, the Executive committee should develop a strategy so that within a specified amount of time, NAWFA would be capable of managing the sesame production program and expanding its other agricultural activities with support from other donors.

5. The timing of the DAP mid-term evaluation, as scheduled in the DAP document, should be maintained despite late startup of project activities in the field in order to use the results to improve program implementation.

The current MTE was conducted after the final year fiscal year resource request was submitted. Since the DAP team knew that there were problems with the implementation of the DAP, it would have been better to maintain the original date of the mid-term evaluation in order to have guidance for changes. The results and recommendations proposed during this evaluation will not be actionable for the Senegambia DAP but may be used to inform the design process of the next DAP.

6.0 Recommendations

6.1 Crucial recommendations for immediate consideration

General

M&E

The DAP Annual Survey should be conducted next in March-April 2006, not this year. It provides valuable information on trends in sesame production and food security at the community level (both DAP and non-DAP farmers). It is too costly to be conducted annually. A DAP survey can be done at the beginning, in the middle, and at the end of the DAP.

The resources that would have been used for the annual DAP survey should be allocated to improve the M&E system, particularly at the partner level. The additional resources can be used to collect additional information for the results report IPTT.

Project Management

CRS should ensure that the two country field teams meet more frequently (including the Partners) in order to share experiences and to coordinate strategies. Specific areas in which project implementation could be improved by closer interaction include: marketing strategies (price setting, contracting arrangements); sesame promotion strategies; resolving commodity management and distribution problems; harmonizing data collection and analysis.

CRS should involve partners more in project decision making and provide more timely feedback on issues which are identified during monitoring missions, when results reports are presented, or during meetings. There should also be better feedback between DAP management and CRS field staff which could ensure that problems which affect field implementation are resolved more quickly.

CRS should explore ways to improve fund transfers to partners. In the case of delays, the partners should be kept informed of progress.

Each country team should have well defined annual performance targets which when combined will be the targets presented in the consolidated IPTT. This would make the workplans more operational, make it easier to identify problems and to find solutions.

Key project documents and reports (including the original DAP document, the Safety Net Manual) should be available in both French and English and shared widely with DAP staff and Partners. This will improve everyone's understanding of the DAP strategy, and facilitate communication and enhance synergies.

Sesame Component

Seed multiplication and distribution

In the short term, CRS should support its partners to organize a farmer seed multiplication system in collaboration with the DRDR (*Direction Régionale du Développement Rural*) in Senegal and NARI in The Gambia. Partners can identify and train the seed multipliers, and have the seed quality be controlled by DRDR and NARI before the sesame is sold or distributed.

Extension services

CRS and its partners should review the extension service systems that are currently being used to promote sesame production and marketing. The study should identify what steps need to be taken to improve service delivery and effectiveness.

CRS should work closely with its partners to establish job descriptions and basic educational and experience levels that are required of field extension agents. In order to improve technical assistance to farmers, it is essential that extension agents be recruited on the basis of their technical knowledge and experience in agriculture, marketing/finance.

The extension agents should receive training on a continuous basis in order to upgrade their skills (technical and communication) and provide them with new information on sesame production and promotion.

Because contact farmers play an important role in the DAP implementation in Senegal (collecting information for M&E; providing extension services), CRS and the DAP partners should review their situations and identify ways of rewarding them or giving them some form of incentive, for example, training them in seed multiplication.

Only individuals who are literate should be selected as contact farmers because they are required to collect field level data. This will limit the number of women who will be selected unless literacy training is expanded in the DAP zones of intervention.

Sesame Cleaning Machines

The evaluation team recommends that no additional cleaning machines be bought for the program. CRS/The Gambia and CRS/Senegal should set up a joint committee to conduct a study to identify strategic locations for the existing 8 machines. Criteria for selecting the locations should include: 1) the amount of sesame produced in the area; 2) whether or not the site is the DAP intervention zone; 3) the cost/benefit of locating the machine at the site; 4) the sustainability of the machine operation; and in Senegal, 5) the planned location of the PADFSE cleaning machines.

If during the study recommended above, the committee demonstrates that the cleaning machines will not be sustainable even after moving to more strategic locations, the committee should explore options for selling them according to CRS and FFP regulations.

Agricultural Equipment

CRS should continue to support research and on-farm testing of seeders adapted to sesame production in collaboration with the government and the private sector, for example, the sesame grower in Ziguinchor who has adapted a seeder plate for sesame planting.

Exit strategies

CRS should develop exit strategies for NAWFA and other organizations with which it works in implementing the sesame component. This would include strengthening the executive/operational staff of these organizations. Besides reinforcing the financial and management capacity of these organizations, emphasis should be placed on strategic planning, program development, monitoring and evaluation. A timeline for implementing the strategy and expected outcomes at each point should be included so that at some point (sooner for NAWFA), these organizations would be independent of CRS, capable of offering services to their members, raising funds, and lobbying for their members.

Capacity building

CRS should place more emphasis on increasing the capacity of Associations/SGAs so that they can be more active in federations, unions, and national organizations of farmers. The CRS partners should develop a capacity building plan for each federation and association with which they work. The implementation of the plan should be supported by CRS.

Operators and book keepers at collection centers in The Gambia, need additional training in order to improve the record keeping systems. The necessary information collection tools should be provided to each location and be available for inspection by NAWFA and CRS staff.

Price setting strategy

CRS should work with its partners to encourage SGAs/Associations to be realistic when setting prices at the beginning of each marketing campaign and to use fair price to growers rather than a speculation prices as the basis for negotiations. In addition, CRS should encourage all DAP partners to establish profit sharing schemes so that the profits from the sale of sesame are regularly returned to the producers in addition to ensuring that farmers receive a fair price for their production.

Pre-financing and contract arrangements

NAWFA and the Senegal DAP partners should make sure all the tools and appropriate human resources are in the field and are capable of collecting relevant data that will enable them to better predict the quantity and the quality of sesame they will receive during the year.

FENPROSE

CRS should improve the operational and managerial capacity of FENPROSE so that it can represent sesame growers nationally in the future. CRS/Senegal should develop a capacity building project (2-3 years) for FENPROSE which would include : support for a small secretariat with minimum staff and equipment; the necessary means to coordinate and increase awareness among sesame grower associations nationally; resources for exchange visits with NAWFA and other commodity federations; a well defined exit strategy. CRS/Senegal should consider allocating private funds to this initiative.

NAWFA

In order to better provide technical assistance to growers, NAWFA should review its recruitment policy and make sure that competent staff is recruited for the field. Extension agents should have experience/training in agriculture or marketing and have a minimum education level.

CRS should ensure that the M&E system become fully operational within NAWFA as soon as possible.

Safety Net

Capacity building

CRS should reinforce its commodity management training program for its own staff and its partners. Special emphasis should be placed on understanding USAID regulation 211.

CRS should organize exchange visits for its partners in Senegal and The Gambia. The Senegal partners would better understand the CRS system of commodity management and warehousing. GAFNA would be able to see more effective use of commodities in an institutional setting in Senegal. Partners from both countries and CRS would benefit

from a frank exchange of views which could lead to more effective program management.

Call forwards and food dispatching

Food pipeline analysis should inform call forwards and food dispatching more effectively in the future.

Spoiled food

CRS should review procedures for removing small amounts of spoiled foods from institutions and community centers and establish appropriate mechanisms for the future. In the immediate, CRS should arrange for the immediate removal of spoiled food from the institutions and community centers. In The Gambia, CRS should authorize GAFNA to collect the spoiled bags and bring them to the CRS warehouse in Banjul where they will undergo quality control and be disposed of accordingly.

Requests for commodities

For each quarter, the partner organization should request food that will get the institution, or community/parish, through the rest of that quarter, even if it is only for one or two months. This will ensure that no institution misses a month of rations, that CRS does not have to pay the cost of one small shipment and that everyone is on the same cycle.

Commodity tracking

CRS should harmonize the commodity tracking systems used in The Gambia and Senegal. Simple excel spread sheets will be adequate until West African Regional Office (WARO) completes the development of a system which will eventually be used in the region.

CRS/SeneGambia should review its food management information system at distribution centers level: availability of way bills; monthly food distribution reports with identification numbers (Packing List, CCC); monthly inventory; and audit reports.

Commodity management systems should be computerized at all the partner offices.

Distribution

CRS and the partners should encourage committees responsible for food distribution to be creative in finding solutions to food distribution problems, such as beneficiaries who are far from the distribution site. Alternative strategies should be tested on a small scale to determine their effectiveness.

6.2 Medium term recommendations

General

Program design

CRS should include partners and field teams in future program design in order to benefit from their field experience; to ensure program ownership and better institutional memory; and to ensure a better understanding of the roles and responsibilities of each organization in the execution and monitoring of the program.

Collaboration and Synergies

The CRS DAP team should be encouraged to establish closer linkages and collaboration with other poverty reduction and food security programs in their intervention zones. As part of the Strategic Planning Process, CRS will be identifying its strengths and sectoral priorities. This will enable CRS teams to be able to concentrate on areas for which they have a comparative advantage and to facilitate linkages with other organizations in complementary areas of rural development.

Given the generalized poverty in the DAP intervention zones, CRS should focus more on diversified development activities. Synergies within components of the DAP should be fostered as well as better collaboration between the DAP and other CRS programs.

Project management

CRS Senegal is encouraged to use some of its private funding for activities which are complementary to the DAP. These might include but not be limited to: capacity building of FENPROSE; literacy training of Association committee members, and in particular women.

Sustainability

CRS should ensure that an effective exit strategy is an integral part of new program design and it will be implemented from project inception. Since most exit strategies involve significant capacity building of partners and grass root organizations, waiting until the last year of project implementation will not yield the desired results.

Partnership reflections

CRS should organize a 2-3 day partnership reflection with its DAP partners in order to increase mutual understanding. This type of meeting should take place every 2 years during the DAP period. CRS/WARO has regional people who can help facilitate partnership reflections.

Capacity Building

CRS should provide additional training in M&E at the partner level. This should include not only field data collection techniques but also computer skills and analysis

and interpretation skills so that partners will be able to use the information themselves in program decision making.

Literacy training should be an integral part of all future CRS programs in order to increase effective participation in field implementation.

Sesame

Seed multiplication and distribution

CRS should collaborate with its partners and with the DRDR (Direction Régional du Développement Rural) in Senegal and NARI in The Gambia to develop commercial farmer based seed multiplication systems which will meet the national norms for seed certification.

Extension services

The MTE team recommends that each partner select an area for a pilot intensification of extension services and observes changes in adoption of techniques as well as increases in production for 2-3 years. The lessons learnt on this can be replicated progressively in the other areas.

Agricultural equipment

The DAP team should develop a strategy for ensuring that sesame producers have access to appropriate farm equipment. Feasibility studies should be done to evaluate alternative strategies before action is taken. Some strategies which might be considered include: linking Senegalese farmers to the government's sesame promotion program; working with Associations/SGAs to develop a plan to reinvest their profits into agricultural equipment either through a credit program or an Association managed rental system; CRS providing equipment directly to Associations/SGAs/villages; linking SGAs/Associations to existing rural credit institutions.

Pre-financing and contract arrangements

Given the importance of the pre-financing in the overall marketing strategy, the DAP partners should take steps to increase their professionalism and maintain their credibility with buyers. They should adhere to the agreements that they make with respect to the quality and the quantities of sesame that they are to provide. This requires having an adequate M&E system and the capacity to forecast the quantity and quality of sesame that will be produced.

Price setting strategy

The CRS DAP partners may need to explore the potential for “**fair trade**” sesame or sesame oil production for markets in Europe and in the U.S.

Sesame promotion

In order to increase sesame production in the DAP areas, it is important that population knows about sesame production and its potential for increasing income. CRS and its partners should develop a sesame promotion campaign, using appropriate media channels and lobbying at the government level. In Senegal, this should be coordinated with the upcoming government sesame promotion activities.

Diversification

The objective of long-term food security requires that in the future, the DAP program should diversify its agricultural activities in order to increase farmers' income. The skills currently used for sesame production, promotion, and marketing could be applied to other crops depending on farmers' interest and the different agroecological zones.

The socio-economic and gender studies which will be conducted in FY 2005 should be used to determine where there are opportunities for future income generating activities related to agriculture or in other sectors.

Collaboration with government services

CRS should take care that it does not become a substitute for government in implementing the DAP program. An appropriate collaboration with government institutions would resolve part of the extension services provision problems encountered.

Capacity building

CRS should emphasize capacity building for its DAP partners, particularly for the grass root membership organizations such as ASSOLUCER and NAWFA. For ASSOLUCER to implement larger project initiative, the staffing situation needs to be reviewed. Neither the accounting nor the Supervision positions are staffed with people with appropriate backgrounds.

CRS should work with Partners to ensure that Associations and Federations have transparent systems of accounting and that their members are kept informed of how resources, particularly from the sale of sesame, are allocated and used.

Targeting

It is recommended that the region of Ziguinchor be included in future DAP activities. The *Fédération Départementale des Femmes de Bignona*, a strong association which had collaborated with CRS in the past, and which has been instrumental in the establishment of FENPROSE, could be considered as the DAP partner. In previous collaboration with CRS, they worked in the conflict zone and contributed to peace building through their contact with the rebels.

Partnership Management

CRS should initiate annual meetings with the GADEC management to discuss project issues and partnership opportunities in general in order to improve the relationship with this NGO.

M&E

CRS should work with NAWFA to establish a system that can be used to predict, with a high degree of confidence, the volume of the production and the quality of sesame which will be available during the campaign so that they can make realistic and credible agreements with buyers.

Safety Net

Food rations

CRS should review both the quantity and the type of food rations which are distributed to communities and institutions. The safety net team should consider modifying the rations according to beneficiary type; increasing the ration size to facilitate weighing and distribution.

CRS commodity management team should round up instead of down when preparing the rations from the commodity requests submitted by the partners. In addition, they should make some allowance for losses due to accidents during distribution so that the beneficiaries don't get penalized for short-falls.

The CRS commodity team should work with the partners to develop a strategy for distributing un-collected rations. Since these have already been programmed, they should be used to the benefit of the vulnerable members of the communities.

Commodity management

CRS needs to encourage its partners to take more responsibility for and to be more consistent following up problems related to commodity management and storage which are identified during the quarterly audit done by the end use checkers.

Institutions

In The Gambia, CRS should work with GAFNA to better define what standards must be met by institutions before additional food can be provided. In addition, GAFNA should work with the institutions to re-negotiate the terms of collaboration and address the deficiencies of the storage facilities.

CRS and GAFNA should consider reducing even further the number of institutions which distribute food. For example, the health center beneficiaries could be referred to communities or to the charitable organizations, like St. Vincent De Paul, which function more like communities than institutions.

Storage at community and institution level

In the future, CRS should consider using ITSH (internal transport, storage and handling) funding to improve storage at both the institution and community levels.

Targeting

In order to better focus food aid on those who need it, CRS and its partners should develop a strategy for linking some beneficiaries and/or their family members to development and income generation activities. This will enable those who are able and willing to “graduate” from the program to provide for their own food needs and those of the vulnerable members of the household.

CRS and the partners should encourage communities to modify the allocation of food between beneficiary categories according to the needs of the individual communities as long as overall beneficiary numbers don't change and that the criteria for determining vulnerability are strictly adhered to.

Institutional and community capacity for implementing safety net activities should be reviewed regularly and allocations modified as needed.

Sustainability

Since the development of food security action plans is a key element of ensuring sustainability of safety net programs within the community, CRS and its partners should place more emphasis on this activity.

CRS and its partners should monitor the implementation of the food security action plans which could provide valuable feedback into the effectiveness of the process by which they were developed.

7.0 Annexes

Annex 1: Scope of Work

Scope of Work SeneGambia Development Activity Program (DAP) Mid-Term Evaluation

Background

Problem Statement: “Rural households and extremely vulnerable groups in Senegal and The Gambia suffer from chronic and seasonal food insecurity”.

Catholic Relief Services (CRS) is currently implementing a Title II Development Activity Program (FY 2002-2006) that aims to increase food security in the most vulnerable regions of Senegal and The Gambia (referred to as “SeneGambia”). The SeneGambia DAP seeks to address some of the underlying causes of food insecurity and mitigate the impact of food insecurity on the most vulnerable members of the population. Rural households in both countries suffer from chronic and seasonal food insecurity as a result of poor economic access to, and limited availability of food. Likewise, the most vulnerable segments of the population in both countries face significant food security challenges year round.¹² In order to more effectively address food insecurity, as well as, maximize available resources, the SeneGambia DAP is implemented as a joint country program in the selected regions of both countries: in Senegal, target regions are Tambacounda and Kolda, while in The Gambia, Lower River, Central River, and Upper River Divisions are the DAP target areas.

The DAP calls for a mid-term evaluation to be conducted in the third year of implementation. Specifically, the DAP calls for a mid-term evaluation to “focus on contextual matters particular to the project: leadership styles, staff characteristics in training; experience and cultural style; mission; and partner agencies. It will also review overall progress towards achieving planned activities and intended results and propose recommendations to change or enhance interventions and indicators.”¹³ The concept of “reflective practice” runs throughout the DAP, where project staff and implementing partners are engaged in continuous learning to improve the project implementation and impact. In this spirit, to the extent possible, the mid-term evaluation will incorporate CRS and partner staff participation and input. Several surveys, technical reports, and reviews have been conducted over the past year that will provide significant background data and analysis to facilitate the evaluation process. For example, the Baseline Survey as well as a consultant report (Tickner) have identified that greater clarification of the sesame marketing system is needed due to a different reality than that assumed in the DAP.

The SeneGambia Development Activity Program (DAP)

¹² The SeneGambia DAP has identified the following groups as being most vulnerable populations to be addressed: malnourished children (6 month – 3 years old), single female heads of households with difficult circumstances, the severely disabled, and the chronically ill, including people living with, and affected by HIV/AIDS and Tuberculosis.

¹³ Catholic Relief Services Senegal and The Gambia Offices, FY 2002-FY 2006 Development Activity Program Proposal. Pg. 47.

The DAP is a five year, US \$10 million USAID funded project. The overall goal of the SeneGambia DAP is to improve the level of food security of targeted rural households and vulnerable groups in Senegal and The Gambia by 2006. In light of the region's socio-economic and geographical profile, CRS is implementing a two-pronged approach to improving food security in Senegal and The Gambia:

- *A market-led approach to sesame promotion.* The Sesame Marketing component of the proposed program seeks to increase income among poor, rural households through the promotion of more stable and efficient sesame market channels. It includes activities aimed at empowering participating farmer's organizations in the areas of marketing, production, advocacy and information as well as provides member training services. The Sesame Marketing component focuses on two aspects: strengthening/establishing marketing systems and extensive market-oriented production research. Research activities are designed to complement and ensure a high quality of the marketing interventions.
- *Safety Net activities.* The Safety Net component of the proposed program aims to increase the availability of food for vulnerable populations by providing food rations to them. This component reinforces the capacities of institutions and community groups to identify, advocate for, and address the food security needs of vulnerable groups. It also includes issues related to conflict resolution in such areas where conflict is demonstrated as a cause of food insecurity.

The program is carried out using local partners to implement field-based activities. The implementing partners in The Gambia include the National Women's Farming Association (NAWFA) for the sesame component, and the Gambia Food and Nutrition Association (GAFNA) for safety net activities. In Senegal, the partners for sesame include: ASSOLUCER, GADEC, and 7A. The Safety Net partner in Senegal is CARITAS.

The DAP focuses on two Strategic Objectives:

Strategic Objective 1. *Improved economic access to food for farm households engaged in sesame production in targeted areas in Senegal and The Gambia by 2006.* CRS is aiming to achieve this Strategic Objective through the completion of the following Sub-Strategic Objectives:

- Sesame Collection Centers are operating as market venues to improve market stability and efficiency.
- Farmers' associations provide policy, advocacy, marketing, production and information services and training to members.
- Research is being conducted to identify and reduce the costs of, and constraints to marketing; to improve the post harvest handling practices; and to increase productivity of sesame farmers.

Strategic Objective 2: *Increased availability of food for vulnerable persons in Senegal and The Gambia by 2006.* CRS is aiming to achieve this Strategic Objective through the completion of the following Sub-Strategic Objectives:

- Food distribution to vulnerable individuals.
- Increasing the capacity of institutions and community organizations to manage safety net interventions for vulnerable groups.

- Increasing the capacity of institutions and communities to analyze and advocate for safety net needs.

CRS is using Title II commodities in order to support program activities through monetization and to provide food resources to selected vulnerable groups through food distribution activities.

Mid-Term Evaluation (MTE)

The purpose of this Mid-Term Evaluation is to assess the progress made toward meeting program objectives (particularly at the Intermediate Results level), as well as review the organizational structures and systems in place to meet the objectives. The MTE Team, working closely with CRS and partner staff, will identify problems and constraints, and develop actionable recommendations to improve the project's design and implementation. Specifically, the Mid-Term Evaluation will address the following:

- Assess the current status of the DAP activities, measured against Intermediate Results and Strategic Objectives (see Appendix A for Intermediate Results)
- Assess the strengths and weaknesses of the implementation strategy, and determine the extent to which project activities and indicators are relevant to meeting the DAP objectives.
- Assess the appropriateness and capacity of partners to implement DAP activities.
- Determine the effectiveness of project's organizational structure and systems (i.e. M&E and reporting systems) in place, and the extent to which the systems are sustainable.
- Provide lessons learned for implementation of the remainder of the current DAP
- Make recommendations to CRS on how to improve the implementation of the current DAP activities

Methodology

The Mid-Term Evaluation will rely upon secondary data sources and semi-structured¹⁴ key informant interviews. The Annual DAP Survey (ADS), conducted in May 2004, surveyed over 2,000 households in Senegal and The Gambia on sesame production and marketing, and to a lesser extent, safety net-related activities. Summary of ADS Findings Reports for both countries are available for the Mid-Term Evaluation Team. Furthermore, additional data is included in the ADS database and can be made available to the Team as required. Likewise, in September 2004, a DAP Management Review was carried out, at which time strengths and weaknesses of the DAP management systems were identified, and recommendations for improving the systems outlined. The Management Review Report and FY 04 Results Report may also serve as references to aid in the preparation of the Mid-Term Evaluation. Semi-structured interviews will be conducted with DAP partners and targeted beneficiaries to compliment the pre-existing data.

¹⁴ A standard format should be used to conduct interviews in both countries. As such, it is envisioned that upon signing of the contract to conduct the MTE, a proposed interview guide(s) shall be presented by the Team Leader, discussed with CRS, and accepted prior to commencement of field interviews.

The Mid-Term Evaluation will start off with a briefing session in Dakar.¹⁵ The MTE team will meet with key DAP CRS/SeneGambia staff to review the proposed workplan, finalize logistics arrangements for fieldwork, review the Scope of Work, and review available documentation. The MTE team will then proceed to Tambacounda and Kolda regions of Senegal, where the team will meet with the key safety net and sesame partners. Following the interviews with partners and project beneficiaries in Senegal, the team will proceed to The Gambia where they will also meet with the DAP partners and beneficiaries, ending up in Banjul where the team will be provided with the necessary support to prepare the first draft report. The Team shall meet with CRS to discuss the report outline and preliminary findings (a detailed Report Outline will be presented and discussed at this meeting). The MTE team will then present the key findings during a briefing session to be held in The Gambia, with key Senegal staff in attendance. During the briefing session, comments and concerns will be raised regarding the findings, and the final draft submitted for review prior to departure from The Gambia. Comments to the Final Draft MTE Report will be provided to the Team Leader no later than one week after submission to CRS, and the final Mid-Term Evaluation report shall be submitted within a week of the comments being provided to the Team Leader.

Deliverables

The following items constitute the deliverables associated with the Mid-Term Evaluation:

- Preliminary workplan, logistics request, and schedule
- Interview Guide(s)
- Report Outline, highlighting major sections and themes to be covered
- Final Draft Mid-Term Evaluation
- Final Mid-Term Evaluation

All deliverables should be submitted in both hard copy and computer copy, using Microsoft Word/Excel.

Team Composition

The team will be composed of a Team Leader, an Agriculturalist, and a Food Security Consultant. Overall Team responsibilities and tasks include:

- Review reference documents and other relevant literature
- Conduct interviews with key informants as they are relevant to the evaluation
- Prepare a draft document with findings
- Brief CRS and the relevant partners on MTE findings
- Prepare the final report

¹⁵ Note that all official meetings with CRS staff, whether in CRS/Senegal or The Gambia, will be conducted in English. Field interviews in The Gambia will be carried out in English and/or local languages, while French and local languages will be the operational language in Senegal. All team members must be proficient in both English and French.

The Team Leader is responsible for the final Mid-Term Evaluation Report. As such, the Team Leader will be contractually obligated to provide the stated deliverables CRS within the agreed upon timeframe. S/he will sub-contract for the services of the remaining team members¹⁶, and oversee their contribution, ensuring that that evaluation is conducted effectively, and that the deliverables produced are of the highest quality. S/he will lead the Mid-Term Evaluation Team through the consultative assessment process with key stakeholders to ensure that the overall design meets the various needs of those involved. The Team Leader will ensure that the Mid-Term Evaluation focuses primarily on the extent to which the project design and activities meet the needs of the project beneficiaries. The Team Leader has the responsibility of reviewing the Monitoring and Evaluation System, with a particular emphasis on the suitability of the indicators, making recommendations on revisions to indicators in line with the findings of the evaluation. S/he will submit a preliminary workplan within the first week of the assignment, clarifying logistical requirements and planning schedules. The Level of Effort for the Team Leader is 30 days.

Qualifications

- Advanced degree in agriculture or development related field
- Have previous experience in multi-disciplinary evaluations
- Demonstrated the ability to effectively manage a team and provide leadership and guidance in the field
- Hold an advanced degree in relevant discipline
- Demonstrated ability to prepare and present findings to groups
- Demonstrated excellent report writing skills (in English)
- Demonstrated functional capacity in both English and French, with local language skills desirable

The **Agriculturalist** will be responsible for evaluating the sesame component of the DAP. S/he will work in conjunction with the Team Leader, the safety net consultant, and DAP staff to ensure that the evaluation is conducted in an efficient manner. S/he will be responsible for providing draft components of the final report as requested by the Team Leader. The Agricultural consultant will conduct a review of secondary data and key informant interviews, in order to assess sesame marketing structure in light of DAP program design, as well as assessing institutional capacity of the relevant implementing partners. The Level of Effort for the Agricultural consultant is 24 days.

Qualifications

- Demonstrated background in agricultural development, with experience in market system analysis or related field.
- Previous evaluation experience
- Demonstrated ability to effectively work in a team
- Hold an advanced degree in relevant discipline
- Demonstrated ability to prepare and present findings to groups
- Proven report writing skills (in English)
- Demonstrated functional capacity in both English and French required, with local language capacity desirable

¹⁶ CRS may recommend candidates to serve on the team if requested by the Team Leader. CRS must approve all individuals of the final Mid-Term Evaluation team.

The **Food Security Consultant** will be responsible for carrying out the relevant interviews, reviewing relevant documents, and reviewing indicators relating to the DAP Safety Net component. Specifically, the Food Security Consultant will assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the food storage, delivery, and reporting system used by the program, as well as targeting mechanisms used by the program and whether the food is reaching the intended beneficiaries in the recommended quantities. Key lessons learned and recommendations that could improve the implementation of the DAP in this cycle will be identified by the Food Security consultant. The Level of Effort for the Food Security Consultant is 24 days.

Qualifications

- Have previous evaluation experience
- Background in food security, food distribution programs, and/or household level targeted assistance to vulnerable populations
- Demonstrated the ability to effectively work in a team
- Hold an advanced degree in relevant discipline
- Strong writing skills (in English)
- Demonstrated ability to prepare and present findings to groups
- Demonstrated functional capacity in both English and French language, with local language capacity desirable

Proposed Time Frame

The MTE will commence in early November 2004 and shall be completed by mid-December 2004. A tentative schedule is provided below:

Proposed Time	Activity	Location
November 1-5, 2004	Sign Contracts	Banjul
November 8-9, 2004	Initial Meetings	Dakar
November 10 – 14, 2004	Senegal Interviews	Tambacounda/Kolda
November 15 – 19, 2004	Gambia Interviews	URD, LRD, CRD/Banjul
November 19, 2004	Outline Presentation	Banjul
November 20-25, 2004	Report Preparation	Banjul
November 29-30, 2004	MTE Final Draft Debriefing	Banjul
December 6-8, 2004	Final Report Submitted	Banjul/Dakar

Illustrative List of Reference Documents:

- Development Activity Proposal
- DAP Baseline Survey (The Gambia and Senegal)
- 2004 Annual DAP Survey: Summary of Findings (The Gambia and Senegal)
- FY 04 Results Report
- DAP final evaluation (2000) from previous cycle
- Food Distribution Manual
- Safety Net Reporting System
- Sesame Reporting System
- Vincent Tickner "Further Towards Sesame Marketing Strategies in Senegal and The Gambia December 2003
- Vincent Tickner, "Towards a Sesame Marketing Strategy in Senegal and The Gambia", December 2002
- Coutts de la Production et meilleurs pratiques Sahel Express consult, Senegal,

- DAP Management Review Summary
- Rapport de la Campagne de Commercialisation du Sésame Année, Alphonse Sanga 2003/04

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Appendix A: List of Strategic Objectives and Intermediate Results Outlined in the DAP

Objectives	Intermediate Results
<i>Agriculture Sector</i>	
Strategic Objective 1: Improve economic access to food for farm households engaged in sesame production in targeted areas in Senegal and The Gambia by 2006	
Sub- Strategic Objective 1.1: Sesame Collection centers are operating as market venues to improve market stability and efficiency for 25,000 farm households.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Twenty Collection Centers Established • Marketing information services provided through collection centers • Sixty Collection Center Operators certified in cleaning, weighing, bagging, tagging and storing sesame • Record keeping and inventory control procedures established and each center will employ a certified storekeeper/ auditor • Collection center location and services made known to sesame growers and buyers
Sub-Strategic Objective 1.2: Democratic and efficiently managed Farmer Associations (Senegal) and Sesame Growers Association (The Gambia) represent the concerns of and provide policy advocacy service to its members.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Farmers' organizations are democratically governed, well managed and have planning, financial, and administrative systems in place • 1700 SGA members trained in functional literacy • Sesame growers' concerns and needs are represented to key government agencies, and mutually supportive linkages are made with research institutions and other development agencies
Sub-Strategic Objective 1.3: Research is conducted to identify and reduce the costs of, and constraints to marketing; to improve post harvest handling practices; and to increase productivity of sesame farmers.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Thirty farmers participate in on-farm research and receive training in seed multiplication and sales of market oriented varieties • Transaction costs estimated for identified links in marketing chain and reviewed in workshop for possible incorporation into project • Data on socio-economic and gender influences on sesame production, processing, and marketing decisions collected, analyzed, reviewed and incorporated into project • Information on post harvest seed treatment and appropriate seed cleaning technology collected, reviewed and incorporated into project • Production cost data collected, analyzed and reviewed to determine profitability and competition for farm resources • "Best Practices" in sesame production identified, tested, reviewed and assessed in farmer and project staff workshops, and incorporated into project.
<i>Humanitarian Sector</i>	
Strategic Objective 2: Increased availability of food for vulnerable households in Senegal and The Gambia by 2006	
Sub-Strategic Objective 2.1: 3,959 MT of food distributed to vulnerable individuals	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Distribution of 3169.6 MT of food to vulnerable individuals in institutions • Distribution of 792.4 MT of food to vulnerable individuals in communities
Sub-Strategic Objective 2.2: Twenty institutions and twenty communities are able to analyze the causes of food insecurity and provide support to vulnerable groups	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Twenty institutions trained on food security issues • Twenty communities trained on food security issues • Twenty communities trained in conflict resolution and transformation • Three hundred and sixty peer group counselors trained in nutrition counseling and home-based care of persons living with HIV-AIDS in targeted communities • Twenty institutions trained in proposal development, resources acquisition and diversification of funding • Twenty communities trained in proposal development, resources acquisition and diversification of funding
Sub-Strategic Objective 2.3: Institutions and communities can manage safety net interventions for vulnerable groups	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Twenty institutions trained in organizational financial systems and commodity management • Twenty communities trained in organizational financial systems and commodity management • One hundred percent of commodities accounted for by institutions and community organizations

Annex 2: Documents Consulted

- Bakurin, Ndey Sireng. 2004. Report on the Institutional Capacity Assessment of Gambian Food and Nutritional Association (GAFNA). CRS, Banjul.
- Cabinet “CIG”. 2002. Etude sur le Filet de Sécurité Alimentaire du Projet DAP et la Sénégal : Régions de Kolda et de Tambacounda. Projet de Rapport Final. CRS, Dakar.
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Annex 3A: Interview Guidelines, Sesame Component

Interview guide for a kaffo

Kaffo name....

Association....

Date.....

1. When was your kaffo established
2. What is the purposes of your kaffo
3. Does your kaffo has by-laws
4. How is your kaffo bureau selected
5. How many members of your kaffo are represented at the association level
6. What is the place of sesame in your farming system
7. How is sesame activities organized in your kaffo
8. How many people are involved? How do you remunerate them
9. How do your members benefit from the sesame activities
10. What prices your members receive from the SGA as compared to the banabana
11. What are the major constraints you see in the sesame marketing activities
12. How can that be improved
13. What variety of sesame do your members produced
14. What guide the decision to produce there varieties
15. How do you see the revenue of sesame as compared to other crops
16. How is revenue from sesame utilized
17. What overall support does your kafoo gets from the association

Interview guide to Grower Groups/SGA

Name of the SGA/group.....

Name of the Association.....

Country.....

Date.....

Background

1. When was the group formed
2. How many members today
3. What are the objectives of the group
4. When was the group joined the association and why

Management/Governance

5. What is the composition of the group management
6. How are the management committee selected
7. How long is their term
8. How many time the committee was renewed
9. How many women are in the management committee
10. How long is the president in the committee
11. What is the role of each member of the Management committee
12. How many people are literate in the group
13. How many people or commercant/business men in the group
14. How do you make decision for your group
15. Who participate in the decision making
16. What important decision have you taken recently
17. Who participated

Relationship with the implementing Partner

18. How did you decide of this membership to the organization
19. What concrete services your Organization is offering to you
20. How do you participate in the life of your Organization/NGO
21. How do you participate in the decision making of your association
22. How often do your group meet with the association/NGO
23. What subjects are being discussed
24. How does your group contributes

Sesame production activities

1. What variety of sesame is mostly used by the Association members
2. What drive the decision for selecting a particular variety
3. What variety the association would have liked its member to produce
4. How member access to adequate seeds
5. What is your group knowledge of production techniques
6. How are your group members applying improved techniques
7. How do your group members know the market demand and requirement
8. How important is sesame production for your group members
9. Why are they producing sesame
10. Is there any competition with other crops? Which ones
11. What are the major problems your group members encounter in sesame production

Sesame marketing

25. Explain how your group was organized for the collection of the sesame
26. How did your group members know about the center
27. How many of your group member sell through the center
28. How far is your group from the center
29. What other services the center offer to your group members
30. What marketing information your group receive and how
31. What is the price you receive through the marketing channel as compared to the from private collector
32. What advantage do you see

Revenue from sesame

33. How important is the sesame revenue for your group members
34. How do they use it?

Interview guide to group members

Name of the association.....

Name of the group

Name of the grower

Date.....

Background

35. When was the group formed
36. How many members today
37. What are the objectives of the group

Management/Governance

38. What is the composition of the group management
39. How are the management committee selected
40. How long is their term
41. How many time the committee was renewed
42. How many women are in the management committee
43. How long is the president in the committee
44. What is the role of each member of the Management committee
45. How many people are literate in the group
46. How many people or commercant/business men in the group
47. How do you make decision for your group
48. Who participate in the decision making
49. What important decision have you taken recently
50. Who participated

Relationship with the Association

51. To which association do you belong to
52. How did you decide of this membership
53. What concrete services you association is offering to you
54. How do you participate in the life of your association
55. How do you participate in the decision making of your association
56. How often do your group meet with the association
57. What subjects are being discussed
58. How does your group contributes

Production

1. How long have you been growing sesame
2. How large is your farm and on what portion do you grow sesame
3. How do you estimate your annual yield
4. What variety of sesame do you grow and why
5. How do you access the seed
6. Describe your techniques of production including input use and how you access them
7. What services and training do you receive from your association
8. What are the major constraints to sesame production

Marketing

9. When did you start selling through the center and why
10. How did you sell before
11. How did you know about the center
12. What quantity of sesame did you sell through the center the last 2 years
13. What variety did you sell

14. How far are you from the center
15. How did you transport your product to the center
16. What prices did you received from the center as compared to others at this moment
17. What information are key to you when making your sell
18. What information do you receive from the center or your Association
19. How is the information disseminated to you (radio, workshop, etc)
20. What other information do you like to receive to help you decide
21. Was the price offer really profitable to you
22. How do you know the price is profitable?
How are your paid for your sesame?
23. How do you calculate your cost of production
24. What extension services do you receive and from whom

Interview guide for the Collection center operators

Managing Association..... (is the center under an SGA or does it have another management structure?)

Name of the collector (?)....

Date of the interview...

The Collection center

1. When did the center start operations
2. What are the primary functions of the center
3. What is the storage capacity
4. What is the cleaning capacity/performance

Sesame collection

5. What quantity of sesame did the center collect and market during the last 2 years
6. What type/varieties of sesame did you collected
7. What prices did this center offer to farmers for their sesame for each variety
8. How was the price decided
9. How many farmers sold through this center (members and non-members?)
10. What was the method of payment and
11. How do farmers appreciate actual method of payment
12. From how far away do farmers groups/associations come to sell or do you go to collect
13. How do the farmer know about the center
14. What are the main reasons farmer sell through the center
15. Collection calendar (time of year, length of campaign)
16. How long to the center keep the sesame
17. How do you evaluate the performance of the collection the last 2 years
18. What are the constraints of the farmers to use the collection center
19. Were there other private collectors around
20. What price where they giving
21. What are their methods of payment
22. How do farmers like their methods
23. What advantage does the center has as compared to the private collectors (important)

Post harvest handling services Cleaning

24. How much sesame was cleaned the last 2 years
25. What was the cleaning performance (isn't this the same as 26?)
26. What is your machine cleaning capacity
27. How do you package the sesame (kg)
28. Who pay the functioning

Selling of sesame

29. When did the center sell its sesame
30. How long did the center take to bulk (10MT)
31. How do you and farmers perceive the bulking strategy (quantity required)
32. To whom did the center sell sesame the last 2 years

33. How did they know about the center
34. How is the selling price decided
35. Who participated in the negotiation
36. At what price did the center sell the sesame (per variety)
37. Who also cleans and sell sesame around
38. Who also collect sesame around
39. What are their price compared to the center

Market information system

40. How do farmers know about market prices and information?
41. What information does the center give to farmers
42. Who provide the information to the center
43. At what frequency the information is updated and provided
44. Does the center collect the information
45. How does the center disseminate information to the farmers
46. How do you evaluate the pertinence of information provided
47. How do you estimate the effectiveness of the dissemination of the information to farmers
48. What feed back do you receive from farmers about the pertinence and the dissemination of the information
49. How do buyers know about the center
50. What information does the center give to the buyer
51. Who provide the info to the center
52. How does the center collect the information
53. How does the center disseminate the information to the buyer
54. How many buyers contacted the center this or previous year
55. How do you evaluate the pertinence of information provided
56. How do you estimate the effectiveness of the dissemination of the information to buyers
57. What feed back do you receive from buyers about the pertinence and the dissemination of the information
58. How can the system be improved?

Operation of the center

58. How many staff are working in the center
59. How have they been selected and contracted
60. Do the staff have contracts? What terms are they
61. What system exist for inventory management
62. What system exist for accounting and financial management
63. Who do the center staff report to and in what frequency
64. How long does the center operate a year
65. Who pays for the center operations
66. How do we know the financial performance of the center
67. How do you know the profit or loss made by the center
68. What was the financial performance during the last 2 years
69. Does the center produce annual income statement and balance sheet
70. Is the center audited annually
71. Who follow up the implementation of the audit recommendations

Training received from CRS

72. What training have you received from the project
73. How long was the training and by whom
74. Which of the knowledge received do you apply the most and why
75. Which knowledge do you master the most
76. Which part of your job do you still need reinforcement
77. Which training knowledge do you use the less
78. Which area of your job you need training

Interview guide for a sesame buyer

Name of the Company.....

Country

Date of interview.....

1. How long has your company been in business
2. What are your main activities?
3. How much sesame you bought the last 2 years
4. What variety of sesame do you prefer
5. What are you doing with the sesame you buy
6. How much sesame did you buy from CRS collection centers (are the collection centers recognized as having been initiated and supported by CRS?)
7. At what price did you buy it and how did you come to this price
8. What were the modality of the payment
9. Were your needs met in terms of quality
10. Were your needs met in terms of quantity available
11. How did you know about the collection center
12. What advantage does the collection center has for you
13. What information does the collection center offer you and what information do you provide to the center
14. What information would you like to receive from them
15. Are you also collecting buying from other traders, farmers, and/or associations
16. What are the prices you offered and why
17. How do you compare the collection centers and the private collectors
18. To where do you export the sesame
19. What price do you receive at the port
20. What cost do you pay to reach the port
21. What services if any do you offer to the farmers' groups/associations
22. What has been your experience in the perfinancing?

Interview guide for Contact Farmers

Name.....

Association/Partner.....

1. How is the sesame activities organized
2. Describe your main role in the sesame activities
3. How are sesame information provided to farmers
4. What extension services are provided to farmers
5. How are the extension service provision organized
6. What are the main constraints in the marketing activities
7. How can that be improved
8. What are the key constraints to production in your area
9. How can that be improved
10. How many farmers do you oversee
11. How do you plan production with farmers
12. What technology package to you teach to farmers
13. How do you provide extension services and technical assistance to farmers
14. How do you evaluate farmers adoption of technology
15. What is the place of sesame in the farming system in your area
16. What are the main reasons/constraints
17. What are your suggestions to improve productions/adoption of the techniques
18. What marketing information is provided to farmers-How do you do it
19. How are you remunerated?
20. What time do you allocate to farmers training
21. How do you evaluate training provided
22. How is women participate in your training
23. How do you see women involvement in sesame in your region?
24. What do you suggest to increase women participation and benefit to the project

Interview guide for the Government
Sesame promotion officer

Name.....

Function....

Date.....

1. When did the Government established this program
2. What is the overall purpose of this project
3. What is the geographic coverage of this project
4. Is there any specific area of the country the project will emphasis
5. What is the budget
6. What specific activities this project will be doing
7. What will be the emphasis of the project
8. How does the project envision to collaborate with the other NGOs and existing projects
9. How is this project going to work? Through NGOs or Government channels
10. What are the majors constraints to sesame production and marketing
11. How does the government prepare to tackle them
12. What is the project plan to support Sesame grower Federations and Associations in the country

Interview guide for CRS Implementing Partners

Name of the Partner/Association.....
Country.....
Date of the interview.....

Background information

12. When was the association created
13. What are your organization Objectives/Mission/vision
14. What are your organization key activities
15. What are your organization funding sources/Donor and project support other than CRS

Organizational structure and governance

16. How are the board members selected and what is their terms
17. How long the current board members have been in office
18. Who are the board members (location, qualification, education, etc)
19. Do the Association has by-laws, strategic document?
20. How often do you hold general Assembly meeting
21. How do the Association communicate with its members
22. How do Association members participation in decision making
23. Is the association making profit from sesame activities
24. How is the profit used? What decide on it?
25. Is your association audited periodically? By whom

4.2 Staffing

26. Does the Association have sufficient qualified staff to implement the project
27. Has each of the staff received adequate training related to the position
28. How frequently staff are in the field
29. What is the staff turnover in this project
30. How would we describe the work environment here
31. What incentive exist for staff
32. What policy does the association has for staff retention
33. How are staff utilized? For one project or for many other project
34. How many staff handle the sesame section of the project
35. How is staff time allocated to various sources of funds/project
36. How is extension services provided
37. What were the results of the research
38. How was the results disseminated to the farmers
39. What is the experience and education level of the extension service people
40. How was the capacity building section conducted
41. How effective was it

4.3 Systems

M&E

- 42. How does the Association follow progress made in the project
- 43. What are the key information needed
- 44. How does the Association involved in information collection
- 45. Are there tools available for progress tracking
- 46. Are there tools available for planning
- 47. What is the quality of the information provided
- 48. Does the Association has computerized management information system
- 49. How does the association use the information collected from the M&E
- 50. How timely are project report submitted to CRS and other donors
- 51. What is the donor feedback on your report

Accounting/Financial management System

- 52. Does the partner have a sound or computerized accounting system
- 53. Who handles the accounting and financial management of the Association
- 54. Does the association produce income statement
- 55. Does the Association has and follow administrative system and policy in place
(for recruitment, evaluation, acquisition of good and services, etc..)
- 56. Does the association have an adequate filing system for the project documents

Planning and monitoring of project

- 57. Does the Association has a Strategic plan
- 58. How does the Association plan for project activities and what tools are used
- 59. Who participate in the project activity planning
- 60. How often the field visits are undertaken
- 61. What problems have been encountered and how have they been resolved?

Learning and innovation

- 62. How does change happen in the Association
- 63. What significant changes in tools and systems have taken place recently
- 64. How flexible is the Association to changes and innovation

Training received from CRS

- 65. How many staff received training from CRS
- 66. What training were offered by CRS
- 67. How were the training planned
- 68. How relevant are the training received to the job

Experience in sesame marketing

- 69. How long has the association been in Sesame
- 70. Explain how the NGO member groups/Association have organized themselves for the sesame collection

71. What are their main activities
72. Amount of sesame collected the last 3 years
73. How does the Association decide the price to farmers
74. What information do the association need prior to deciding the price to farmers
75. How does the Association handle competition in prices with private collectors
76. How does the partner coordinate with other CRS sesame partners in price setting
77. Who negotiate for the Association
78. How do you prepare for negotiation
79. How are the offers made
80. Who are the key buyers of the Association
81. How does the association participated in the idea of the establishment of the collection centers
82. How does the Association manage the collection centers
83. Does the Association keep track of the financial performance of the centers
84. Who owns the cleaning machines
85. How do you view the sustainability of the centers in the long run
86. What factors are determinate for the sustainability of the centers

Service to its members

87. What services does the Association provides do its members
88. How are these services provided
89. Training provided to members
90. What are the profit made during the last 2 years in the sesame marketing
91. How was the profit used for
92. How is this profit returning to members

Annex 3B: Interview Guidelines, Safety Net Component

Safety Net Interview Guide Partners

Director Level

1. When was your organization established? What are its principal activities? Who supports them?
2. Do you have other projects/support from CRS besides the safety net activities?
3. What previous experience have you had in implementing food distribution programs in the community? In centers?
4. What type of structure have you put in place to implement the Safety Net Program in communities? In Centers?
5. How do the systems put in place for managing the Safety Net activities with CRS compare to those you put in place to manage other organization's programs?
6. What types of support has your institution received from CRS to implement the safety net program?
7. According to the contract what are the responsibilities of CRS? Your institution? Have the terms of the contract been respected?
8. What problems have you encountered in your partnership with CRS? What suggestions do you have to improve the working relationship in the future?
9. Currently, do you have support from other organizations to provide Safety Net services to communities/centers?
10. Given that this region experiences chronic food insecurity, what criteria did you use to prioritize the communities and to select the beneficiaries?
11. What is your strategy for ensuring the sustainability of future safety net interventions?

Coordinateur/personnel

1. To how many parishes/communities do you distribute food ? Beneficiaries?
2. What type of structure have you put into place to implement the Safety Net Program in communities? In Centers?
3. What training have you received in order to manage the safety net program? Who organized it?
4. Do you participate in any other food distribution or development activities of your institution? If so, what percentage of your time?
5. Are the monthly reports for the last two months available at the institution (to verify)?
6. Were the reports submitted to CRS on-time? If there were delays, why?
7. How do you use the information in your reports? Do you ever receive feedback from the reports you submit?
8. How often do you submit food requests? When was the last time one was submitted? After submission how long after did you receive the food? If there were delays, do you know why?

9. When was the last food delivery? What do you do when the safety food does not arrive and there's a break in the stock? If this has happened, what have you been told by CRS?
10. Have you ever experienced a significant food loss? Under what circumstances? What was the cause? What have you done about it?
11. Has a CRS end use checker done a supervisory visit at the center within the last 30 days that is recorded in the documentation at the food distribution center? If not, when was the last time he visited?
12. What problems have you encountered in the safety net program?
13. How can the program be improved?

Warehouse:

1. Did you have adequate storage to participate in the program? If not, what support did you receive to bring it up to standard?
2. To verify:
 - Is food stored at ground or elevated?
 - Is it the minimum distance from the wall?
 - Are there signs of rodent or other pest infestation?
 - Is the site appropriately ventilated?
 - Is there evidence of leakage from the roof?
 - Is food separated by commodity and activity (distribution and food from other donors)?
 - Is food properly stacked?
 - Is the door locked with a key?
 - Are there other things stored in the site?
 - Is there evidence of oil leakage, torn bags, or any loss from storage container?
 - Is the spoiled food stored at the same location?
3. Are the way bills available?
4. Is there a ration table?
5. Are the reports: daily, monthly available?
6. Is a sanctions policy document available?

Safety Net Interview Guide
Institution Director/Personnel

1. When was the institution established? Who are its main clients?
2. What are the main activities of the Institution?
3. How many people does the institution serve? Have the numbers changed over time? If so, why?
4. What kind of support does the institution receive and from whom? In particular, does it receive any other food assistance?
5. How did the institution become a “beneficiary” of the CRS-CARITAS safety net program?
6. The rations you receive from the safety net, what proportion of the overall food ration of the institution do they represent?
7. What changes have you observed in the lives/well being of your beneficiaries since you have started receiving food from the Safety Net program?
8. What types of training have you received and from whom in order to manage the safety net program?
9. Are the monthly reports for the last two months available at the institution (to verify)?
10. Were the reports submitted to CRS on-time? If there were delays, why?
11. How do you use the information you report to CARITAS? Do you ever receive feedback from the reports you submit?
12. How often do you submit food requests? When was the last time one was submitted? After submission how long after did you receive the food? If there were delays, do you know why?
13. When was the last food delivery? What do you do when the safety food does not arrive and there’s a break in the stock? If this has happened, what has CARITAS told you?
14. Have you ever experienced a significant food loss? Under what circumstances? What was the cause? What have you done about it?
15. Has a CRS end use checker done a supervisory visit at the center within the last 30 days that is recorded in the documentation at the food distribution center? If not, when was the last time he visited?
16. What problems have you encountered in the safety net program?
17. How can the program be improved?
18. What are your long-term plans to ensure the sustainability of your activities, in particular, when the safety net support is no longer available?

Warehouse:

1. Did you have adequate storage to participate in the program? If not, what support did you receive to bring it up to standard?
2. To verify:
 - Is food stored at ground or elevated?
 - Is it the minimum distance from the wall?
 - Are there signs of rodent or other pest infestation?
 - Is the site appropriately ventilated?
 - Is there evidence of leakage from the roof?
 - Is food separated by commodity and activity (distribution and food from other donors)?

- Is food properly stacked?
- Is the door locked with a key?
- Are there other things stored in the site?
- Is there evidence of oil leakage, torn bags, or any loss from storage container?
- Is the spoiled food stored at the same location?

Kitchen facilities:

1. Is the kitchen space covered? Protected?
2. Are there latrines?
3. Have the personnel been trained in hygiene and nutrition?

FOR TB-HIV/AIDS SITES:

1. Does the site use the Direct Observation Treatment? Is the DOT Register available and used properly?

1. Quels sont les critères que vous avez utilisé pour sélectionner les bénéficiaires ?
2. Quelles sont les difficultés que vous avez rencontré dans leur sélection ?
3. Quelles améliorations pouvez vous proposer ?
4. Quelles sont les difficultés que vous avez rencontré au moment de la distribution ? et leurs conséquences ?
5. Quelles améliorations pouvez vous proposer ?
6. Est-ce que il y a des conflits entre membres de la communauté ou entre membres et responsables à cause du choix de bénéficiaires ? Si oui, décrivez les et quelle solution proposez vous ?
7. Selon vous quelle est la relation entre CRS et CARITAS ?
8. Quelle formation avez-vous reçu pour gérer le programme ? de qui ?
9. Avant l'intervention de CRS, est-ce qu'on avait de programme de distribution de vivres ? Si oui, de qui et quel type de ration etc ? Comparez les deux approches
10. Est-ce que vous avez constaté des cas des denrées avariées dans votre centre ? Si oui, qu'en faites vous ? Est-ce que vous pourriez proposez des solutions ?
11. Au moment de livraison, est-ce que vous avez observé des manquements ou des excédents ? Qu'en faites vous ?
12. Est-ce qu'il arrive des fois quand vous ne pouvez pas distribuer toute la ration complète aux bénéficiaires (WSB, huile, lentille, mais), si oui qu'est-ce que vous faites ?
13. Vos relations avec le coordinateur de Programme Filet de Sécurité, comment sont-elles ? Il vient avec quel fréquence ?
14. Quel est la dernière visite de 'end use checker' ? Est-ce qu'il a laissé un rapport ?
15. Les formulaires à remplir, sont ils faciles ou difficiles à remplir ? Est-ce que vous avez des améliorations à proposer ?
16. Qu'est-ce que faites avec ces fiches ? Quel feedback est-ce que vous en recevrez ?

Guide Bénéficiaires

Combien de personnes sont dans le ménage et qui mangent les rations ?

Combien de vivre (par type) est-ce que vous recevrez par mois ?

Combien de repas par jour faites –vous avec ces rations ?

Les rations durent combien de temps ?

Parmi les rations reçues, laquelle préférez vous ? Pourquoi ? Comment vous l'utilisez ?

Lesquelles n'aimez pas ? pourquoi ?

Dans l'année, combien de fois est-ce que vous recevrez les vivres ?

Les rations que vous avez reçu, est-ce qu'il y a qui sont avariés ? Si oui, quelle proportion de quel type ? (Maize, WSB)

Qu'est-ce que vous faites avec ces rations avariés ?

Est-ce que vous recevrez de l'aide d'autres sources (famille, église, d'autre ONG) ? Si oui, de quelle nature et avec quelle fréquence ?

Annex 4: Field Visit Schedule

Date	Activity/Meetings
Sat., Jan. 29	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Leave Dakar for Tambacounda - Meeting with sesame buyer in Kounghel - Meeting with GADEC supervisor in Kounghel - Meeting with officers of farmers group RADEC, Kounghel
Sun., Jan. 30	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Meeting with CARITAS/Tambacounda Safety Net Coordinator (SN)* - Visit to NGO La Lumière ; Meeting with Director and Staff (SN) - Meeting with Groupement Kambeng Kaffo (SC)** - Meeting with Groupement Tessito (SC)
Mon., Jan. 31	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Meeting with CARITAS/Tambacounda Director, Asst. Director (SN) - Visit to CARITAS warehouse (SN) - Visit to CREN Tambacounda (SN) - Travel to Kedougou (SN) - Meeting with head of Foyer Kedougou (SN) - Meeting with GADEC DAP Team (SC) - Meeting with Executive Secretary of GADEC (SN) - Meeting with GADEC Collection Center Staff - Travel to Kolda (SC)
Tues., Feb. 1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Visit to Foyer Kedougou (SN) - Visit to St. Joseph Community (SN) - Return to Tambacounda (SN) - Meeting with Federation ADC Ninamba, Kolda (SC) - Focus group, three women sesame producers, ADC Ninamba (SC) - Focus group, men sesame producers, ADC Ninamba (SC) - Meeting with contact farmers, ADC Ninamba (SC) - Meeting with Union Kento, Kolda (SC) - Visit to 7A cleaning machine, Kolda (SC) - Meeting with Executive Secretary, 7A, Kolda (SC) - Meeting with 7A DAP project team, Kolda (SC)
Wed., Feb. 2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Meeting with the President ASSOLUCER, Kolda (SC) - Meeting with ASSOLUCER DAP Project team, Kolda (SC) - Visit to ASSOLUCER cleaning machine, Kolda (SC) - Meeting with Groupement Kairaba, Kolda (SC) - Travel to Vélingara (SN) - Meet CARITAS Kolda Safety Net Manager (SN) - Visit Jean Joseph II College, Vélingara (SN) - Visit Community John Joseph, Vélingara - Visit CREN, Vélingara - Visit Community Mampitim

* SN – Safety Net Component; ** SC – Sesame Component

Date	Activity/Meetings
Thurs., Feb. 3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Meet CARITAS Kolda Director, Kolda (SN) - Courtesy call on the Bishop of the Kolda Diocese (SN) - Visit to CREN, Kolda (SN) - Visit CARITAS Warehouse (SN) - Meeting with Parish Committee, Notre Dame Victoires - Visit CRS/Kolda Office (SN) - Brief discussion with CRS/Microfinance manager (SN) - Travel to Ziguinchor (SN) - Meeting with AAJAC President and Program Manager, Ziguinchor (SN)
Fri., Feb. 4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Meeting with committee Sedhiou - Visit Warehouse Sedhiou - Travel to Ziguinchor - Meeting with Senegal sesame team, Ziguinchor, SN - Evaluation team meeting, Ziguinchor (SN and SC)
Sat., Feb. 5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Meeting with FDGPF, FENPROSE, Bignona, (SN and SC) - Cross border into The Gambia
Sun., Feb. 6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Meeting with SGA-Kambeng Madina, LRD (SC) - Meeting with SGA-Kwenella Kambeng, LRD (SC) - Meeting with male individual sesame grower, LRD (SC) - Meeting with Land Advocacy Committee member, LRD (SC) - Meeting with NAWFA NEC member and extension agent, LRD (SC) - Meeting with St. Vincent DePaul Society, Fulabantang, CRD (SN) - Visit several Beneficiaries of St. Vincent de Paul (SN) - Visit to Bansang Hospital, CRD, (SN)
Mon., Feb. 7	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Meeting with SGA Nafaa Bunda + NEC member + 8 SGA presidents, CRD-S (SC) - Visit of a cleaning machine, CRD-S (SC) - Visit to Basse Health Center, URD (SN) - Discussion with beneficiaries Basse Health Center, Basse (SN) - Meeting with staff of RSOD, Basse (SN) - Meeting with beneficiaries of RSOD, Basse (SN)
Tues., Feb. 8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Meeting with NAWFA extension agent, Basse (SC) - Meeting with SGA Nema Basendin, URD (SC) - Meeting with male individual sesame farmer, Basse, (SC) - Meeting with CMC Banni, CRD-N (SN) - Meeting with peer counselors, Kayai, CRD-N (SN) - Meeting with CMC members, Kayai, CRD-N (SN)
Wed., Feb. 9	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Meeting with SGA Njau members, CRS-N (SC) - Visit to cleaning machine of SGA Njau, CRD-N (SC) - Travel to Banjul (SC) - Meeting with CMC Kaur and beneficiaries, CRD-N (SN) - Meeting with CMC Kuntaur and beneficiaries, CRD-N (SN) - Travel to Banjul (SC)

Date	Activity/Meetings
Thurs., Feb. 10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Meeting with Dr. Mopoi Nuwanyakpa, CRS Consultant (SC) - Meeting at NARI, Banjul (SC) - Meeting with Royal Enterprise, Banjul (SC) - Meeting with RAM Moham, buyer (SC) - Meeting with Sisters of Charity, Banjul (SN) - Meeting with CRS Commodity management team, Banjul (SN) - Visit to Warehouse, Banjul (SN)
Fri., Feb. 11	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Meeting with Gambia safety net staff (SN) - Meeting with GAFNA Director (SN) - Meeting with M&E staff (SN) - Meeting with CRS/The Gambia Head of Programming, (SN) - Meeting with NAWFA
Sat., Feb. 12	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Preparation for debriefing session (SC and SN)
Sun., Feb. 13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Meeting with CRS Senegal DAP staff and regional specialists (SC and SN)
Mon., Feb. 14	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Debriefing meeting (SC and SN)
Tues., Feb. 15	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Meeting with DAP management and operational staff (SC) - Visit to Santa Yalla Society, Banjul (SN)
Wed., Feb. 16	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Meeting with Safety Net team (CRS and Partners) to review indicators (SN) - Meeting with CRS/The Gambia Health Program head (SN)

Annex 5: Persons Consulted

<u>Dakar, Senegal</u>	
Mr. Godlove Ntaw	Country Representative, CRS/Senegal
Ms Lisa Washington-Sow	DAP Manager and Safety Net Liaison, CRS/Senegal
Mr. Massamba Gningue	Project Officer, CRS/Senegal
Mr. Kevin Sturr	FFP Regional Office, USAID, Dakar
Mr. Dramane Mariko	FFP Regional Office, USAID, Dakar
Mr. Magaye Thioune	National Coordinator, PADFSE, Ministry of Agriculture, Dakar
Mr. Mansour Gueye	Sesame Buyer, RECOFI, Dakar
<u>Tambacounda Region, Senegal</u>	
Mr. Mamadou Moustapha Niang	Sesame Collector and Director PRODICIAS, Kounghoul
President and several members	RADEC, Farmers Association, Kounghoul
Mr. Denis Traore	Director, CARITAS, Tambacounda
Abbe Paul Mamba	Director Adjoint, CARITAS, Tambacounda
Mr. Philippe Correa	Coordinator Safety Net Program, CARITAS, Tambacounda
Mr. Antoine Michel	Accountant Safety Net Program, CARITAS, Tambacounda
Mr. Joseph Gaye	Warehouse manager and food security, CARITAS, Tambacounda
President and members Groupement Kambeng Kaffo	Kanape Koto , Tambacounda
Mr. Welle Sane Mr. Hawa Ba Mr. Omar fall	Sesame Project Team, GADEC, Tambacounda
Mr. Alassane Guisse	Executive Secretary, GADEC, Tambacounda
Mr. Alhousseny Ndiaye	Stock / inventory manager, GADEC Collection Center, Tambacounda
Mr. Ibrahima Sory Diallo	Executive Director, Association La Lumière, Tambacounda
Mrs. Mame Thioro Ndiogou	Secretary and Food Monitor, Association La Lumière, Tambacounda
Pere Marek Myslinski	Director, Foyer St. Joseph, Kedougou
Frere Baltheck	Stagiaire, Foyer St. Joseph, Kedougou
Mr. Albert Biiss	Warehouse manager, St. Joseph Parish, Kedougou
6 young school girls	St. Joseph Girls Dormitory, Kedougou
8 beneficiaries and family members	St. Joseph Parish, Kedougou

<u>Kolda Region, Senegal</u>	
Mr. Alphonse Sagna	Sesame Marketing Manager and Head of Office, CRS/Kolda
Mr. Pape Said Coly	M&E Assistant, CRS/Kolda
Mr. André François Faye	Safety Net Assistant Manager, CRS/Kolda
Mr. Ousmane Sagne	Marketing Assistant, CRS/Kolda
Sister Régina Mnich	Head of the Center for Rehabilitation, Education Nutritionnelle, Vélingara
Abbé Jean Pierre	Vélingara Parish
M. François Djatta	Committee member, Vélingara
M. Jean Pierre Djihounouck	Stock specialist, Vélingara
Jean Marie Coly	Responsible of Internat College Jean Paul II
Frère Nicolas Le Meilleur	Responsible de formation, College Jean Paul II
Marcel Kambinka	Head of Committee, Mampitim
Mr. Pierre Diatta	Head of CARITAS Kolda
Monsignor Jean Pierre Bassene	Bishop of the Diocese of Kolda
Abbé Olypiad	Pakour Parish Priest
Mr. Tiburce Manga	Safety Net Field Coordinator, CARITAS, Kolda
Daniel Nyouky	President de Comité; Notre dame Kolda
Sister Marie Rose	Responsable CREN ; Kolda
Mr. Abdourahame Fall	Service Régional de Ministère de la famille, Kolda
Abbé Joachim Labar	Former CARITAS Ziguinchor Director, Sedhiou
Mr. Alfred Bainjdoss Sagna	President of the Parish Committee, Sedhiou
M. Paul Kandetty	Vice president, Parish Committee, Sedhiou
Mme Christiane Coly	Parish committee member, Sedhiou
Mr. Roger Diatta	Warehouse guard, Sedhiou
Mr. Souba Mane and Mr. Camara sadio	Contact farmers, Federation ADC Ninamba, Kolda
Mr. Balamouso Sadio Soto Cisse	Stock manager and cleaning machine operator, 7A collection center, Kolda
Mr. Ndiobo Mballo	Executive Secretary of 7A, Kolda
DAP project team	7A, Kolda
Mama Souane	President, ASSOLUCER
DAP project team	ASSOLUCER, Kolda
<u>Ziguinchor Region, Senegal</u>	
Mr. Fernando Kao	Sesame production and promotion, CRS/Ziguinchor
Mr. Mamadou Sane	AAJAC President, Ziguinchor
Mr. Djbril Balde	AAJAC Program Manager, Ziguinchor
Mrs. Constance Coly	President, FDGPF and FENPROSE, Bignona
Mrs. Sawdiatou Sauko	Secretary-Accountant, FDGPF, Bignona

<u>Lower River Division, The Gambia</u>	
Mr. Omar Jibba	Individual Sesame grower, LRD
Chief Seffo Demba Sanyag	Land Advocacy Committee Member, LRD
Members of SGA	SGA-Kwenella Kambeng
Members of SGA	SGA-Kambeng Madina, LRD
NAWFA NEC member and NAWFA extension agent	LRD
<u>Central River Division, The Gambia</u>	
Mr. Gibbi Sy	Regional Coordinator for Institutions, GAFNA, based in Basse
Mrs. Claire Jawo	President, St. Vincent DePaul Society, Fulabantang
Mr. Francis Jawo	Secretary, St. Vincent DePaul Society, Fulabantang
Mr. Edward Jatta	Vice President, St. Vincent DePaul Society, Fulabantang
Mr. Francis Baldeh	Public Relations Officer, St. Vincent de Paul Society, Fulabantang
Mrs. Angel Gibba	Treasurer, St. Vincent de Paul Society, Fulabantang
Mrs. Mammi Camara	Principal Nursing Officer, Bansang Hospital, Bansang
Mr. Lamine B. Jaju	Pediatric Nurse, Bansang Hospital, Bansang
Mr. Ensa Camara	Head of the Pediatric Unit, Bansang Hospital, Bansang
2 beneficiaries (husband and wife)	Bansang
8 SGA presidents	CRD-S
SGA Nafaa Bunda members	CRD-S
Mrs. Aminata	Record Clerk, CMC, Banni, CRD-N
2 female beneficiaries and 4 CMC members a male counselor	Banni CMC, Banni, CRD-N
Mrs. Jallon Fofano	Peer Counselor, Kayai, CRD-N
Mr. Lamine Jobati	Peer Counselor, Kayai, CRD-N
Mr. Kajali Jobati	Peer Counselor, Kayai, CRD-N
Mr. Jon Kunda	Record Clerk, Kayai, CRD-N
4 CMC members and President	Kayi, CRD-N
Mrs. Mansata Jabi	President CMC Kuntaur
Mrs. Nany Fofana	VP CMC, Kuntaur
Mr. Ebrima Tatouri	Record Keeper, CMC Kuntaur
Mr. Lamine Kinte	GAFNA Field Coordinator, CRD North
El Hadji Bantey Jaideh	Division Agriculture Coordinator, Kuntaur
Mr. Moustapha Bah	Soil and water Conservation, Dept. of Agriculture,

	Kuntaur
Mrs. Sira Camara	CMC, Kaur
Mr. Baboucar Saine	Safety Net Manager, Health Center Kaur
<u>Upper River Division, The Gambia</u>	
Buba Jadama	Officer in Charge of Safety Net, Basse Health Center, Basse
Lamin Danjo	Pharmacist, Basse Health Center, Basse
Ebrima Njai	President, RSOD, Basse
Francis Manneh	Head of Education, RSOD, Basse
Amadou Bah	Safety Net and Field Activities, RSOD, Basse
2 men and three women	RSOD members and safety net Beneficiaries, Basse
2 women beneficiaries	Basse Health Center
Mr. Ebou Sanyang	NAWFA extension agent, Basse
Eladj Ami Silla Sabi	Individual sesame grower, Basse
<u>Banjul</u>	
Mr. Benjamin Safari	Regional Marketing Manager, CRS/The Gambia
Mr. Alfasainey Darbo	Monitoring and Evaluation Assistant
Mr. Omar Gaye	Commodity Management, CRS The Gambia,
Mr. Bakary Jallow	Warehouse Officer
Mr. Ebrima Jarjou	Head of Programming, CRS/The Gambia
Mrs. N'Della N'Jie	Health Program Manager
Mr. Karafa Manneh	M&E Regional Manager, CRS/The Gambia
Mrs. Ellen Sambou-Manneh	Program Assistant Safety Net, CRS/The Gambia
Mr. Alfasainey Darbo	Monitoring and Evaluation Assistant, CRS/The Gambia
Mr. Albert Cox	Director, GAFNA, Bakau
Mr. Boubacar Cham	Program manager, GAFNA
Ms. Jo Ann Y Sallah	CRS Consultant, Banjul
Sister Susan	Sisters of Charity, Banjul
President and members	Santa Yalla Society, Banjul
Dr. Mopoi Nuwanyakpa	CRS Consultant, Banjul
Mr. Moham Ram	Sesame buyer, Banjul

Annex 6: Proposed Modifications to IPTT

SENEGAMBIA DAP IPTT RECOMMENDED INDICATOR MODIFICATIONS

Indicator	Recommended Modification	Comments/Justification
Goal: Improve the level of food security of targeted rural households and vulnerable groups in Senegal and The Gambia by 2006		
	Average number of months of adequate food provisions during previous 12 months	SO1 and SO2 both contribute to improved food security. Several factors may influence the outcome of # of months of adequate food provision (i.e. environmental, market, political, etc.). The DAP may mitigate some effects, but most factors are outside of the control of the DAP.
SO1: Improved Economic access to food for farm hhs engaged in sesame production in SeneGambia by 2006		
1. Average number of months of adequate food provisions during previous 12 months	Put indicator at the goal level	Indicator is more appropriate for goal level. An indicator such as increased income from sesame sales may be more appropriate. However, assumption that increased income would be spent on food may not be a correct.
Sub-Strategic Objective 1.1. Improved market stability and efficiency for 25,000 farm households.		Note change in wording: focus is on market; not on collection centers
Impact Indicators :		
2. Ratio of sesame farm-gate price to export price	N/C	Proposal to change export prices from Lagos FOB to Japanese port, since most SeneGambian sesame is destined for Japan.
3. # of tons of sesame marketed through collection centers	Annual increase in # MT collected and purchased through DAP partners (buying points and/or collection centers)	Strategy has changed. To capture all sales, both buying points and collection centers need to be monitored.
4. % of collection centers receiving an acceptable rating or higher by independent audit	Remove	Focus of strategy no longer collection centers.
5. % of foreign material, by weight, from a random sample of bags	Remove	Not an impact indicator
Annual Monitoring Indicators:		
6.# of collection centers constructed or renovated, staffed and operational	N/C	Note that it is recommended that no additional collection centers be constructed so LOA target will change
7. # of sesame buyers pre-qualified to purchase from CCs	# of buyers who have signed contract with DAP partners	# of buyers more important than that they are pre-qualified

Indicator	Recommended Modification	Comments/Justification
8. # of field days attended to provide market information	Remove	Other sources of information more important than field days. Use of the term "field day" for a meeting to inform farmers of market prices is misleading.
9. # of market information "products" developed and disseminated through public information campaign	N/C	
10. % of sesame growers who know market prices before arriving at collection centers	N/C	
11. Average score on sesame growers perception questionnaire on marketing info	N/C	
12. # of people trained as collection centre operators	# of people trained to serve as collection center staff	Note that since the strategy has changed, the LOA targets will need to be modified accordingly
13. # of people certified as collection center operators	# of people passing proficiency tests to serve as collection center staff	Emphasis is on training not on certification
14.# of people trained in record keeping and inventory control	# of people trained in record keeping and inventory control at buying points and collection centers	Change to accommodate the shift in strategy to include buying points
15. # of people that passed proficiency test for record keeping and inventory control	N/C	This indicator could be removed but it is important to assess the competency and comprehension after training.
16.# of sesame collection centers with proper inventory control	# of collection centers and buying points with proper inventory control	Change to accommodate the shift in strategy to include buying points
17. % of sesame growers who can correctly identify location of collection centres	Remove	Strategy has changed and knowledge of collection center location no longer important
18. % of sesame growers who can correctly identify services offered by collection centres	Remove	Ditto
Sub-Strategic Objective 1.2. Democratic and efficiently managed Farmer Associations in Senegal and Sesame Growers Associations in The Gambia represent the concerns of, and provide policy advocacy services to members.		
Impact Indicators:		
19. Member perception score	N/C	
20. Management matrix scores	N/C	
21. # of members completing organizational development and management courses	N/C	

Indicator	Recommended Modification	Comments/Justification
22. # of members passing organizational development and management courses	Remove	Attendance is adequate
23. # of farmer associations / SGAs having by-laws .	N/C	
24. # of farmers associations/SGAs with annual working plan	N/C	Note that it was proposed that this be removed because of the low rates of literacy among SGA members; that it may be more appropriate at the federation or union level. However, if the objective is to reinforce the capacity of grass root organizations, this would indicate progression toward improved capacity
25. # of SGA members trained in literacy.	# SGA/Association members trained in literacy	Encourage CRS/Senegal to use private funds to implement literacy program
26. # of SGA members who pass final literacy test at 75% or higher	N/C	
27. # of MOUs between a farmers' association/SGA and gov't agencies, research institutions, or development agencies.	# of farmers Associations/SGAs collaborating with and receiving services from gov't agencies, research institutions, or development agencies	Associations should have access to a range of services, many of which may not require an MOU
Sub-Strategic Objective 1.3. Research results reduce the costs of, and constraints to marketing; improve the post harvest handling practices; and increase productivity of sesame farmers.		
Impact Indicators:		
28. % of sesame growers using project recommended seed varieties.	N/C or Remove	Note: recommended variety is part of recommended production practices; keeping it or not depends on objective.
29. Amount (MT) of project recommended seed sold to growers	Amount (MT) of project recommended seed sold to growers through DAP seed multipliers	Focus on seed produced by seed multipliers
30. % of sesame growers adopting two or more recommended production practices	% of sesame growers who apply recommended production techniques	Recommended production practices often extended as a package
Annual Monitoring Indicators:		
31. # of farmers who participate in on-farm research.	N/C	
32. # of farmers who receive training in seed multiplication and sale	N/C	
33. Transaction costs study completed and reviewed	Remove	This is a discrete activity and does not need a monitoring indicator.

Indicator	Recommended Modification	Comments/Justification
34. Socioeconomic and gender study completed	Remove	This is a discrete activity and does not need a monitoring indicator.
35. Post harvest handling study completed and reviewed	Remove	This is a discrete activity and does not need a monitoring indicator.
36. Production cost study completed and reviewed	Remove	This is a discrete activity and does not need a monitoring indicator.
37. # of farmer workshops conducted	N/C	
38. Recommended production practices package completed.	Remove	This is a discrete activity and does not need a monitoring indicator.
39. Recommended production practices extension component implemented	Remove	The focus of this indicator is on extension and therefore is covered by indicator 30.
SO2. Increased availability of food for vulnerable households in Senegal and The Gambia		
Sub-Strategic Objective 2.1. 3959 MT of food distributed to vulnerable individuals in targeted institutions and communities.		
Impact Indicators:		
40. % of food distributed to vulnerable individuals in institutions	Remove	Original indicator is not an impact indicator. In addition, since SSO 2.1 is an activity and not a SSO, there should not be a need for an impact indicator
41. % of food distributed to vulnerable individuals in communities	Remove	Original indicator is not an impact indicator. In addition, since SSO 2.1 is an activity and not a SSO, there should not be a need for an impact indicator
Annual Monitoring Indicators:		
42. Quantity of food distributed, in MT, to vulnerable individuals at institutions	N/C	
43. Quantity of food distributed, in MT, to vulnerable individuals in communities	N/C	
44. # of partners and communities with established protocol for group selection	Remove	Having a signed agreement is a requirement of participating in the program and therefore should not need to be monitored
Sub-Strategic Objective 2.2. 44 institutions and communities are able to analyse causes of food insecurity and provide support to vulnerable groups.		
45. # of institutions that have completed a food security analysis	Remove	For whom would the institution carry out a food security analysis? Not necessary
46. # of communities that have completed a food security analysis	# of communities that have completed a food security action plan	Focus should be on action plan and its implementation rather than on the analysis

Indicator	Recommended Modification	Comments/Justification
47. % of institutions that have written proposals for other donors	Remove	More important to have procured funding than to have written the proposal to a donor. Mobilizing local resources, lobbying for more govt support would not necessarily require a proposal
48. % of communities that have written proposals for other donors	Remove	Many community leaders are illiterate. May be unable to write proposals but may be able to mobilize community resources.
49. % of adult community members aware of three main causes of food insecurity	Remove	Project does not address utilization and most adults recognize availability and access
50. % of identified vulnerable individuals that received peer counselling	Remove	Should be used as an indicator in the PC project
51. # of communities that have formulated recommendations for conflict resolution and transformation activities.	N/C	
Annual Monitoring Indicators:		
52. # of institutions completing food security training	N/C	
53. # of communities completing food security training	N/C	
54. # of communities completing training in conflict resolution and transformation	N/C	
55. # of peer counsellors trained and passing practical exam at 75% or higher	Remove	Put in PC project
56. # of institutions completing proposal development resource acquisition and diversification training	N/C	
57. # communities completing proposal development training	N/C	Training for proposal writing may not be as useful to communities as it would be to the partners which give them technical assistance
Sub-Strategic Objective 2.3. Institutions and Community organizations can manage food and safety net interventions for vulnerable groups.		
Impact Indicators:		
58. % of institutions that have successfully managed and distributed food	Remove and replace with Indicator 64	This should be included in the audit rating

Indicator	Recommended Modification	Comments/Justification
59. % of communities that have successfully managed and distributed	Remove and replace with Indicator 65	This should be included in the audit rating
Annual Monitoring Indicators:		
60. # of institutions with established protocol for the selection and distribution to vulnerable groups	N/C	
61. # of institutions completing financial and commodity management training	N/C	
62. # of communities with established criteria for selection and a system for distribution to vulnerable groups	N/C	
63. # of communities completing financial and commodity management training	N/C	
64. % of institutions receiving satisfactory audit rating	Move to become an impact indicator	
65. % of communities receiving satisfactory audit rating	Move to become and impact indicator	